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Introduction 
Three recent crises — the dot-com bubble and the subprime and European sovereign 
debt crises — have revealed the complex dynamics underpinning the global financial 
system and how rapidly risk is propagated across markets. Investors, regulators and 
researchers are thus keen to develop accurate measures of risk transmission between 
assets and markets. From the investors’ perspective of guaranteeing efficient 
portfolio diversification, the risk of contagion is essential for their ongoing interest in 
changes in market linkages. From the regulators’ point of view, risk spillover is 
important to focalize attention on the maintenance and development of new 
financial regulatory and institutional rules such as circuit breakers, transaction taxes 
and short-sale rules. In fact, recognizing important shortcomings in financial 
supervision, the European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB) created 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) at the end of 2010 with the goal of 
monitoring, at the macro-prudential level, the European financial system and 
preventing and mitigating any propagation risk within the financial system.  
The literature contains many definitions of systemic risk. De Bandt and 
Hartmann (2000) defined it “as the risk of experiencing systemic events in the 
strong sense” where “strong sense” signifies the spread of news about an institution 
that has an adverse impact on one or more healthy institutions in a sequential 
manner. Furfine (2003) distinguished between two kinds of systemic risk: “The first 
type is the risk that some financial shock causes a set of markets or institutions to 
simultaneously fail to function efficiently. The second type of systemic is the risk 
that failure of one or a small number of institutions will be transmitted to others 
due to explicit financial linkages across institutions”. On the basis of the theoretical 
model proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Acharya (2009) defined systemic 
risk “as the joint failure risk arising from correlation of returns on the asset-side of 
Introduction 
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bank balance-sheets”. Billio et al. (2010) explained that “systemic risk can be 
realized as a series of correlated defaults among financial institutions, occurring over 
a short time span and triggering a withdrawal of liquidity and widespread loss of 
confidence in the financial system as a whole”. The last two definitions introduce the 
notion that common investment between banks generates correlation and “herding 
effects”, thereby generating systemic risk. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
ECB focus their attention particularly on the consequences of systemic risk for the 
real economy. Thus the IMF, BIS, FSB (2009) stated systemic risk to be “the 
disruption to the flow of financial services that (1) is caused by an impairment of all 
or parts of the financial system; and (2) has the potential to have serious negative 
consequence for the real economy”. The ECB (2009) conceptualized systemic risk as 
a “risk that financial instability becomes so widespread that it impairs the 
functioning of the financial system to the point where economic growth and welfare 
suffer materially”. The above brief list of definitions points to the intricacy of the 
topic and the challenge faced by investors, regulators and researchers in attempting 
to measure the complexity and dynamics of systemic risk. 
Using the CoVaR systemic risk measure (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; 
Girardi and Ergün, 2013), we quantified systemic risk as the impact of the risky 
situation of a particular financial institution, market or system on the value-at-risk 
(VaR) of other financial institutions, markets or systems. Our research objectives — 
potentially of interest to investors, regulators and researchers in equal measure — 
were as follows: 
1. To quantify systemic risk for Spanish financial institution and to account for 
the quantitative effect on the conditional VaR value with a view to assessing 
how the fragile position of one particular financial institution could impair the 
performance of other financial institutions and to determine how much 
regulatory capital a financial institution would need in order to cover its 
exposure to this kind of risk. 
2. To examine systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets and assess how 
this risk changed with the onset of the recent European sovereign debt crisis 
with a view to determining how the deteriorated financial position of a 
particular sovereign debt market can impair the performance of other sovereign 
debt markets. 
Introduction 
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3. To measure the systemic impact of domestic sovereign debt distress on domestic 
financial systems in Europe and of a potentially distressed Greek debt market 
on the financial systems of other countries during the recent financial and debt 
crises with a view to understanding the impact of domestic sovereign distress on 
a domestic financial system and the impact of Greek sovereign debt distress on 
other financial systems. 
The dissertation is laid out as follows: 
In Chapter 1 we provide a survey of the quantitative measure of systemic risk 
in the economics and finance literature. 
In Chapter 2 we examine, using conditional VaR (CoVaR), the systemic risk 
generated by major Spanish financial institutions in the recent global financial crisis 
and the European sovereign debt crisis as a systemic risk measure. CoVaR was 
quantified using quantile regression, multivariate generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) and copula approaches. We also describe 
a novel copula-based approach to computing the CoVaR value, given that copula 
are flexible modellers of joint distribution and are particularly useful for 
characterizing the tail behaviour that provides such crucial information for the 
CoVaR. We found significant increases in systemic risk around the time of the 
recent global financial crisis and, to a lesser extent, around the time of the European 
debt crisis. Our evidence also shows that the quantile regression approach was 
unable to reflect the dynamics of, and sudden changes in, systemic risk. These 
results have implications for capital regulation in financial institutions and on how 
systemic risk should be measured.  
In chapter 3 we study systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets before 
and after the onset of the Greek debt crisis, taking, as a systemic risk measure, the 
CoVaR as characterized and computed using copulas. We found sovereign debt 
markets to be coupled before the debt crisis and systemic risk to be similar for all 
countries. With the onset of the Greek crisis, debt markets decoupled and the 
systemic risk of the countries in crisis (excepting Spain) decreased whereas that of 
the non-crisis countries increased slightly. The systemic risk of the Greek debt 
market increased for other countries in crisis, especially for Portugal (where systemic 
risk tripled after the onset of the crisis) and decreased for non-crisis countries.  
In Chapter 4 we investigated — using the CoVaR measure as characterized 
and computed using copulas and vine copulas — systemic sovereign debt distress in 
European domestic financial systems and the systemic risk of a potentially distressed 
Introduction 
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Greek debt market for other European financial systems countries before and after 
the onset of the recent financial and debt crises. We found that, before the debt 
crisis, sovereign debt had a positive systemic risk on European domestic financial 
systems. However, with the onset of the Greek crisis, the systemic impact of 
sovereign debt increased for countries in crisis (Greece, Italy and Portugal) whereas 
it remained stable or reduced for non-crisis countries. Regarding the systemic impact 
of sovereign Greek debt distress, our evidence indicates that negative impacts were 
limited to a small set of countries (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal).  
The dissertation results are described in three research articles with following 
titles: 
1. A CoVaR approach to systemic risk in the Spanish financial system 
2. A CoVaR-copula approach to systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets 
3. A vine copula-CoVaR approach to systemic sovereign debt risk for the financial 
sector. 
The realization of this results was only feasible by accessing to database as 
Bloomberg or Datastream. Furthermore, with the use of computer programs as: 
Matlab, R-Project, Eviews and OxMetrics. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Literature review 
Over the last years, researchers have developed a number of systemic risk measures 
referring to different systemic risk propagation channels. Three main measures can 
be identified: (1) measures of systemic risk that capture the contagion and exposure 
effect between institutions; (2) measures of systemic risk that quantify the trigger 
effect between the financial sector and the real economy; and (3) measures of 
systemic risk between the financial and public sectors and vice versa. 
The first category refers to the risk of a failure of one financial institution 
having a contagion or domino effect on other institutions through the transactions 
and interconnections linking these institutions. Many researchers have focused their 
attention on this kind of risk propagation. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) created a 
banking stability index that assesses interbank dependence for tail events. Acharya 
et al. (2010) used systemic and marginal expected shortfall (ES) measures to 
quantify downside risk and the contribution of individual financial institutions to 
risk. Allen et al. (2010) proposed a measure of aggregate systemic risk — called 
CATFIN — to predict declines in aggregate bank lending activity six months in 
advance. Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009, 2010, 2012) proposed their distress insurance 
premium (DIP) measure. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed using 
conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) to capture possible risk spillovers between 
financial institutions. Likewise, Brownless and Engle (2012) developed a systemic 
risk measure, called SRISK, to represent the amount of capital needed to restore 
minimum capital requirements. Billio et al. (2012) proposed five measures of 
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systemic risk to capture contagion and exposure effects in the relationship between 
financial institutions. Girardi and Ergün (2013) proposed a new approach to 
quantifying CoVaR using the joint density for the financial system and financial 
institution returns. Finally, Halaj et al. (2013) suggested a simple network analysis 
measure, called the systemic probability index (SPI). 
Regarding measures of the trigger effect, several authors have developed a 
systemic risk measure based on interdependence between the financial sector and the 
real economy. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) showed that systemic risk in financial 
markets increases in crisis periods and has adverse effects that extend to the real 
economy. Giesecke and Kim (2011) developed the default intensity model (DIM) to 
capture spillover effects through the complex network of relationships with the real 
economy. De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2010) proposed a GDP-at-risk model to quantify 
the impact between the macro-economy, the financial markets and intermediaries. 
Finally, regarding systemic risk generated between the financial and public 
sectors, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b, 2010) documented sovereign distress spread to 
the financial system when banks held a substantial amount of government debt in 
their portfolio. Alter and Schuler (2012) examined the relationship between 
sovereign default risk and domestic banks. Mink and De Haan (2013) analysed the 
impact of highly volatile Greek bonds on European bank stock prices in 2010 and De 
Bruyckere et al. (2013) studied contagion between banking and sovereign default 
risk in Europe through asset, collateral and rating channels. Bhanot et al. (2014) 
investigated the impact of changes in Greek sovereign yield spreads on stock returns 
in the financial sector. Battistini et al. (2014) demonstrated that the sovereign debt 
portfolios of European banks revealed growing home bias during the recent crisis, 
with domestic sovereign debt holdings growing in line with sovereign solvency risk. 
Finally, alternative risk measures have been proposed, other than those 
included in the three categories mentioned above. Engle and Manganelli (2004) 
developed their conditional autoregressive value at risk (CAViaR) model that uses 
quantile regression to capture the tail behaviour of returns. De Jonghe (2010) used 
extreme value theory to measure banks’ systemic risk exposure. Zhou (2010) used 
multivariate extreme value theory to quantify systemic risk, analysing the 
relationship between institution size and systemic importance. Finally, Krizman et 
al. (2011) developed a measure of systemic risk called the absorption ratio that relies 
on principal component analysis (PCA). 
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1.1. Systemic risk measures 
Below we describe the methodologies used to quantify systemic risk measures. In the 
selection of the systemic risk measures, we would trace briefly all aspects that the 
literature aims to address. 
1.1.1. Mahalanobis distance 
Kritzman and Li (2010) defined “financial turbulence” as the statistical unusualness 
of a set of returns given historical behaviour patterns, including extreme price 
movements, decoupling of correlated assets and convergence of uncorrelated assets. 
To quantify turbulence they used the Mahalonabis distance (Mahalanobis, 1927). 
Given the returns for a particular period of n assets, the turbulence index was 
formally defined as: 
    1
'
t t td y y

    , (1.1) 
where: 
td = turbulence at time t 
ty = vector of asset returns at time t (n 1) 
= sample average vector of historical returns (n 1) 
= sample covariance matrix of historical returns (n n) 
When applying the turbulence index to two assets, we consider the difference 
between the return for the first asset at time t and the mean return and the 
difference between the return for the second asset at time t and the mean return and 
calculate the covariance between the returns for these two assets. We then take the 
absolute value of the final calculation so that the turbulence index is always 
positive. The information provided by the financial turbulence index is helpful 
because assets that may be negatively correlated during normal economic conditions 
may become positively correlated during times of high turbulence. This systemic risk 
measure, which can be used for stress tests of asset portfolios, provides a realistic 
estimate of possible losses arising from a systemic event. 
1.1.2. Multivariate density estimators 
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) developed a systemic risk measure based on the 
banking system’s multivariate density (BSMD). Considering the banking system as 
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a portfolio of banks, with each bank as part of the portfolio, probabilities of distress  
can be obtained by estimating the BSMD using a multivariate density methodology 
(Segoviano, 2006). It is also possible to estimate banking stability measures from the 
BSMD. Segoviano and Goodhart (2012) used this methodology to examine and 
quantify relative changes in stability over time in the following cases: (1) general 
distress in the banking system; (2) distress between specific banks; and (3) distress 
in the system associated with a specific bank. Given the BSMD, the authors 
proposed a set of measures of systemic risk, namely, joint probability of default, the 
banking stability index and the distress dependence matrix. 
1.1.3. Conditional value at risk  
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed the CoVaR measure for systemic risk, 
which captures possible risk spillovers between financial institutions by providing 
information on the VaR of the financial system conditional on the fact that a 
financial institution is in distress. These authors also calculated the systemic risk 
contribution of an institution as the ∆CoVaR, which measures the difference 
between the CoVaR under financial distress and the CoVaR in the benchmark state. 
Formally, the CoVaR can be defined as the q-quantile of a conditional distribution: 
  j|i iq qPr X CoVaR |X =VaR =q,j i  (1.2) 
with the systemic risk contribution defined as: 
 j|i j|i j|iq q 50%CoVaR CoVaR CoVaR   . (1.3) 
The authors proposed using quantile regression to compute the CoVaR:  
 i i i i it t t-M
system| system| system|
1CoVaR VaR      , (1.4) 
where t-M 1  denotes a set of explanatory variables. 
1.1.4. Co-risk 
An IMF Global Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2009a) proposed the co-risk 
methodology to estimate co-movements between the credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads for several financial institutions. This methodology assesses direct and 
indirect financial linkages that may arise from exposure to common risks (similar 
business models, common accounting practices, etc). Like the CoVaR, co-risk 
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employs quantile regression to estimate co-movement between risk factors for 
financial institutions in distress. The co-risk measure is formally defined as: 
 
k
i , i i , i j
i
CDS R CDS
  
      , (1.5) 
where iCDS is the credit default swap spread of the institution i, jCDS  is the credit 
default swap spread of the institution j, iR denotes common aggregated risk factors, 
  denotes the quantile (usually the 95th) corresponding to a distress period and 
where , i  are the parameter estimates that quantify the input of firms as the credit 
risk of firm i at quantile  . Hence, the conditional co-risk measure is given by:  
 
k
95 95,i i 95, j j
i
i, j
i
R CDS (95)
CoRisk 100 1
CDS (95)
 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 

, (1.6) 
where iCDS (95)  and jCDS (95)  are the CDS spreads of institution i and j 
corresponding to the 95th percentile and where 95 , 95, i  and 95, j  are the quantile 
regression parameters at the 95th level. 
1.1.5. Systemic and marginal expected shortfalls 
Acharya et al. (2010) showed how a financial institution’s contribution to systemic 
risk could be measured and priced as the systemic expected shortfall (SES). The 
SES represents a propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is 
undercapitalized. The SES can be quantified using three measures: (1) the outcome 
of stress tests performed by regulatory bodies; (2) the decline in equity valuations of 
large financial firms during a crisis; and (3) the widening of the credit default swap 
spread of large financial institutions. The same authors also developed leading 
indicators denominated the marginal expected shortfall (MES) and leverage (LVG) 
defined as the ratio of the quasi-market value of assets market to the value of 
equity. They define the MES of a financial institution as its short-run expected 
equity loss conditional on the market taking a loss greater than its VaR at  %. 
Formally it is expressed as: 
   i, t i, t 1 m,t 1 ,t t 1MES r | r q r C ,=E       (1.7) 
or 
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  i, t i, t 1 m,t 1MES r | r C ,=E     (1.8) 
where i, tr is the stock return of the institution, m,tr is the market return and C is a 
constant corresponding to what is considered to be “tail risk” in the market. As all 
the considered institutions belong in the market, it is straightforward to see that the 
MES of one institution is simply the derivate of the market ES with respect to the 
institution’s market share (or capitalization), hence the term “marginal”. LVG is 
defined as: 
 
i
quasi-market value of assets
LVG .
market value of equity
  (1.9) 
Moreover, applying cross-section regression analyses of firms’ SES on MES and 
LVG: 
 i i i iSES MES LVG        . (1.10) 
After estimating the three parameters,  ,   and  , for specific SES metrics, the 
systemic risk of financial institution at a future time t can be calculated as: 
 Systemic Risk of Firm   t ti ii MES LVG
 
   
 
 
    
. (1.11) 
1.1.6. The default intensity model  
Giesecke and Kim (2011) developed the default intensity model (DIM) as a dynamic 
measure of the systemic risk of the financial sector as a whole. Recognizing that 
systemic distress involves all economic agents, they proposed considering the 
systemic risk of the financial sector as the conditional probability of the failure of 
most financial institutions. The model estimated in terms of hazard rate, or 
intensity, is expressed as: 
    
t
t s* * *
t t s
0
exp X e dJ ,
 
      (1.12) 
where *tX  is a time-varying vector of the several explanatory variables, 
*  is a 
vector of parameters and  
*
t
t 1 N
J v ...v ,   
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where  *n nv max 0, log D    . Intensity is the sum of two terms with a bearing 
on economy-wide default: baseline hazard and spillover hazard. The model’s 
parameters are obtained by maximizing log-likelihood for the default rate as follows:  
     
t
* * *
s s s
0
max log dN ds .


      (1.13) 
The conditional distribution at time t of economy-wide defaults over the period is 
estimated via Monte Carlo simulation. Finally, VaR at level   is used to quantify 
the systemic risk. DIM is thus able to capture default spillover within and between 
sectors and also can provide accurate out-of-sample forecasts of systemic risk. 
1.1.7. Distress insurance premium 
As an ex-ante systemic risk measure, Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2010) proposed distress 
insurance as a theoretical insurance premium against systemic financial distress. 
Their methodology is based on each institution’s marginal contribution to systemic 
risk. First, the probability of default is calculated as: 
 
a
a b
t i, t
i, t
t i, t t i, t
s
PoD ,
LGD s


 (1.14) 
where ra e
t T
t t
d
    , 
rb e
t T
t t
d ,
     LGD is the loss given default, r  is the 
risk-free rate and i, ts  is the CDS spread of bank i at time t. Next the correlation 
between banks’ assets is estimated and then a hypothetical debt portfolio is created 
that consists of the liabilities of all the sampled banks weighted by the Size of the 
liability in each institution. The cost of the distress insurance premium is the 
expectation of portfolio credit losses equalling or exceeding a predetermined 
threshold, simulated using the Monte Carlo method in two steps: (1) the probability 
distribution of joint default is calculated; and (2) the LGD distribution is 
incorporated so as to derive the probability distribution of portfolio losses. 
1.1.8. Broader hedge fund-based systemic risk measures 
The broad impact of hedge funds on systemic risk was analysed by Chan, 
Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2006a, 2006b), who, to examine the unique risk/return 
profiles of hedge funds, suggested three risk measures. In the first measure, an 
autocorrelation-based measure is used to proxy hedge fund illiquidity exposure, with 
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the authors adapting a cross-sectional weighted average of rolling first-order 
autocorrelations for hedge funds. The second measure quantifies the probability of 
hedge fund liquidation and the third measure is a regime-switching model that 
quantifies aggregate distress in the hedge fund sector. 
1.1.9. Granger causality tests 
Billio et al. (2010) developed two measures of connectedness for capturing changes 
in correlation and causality among financial institutions, based on an analysis of 
contagion in four financial sectors, namely, hedge funds, banks, brokers and 
insurance companies. The first measure, which determines increases in correlation 
between asset returns, is based on PCA, which decomposes the asset return of a 
sample of financial institution into orthogonal factors of decreasing explanatory 
power (see Muirhead, 1982 for an explanation of PCA). The second measure uses 
pairwise linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests to determine the network of 
relations between financial institutions. This test gives a statistical notion of 
causality based on the relative forecasting power of series of pairs. From this model, 
Billio et al. (2010) made the following network-based measures of connectedness: 
degree of Granger causality (DGC), number of connections, sector-conditional 
connections, closeness and eigenvector centrality. Resolved measures can identify 
and quantify financial crisis periods and act as early-warning indicators of systemic 
risk. 
1.1.10. Simulating a credit scenario 
Chau-Lau, Espinosa and Sole (2009) evaluated a systemic banking network and 
interbank linkage. Their analysis considered a network of N institutions and stylized 
balance sheets for each financial institution i, as follow: 
 ,ji i i i i ij
j j
x a k b d x       (1.15) 
where jix  represents bank i loans to bank j, ia  is bank i’s other assets, ik  is bank i’s 
capital, ib  is long- and short-term borrowing that is not interbank lending, ijx  
represents bank i borrowing from bank j and id  is a deposit in bank i. This 
approach analyses contagion due to a credit shock between institutions and tracks, 
via simulation, the domino effects of each individual failure. 
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1.1.11. GDP stress test 
Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) developed a macroeconomic stress test — useful for 
assessing the potential impact of adverse shocks — using an absorption ratio model 
of actual and expected real GDP growth ( ty ) as good summary indicators of 
macroeconomic status. Their model is defined as: 
 1 1 2 2t t t ty y y       . (1.16) 
As a stress scenario, the authors used the worst negative forecast error of the above 
absorption ratio model, regardless of whether this coincided with a banking crisis or 
not.
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Chapter 2 
2. Measuring systemic risk in the Spanish 
financial system: A CoVaR approach 
2.1. Introduction 
Financial crises draw the attention of investors and regulators to the fragility of the 
financial system and the potential systemic risk effects of a bank default. 
Quantifying systemic risk is therefore crucial to an assessment of how the fragile 
position of a financial institution could impair the performance of other financial 
institutions. It is also crucial to determine how much regulatory capital a financial 
institution needs to hoard in order to cover its exposure to this kind of risk. Below 
we quantify systemic risk for Spanish financial institutions and examine how this 
risk has changed in the recent global financial crisis and the European sovereign 
debt crisis. 
The most widely used risk measure is value-at-risk (VaR), which quantifies a 
financial institution’s maximum loss for a given confidence level and time horizon. 
This measure, however, is centred on the individual risk of an institution and fails to 
consider the potential spillover effects that default may have on other institutions. 
The literature has proposed a large number of systemic risk measures (see Bisias et 
al., 2012 and Bernal et al., 2013 for a review). Huang, Zhou and Zho (2009) 
developed a systemic risk indicator given by the price of credit default swaps (CDS) 
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against systemic financial distress. Using CDS data, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) 
constructed a banking stability index with which to assess interbank dependence for 
tail events. Moreno and Peña (2012) provided evidence regarding the suitability of 
using CDS data to estimate systemic risk. Acharya et al. (2010) introduced systemic 
expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as indicators to quantify downside 
risk and the contributions of financial institutions to risk. Brownless and Engle 
(2012) developed a systemic risk measure called SRISK, representing the amount of 
capital needed to restore a minimal capital requirement. Allen et al. (2010) proposed 
a measure of aggregate systemic risk called CATFIN that can predict declines in 
aggregate bank lending activity six months in advance. Billio et al. (2012) proposed 
five measures of systemic risk that capture contagion and exposure effects in 
relationships between financial institutions. Engle and Manganelli (2004) developed 
a conditional autoregressive value at risk (CAViaR) model that uses quantile 
regression to capture the tail behaviour of returns. 
Recently, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed conditional VaR 
(CoVaR) as a new measure of systemic risk. CoVaR captures possible risk spillovers 
between financial institutions by providing information on the VaR of the financial 
system conditional on the fact that a financial institution is in distress,1 with the 
systemic risk contribution of an institution measured as the difference between the 
CoVaR under financial distress and the CoVaR in its benchmark state. More 
recently, Girardi and Ergün (2013) generalized the CoVaR measure by assuming 
that the conditioning financial distress event should refer to the return of the 
financial institution being less than or equal to its VaR, rather than merely being 
equal to its VaR, as proposed in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Girardi and 
Ergün (2013) also proposed a new approach to quantifying systemic risk that differs 
from the quantile regression approach proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011); 
it consists of using a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model to characterize joint density between the 
financial system and financial institution returns and to obtain the CoVaR value by 
numerically solving a double integral. 
Below we quantify systemic risk for Spanish financial institutions using the 
CoVaR measure and also account for the quantitative effect on the CoVaR value of 
                                                 
1 López-Espinosa et al. (2012) identified the main determinants of systemic risk for a set of 
large international banks using the CoVaR measure proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011). 
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using quantile regression and MGARCH. We also propose a novel copula-based 
approach to computing the CoVaR value, given that copulas are more flexible in 
modelling joint distributions and are particularly useful for characterizing tail 
behaviour, which provides such crucial information for the CoVaR. Estimating the 
CoVaR through copulas is also computationally less cumbersome than using the 
MGARCH approach. The procedure involves two steps: first, given the confidence 
level of the VaR and the CoVaR, we obtain the cumulative probability of the 
CoVaR from the copula; and second, we invert the marginal distribution function 
for this cumulative probability and so obtain the value of the CoVaR. 
We studied systemic risk for financial institutions listed on the Spanish stock 
exchange using weekly data for the period January 2003 to February 2013. Our 
evidence shows that systemic risk displays dynamic behaviour that is well captured 
by the copula and MGARCH approach to computing the CoVaR; quantile 
regression, however, is unable to capture the dynamics and abrupt changes in the 
value of systemic risk. More specifically, we found significant increases in systemic 
risk during the recent global financial crisis and the European debt crisis that 
quantile regression was unable to capture or underestimated. The fact that the 
copula approach, on average, indicated greater systemic risk than the MGARCH 
approach is consistent with the time-varying evidence of tail dependence reported by 
the copula. 
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2.2 characterizes 
systemic risk, quantile regression, MGARCH and copula approaches to the CoVaR,  
Section 2.3 presents our data, Section 2.4 reports the results and Section 2.5 
concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Methodology 
Several systemic risk measures have been proposed in the literature to quantify the 
impact of a potentially risky financial institution on the financial system as a whole. 
For our research, we chose to use VaR — as arguably the measure most widely 
employed by financial institutions — to quantify systemic risk as the effect of the 
risky situation of a particular financial institution on the VaR of the financial 
system overall, specifically, the CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Girardi 
and Ergün, 2013). 
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2.2.1. CoVaR 
The CoVaR of the financial system is the VaR of the financial system conditional on 
the fact that a given financial institution is in financial distress. Let  be the 
returns of the financial system and let  be the returns of the financial institution 
i. The CoVaR for a confidence level  and time t can be formally defined as the 
-quantile of the conditional distribution of : 
 , (2.1) 
where the financial distress situation of the financial institution i is represented by 
the fact that , where  is the VaR for the financial institution i, 
measuring the maximum loss that financial institution i may experience for a 
confidence level  and a specific time horizon t, that is, the -quantile of the 
return distribution for the financial institution i: . Thus, from a 
statistical point of view, computing the CoVaR value consists of determining the 
quantile of a conditional distribution. 
In addition, the systemic risk contribution of a particular financial institution i 
can be defined as the difference between the CoVaR for a confidence level  and 
the VaR of the financial system conditional on the fact that financial institution i is 
in a benchmark state, measured as the median of the return distribution of 
institution i (the VaR value for ). This measure, called delta CoVaR (
CoVaR), is formally defined as: 
 . (2.2) 
Below we describe different approaches to computing the value of the CoVaR. 
2.2.2. Quantile regression 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed using quantile regression to compute the 
CoVaR in such a way that the VaR of the financial institution i and a set of 
explanatory variables determine the quantile of the conditional distribution of . 
We can thus obtain information on the VaR of the financial system conditional on 
the fact that the returns of financial institution i are in its VaR, , that 
is, . We do this by characterizing the  conditional 
quantile function of  as: 
s
tX
i
tX
1
 stX
  s s|i i it , t t,Pr X CoVaR |X VaR =t
i it t,X VaR
i
t,VaR
1   
i i
t t
X VaR

  ,Pr( )
1
0.5  
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 , (2.3) 
where  is the conditional distribution function of  given the set x of 
explanatory variables,  includes a set of explanatory variables and the quantile 
regression coefficient  determines the dependence relationship between the 
 and the VaR of the financial system. The CoVaR value at each time t is 
computed as the estimated value of the quantile regression given by Eq. (2.3) for the 
corresponding confidence levels of  and . 2  Quantile regression is 
computationally simple but has the disadvantage that it provides information only 
on the CoVaR conditional on the fact that  and not on the fact that 
; this fact has repercussions for the CoVaR values, as was discussed in 
Girardi and Ergün (2013). In addition, using quantile regression requires 
computation of the . 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed computing the in Eq. (2.3) 
by means of quantile regression for the distribution of , where only the 
explanatory variables in  were included in order to allow the value of  
to change over time. With the aim of accounting for the effect of heteroskedasticity 
and fat tails of the return distribution on the value of the , we followed a 
different approach to computing the . Specifically, we modelled the returns 
of each financial institution through an autoregressive (AR) moving average (MA) 
model, specifically, ARMA(p,q), specified as: 
 , (2.4) 
where p and q are non-negative integers and  and  are the AR and MA 
parameters, respectively. The stochastic process , where  — the 
conditional variance of  whose dynamic is reflected in a threshold generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (TGARCH) specification (Zakoian, 
1994; Glosten et al., 1993) — is given by: 
                                                 
2 Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed a specification of the quantile regression function 
that is slightly different from Eq. (2.3). As the explanatory variable they include itX  instead 
of i
t,
VaR

 and use the estimated parameter values to predict the CoVaR by substituting itX  
by i
t,
VaR

. In this way, they assume that estimated parameter values are equal across 
different quantile regression functions. 
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 , (2.5) 
where  is a constant,  is the variance prediction error for the previous period 
(the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
component), represents the volatility shock for the previous period (the 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) component) and  captures 
leverage effects. When  takes values greater than zero the future conditional 
variance will increase proportionally more after a negative shock that after a positive 
shock of the same magnitude.  is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and 
unit variance that follows a Hansen (1994) skewed-t density distribution given by: 
 , (2.6) 
where  and  are the degrees of freedom parameter ( ) and the 
symmetric parameter ( ), respectively. The constants a, b and c are given 
by , and . This distribution 
converges to the standard Gaussian as  and  and to the symmetric 
Student-t distribution as  and  is finite. From Eqs. (2.4)-(2.6) we can 
compute the  at each time t as: 
 , (2.7) 
where  is the quantile of the standardized skewed-t distribution for 
probability . This is the value for the VaR that we considered in Eq. (2.3) in order 
to estimate the CoVaR through quantile regression. 
2.2.3. MGARCH 
In order to obtain the value of the VaR conditional on the event , 
Girardi and Ergün (2013) proposed an alternative procedure based on the joint 
distribution of  and . From Eq. (2.1), the CoVaR can be expressed as: 
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 . (2.8) 
Given that , Eq. (2.8) can be written as: 
 . (2.9) 
Hence, the value of the CoVaR can be obtained by numerically solving the following 
double integral: 
 , (2.10) 
for , where  denotes the joint probability density. Thus, 
computing the CoVaR involves knowledge of the joint distribution of  and . 
According to Girardi and Ergün (2013), the joint distribution of  and  
can be obtained using MGARCH and time-varying dynamic conditional correlation 
(DCC). This MGARCH-DCC model, initially proposed by Engle (2002), considers 
the mean and volatility dynamics of the returns as given by Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5). 
The bivariate stochastic terms are given by , where , 
 has a standardized bivariate Student-t distribution and where  is a 
variance-covariance matrix where the variance of each stochastic component is given 
by Eq. (2.5) and the covariance between the two stochastic components is given by 
, where  is the correlation coefficient between the returns of 
the system and the financial institution i. The correlation matrix is given by 
, where  is a 2x2 diagonal matrix, with the conditional variance 
of each variable located along the main diagonal. Engle (2002) proposed 
characterizing the dynamics of the conditional correlations as follows: 
 ,  
 , (2.11) 
where  is the unconditional covariance matrix for the standardized residuals, 
 is the  diagonal matrix and  and  are parameters. Once we 
estimated the MGARCH-DCC model, we had all the necessary information on the 
elliptical , so, for the given value of the  we could numerically 
solve Eq. (10) to obtain the CoVaR for each time period. 
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2.2.4. Copulas 
We can employ copulas3 to compute the CoVaR. From Eq. (2.9), we can express the 
CoVaR in terms of the joint distribution function of  and , , as: 
 . (2.12) 
Furthermore, according to Sklar’s (1959) theorem, the joint distribution function of 
two continuous random variables can be expressed in terms of a copula function. 
Hence, Eq. (2.12) can be written as: 
 , (2.13) 
where is a copula function and  and  denote the marginal distributions 
of  and , respectively, such that  and . 
Thus, from Eq. (2.13) we can compute the CoVaR value following a two-step 
procedure. First, given that  and given the copula specification, for a 
confidence level  we compute the cumulative probability for the CoVaR, , by 
solving from Eq. (2.13). Next, from , we invert the marginal distribution function 
of  to obtain the CoVaR, hence, . 
Computing the CoVaR using copulas offers three main advantages. First, 
copulas offer more flexibility in separate modelling the marginals and dependence, 
which is especially important when the marginals have different characteristics or 
when dependence is not linear — in particular, when the joint distribution displays 
different forms of tail dependence (crucial for the values of the CoVaR). Second, 
computation of the CoVaR through copulas is less computationally burdensome than 
using the MGARCH approach involving the numerical resolution of a double 
integral. Third, computation of the is not necessary, as we only need 
information on the confidence level for , which is exogenously determined. 
Obtaining the CoVaR through copulas requires specification of the marginals 
and the copula function. The marginals we used are given by Eqs. (2.4)-(2.6); in 
order to characterize different patterns of dependence, different copula specifications, 
                                                 
3 For further analysis of copulas, see Joe (1997) and Nelsen (2006). An overview of copula 
applications to finance can be found in Cherubini et al. (2004). Mainik and Schaanning 
(2012) provided the first representation of the CoVaR in terms of copulas. 
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as reported in Table 2.1, were used. We also captured time-varying dependence by 
assuming that copula parameters change over time. For the Gaussian and the 
Student-t copulas, we adopted an ARMA(1,q)-type process (Patton, 2006) for the 
linear dependence parameter : 
 , (2.14) 
where  is the modified logistic transformation that keeps the 
value of  in (-1,1). For the Student-t copula,  is replaced by . We also 
considered time-varying dependence for the Gumbel copula and for its rotated 
version by assuming that the parameters follow the dynamics given by the following 
equation: 
 . (2.15) 
Overall, the family of eleven copulas considered here can be classified as follows: (1) 
symmetric copulas, with either tail dependence (Student-t and time-varying 
Student-t copulas) or tail independence (Gaussian, time-varying Gaussian and 
Plackett copulas) and (2) asymmetric tail dependence copulas (Gumbel, rotated 
Gumbel, BB7, BB1 and time-varying Gumbel and rotated Gumbel copulas). 
The parameters of the marginal and copula models were estimated using a two-
step procedure called inference functions for margins (Joe and Xu, 1996). We first 
estimated the marginal models by maximum likelihood (ML) and then transformed 
each filtered standardized return series (standardized residual) into its uniform 
marginal via the probability integral transform, thus obtaining  and . Using 
this information, we then estimated the copula function parameters by ML. The 
number of lags in the mean and variance equations for each series was selected 
according to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike information 
criterion (AIC). The performance of the different copula models was evaluated using 
the AIC adjusted for small-sample bias, as in Breymann et al. (2003) and Reboredo 
(2011; 2013). 
t
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Table 2.1: Copula specifications 
Name Copula Parameter Structure dependence 
Gaussian  1 1NC (u,v; ) (u), (v)        No tail dependence. 
Student-t  
 
   1 1STC (u,v; , ) T(t (u), t (v))  
 Symmetric tail dependence. 
Gumbel 
   
   
          
1
GC (u,v; ) exp logu log v  
  1  Upper tail dependence and lower tail 
independence. When   1  two variables are 
independent. 
Rotated Gumbel        RG GC (u,v; ) u v 1 C (1 u,1 v; )    1  Upper tail independence and lower tail 
dependence. 
BB7 
   
1
1
BB7C (u, v; , ) 1 1 1 1 u 1 1 v 1

 
 
 
      
                        
1  , 
0   
Differing degrees of upper and lower tail 
dependence. 
Plackett 
 
                         
 
2
P
1
C (u,v; ) 1 1 u v 1 1 u v 4 1 uv
2 1
 
0  , 
  1  
Symmetric tail independence. 
BB1 
   
1
1
CGC (u, v; , ) u 1 v 1 1



 
 
   
        
     
0   
1   
Asymmetric tail dependence. 
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2.3. Data 
We empirically examined systemic risk for nine listed Spanish institutions using 
daily prices for the period 16 January 2003 to 28 February 2013. The set included 
seven banks (BBVA, Banco Santander, Banco Sabadell, Banco Popular, Bankinter, 
Banesto and Banco de Valencia) and two insurance companies (Catalana Occidente 
and Mapfre). To capture the behaviour of the whole financial system, we used the 
MSCI Spain Financials Index. Data were obtained from Bloomberg and returns for 
price data were computed on a continuous compounding basis. 
We also considered daily information for a set of variables that were included 
in  in Eq. (2.3), as follows (all these data were obtained from Bloomberg): 
(a) Daily IBEX-35 volatility, computed as the standard deviation of the daily 
returns in a backward window of three months. 
(b) The first difference of the 12-month Treasury bill rate. 
(c) The slope of the yield curve measured as the difference between the 10-year and 
the 12-month Treasury bill rates. 
(d) The credit spread determined as the difference between interest rates for 
corporate and government 10-year maturity bonds. 
(e) Daily market returns obtained from the IBEX-35 general market index. 
Figure 2.1 shows the time-series plot for the returns of the studied institutions 
( ) and the MSCI ( ). All series display the usual characteristics of financial 
returns — including volatility clustering and fat tails — and also show abrupt 
changes around the onset of the global financial crisis (mid-2008) and European 
sovereign debt crisis (at the end of 2009). Figure 2.2 depicts the temporal dynamics 
of the set of variables considered as explanatory variables in the quantile regression. 
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Figure 2.1: Time series plot of daily returns for each institution and the MSCI 
Index. 
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Figure 2.2: Time series plot for the explanatory variables. 
  
  
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for specific risk factors. 
 
Market 
volatility 
12-month Treasury 
bill variation rate 
Slope 
Credit 
spread 
Market 
yield 
Mean 0.232 0.000 0.018 0.007 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.113 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.015 
Maximum 0.679 0.010 0.043 0.019 0.120 
Minimum 0.080 -0.015 0.000 -0.003 -0.100 
Skewness 1.249 -0.460 -0.073 0.572 0.161 
Kurtosis 4.909 38.921 1.788 3.209 8.687 
J-B 987.6* 129011.4* 148.9* 135.1* 3242.4* 
Q(20) 44079 97.319 45005 41735 61.509 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ARCH 33075.33 8.408 2060.849 1698.055 18.624 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Note. Daily data for the period 16 January 2003 to 28 Febrary 2013. J-B denotes 
the Jarque-Bera statistic for normality. Q(k) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial 
correlation in squared returns computed with k lags. ARCH denotes Engle’s LM 
test for heteroskedasticity computed using 20 lags. An asterisk (*) indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics for weekly price returns for selected Spanish financial institutions. 
 
Banesto Bankinter BBVA Popular Sabadell Santander Valencia Catalana Mapfre MSCI  
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.022 0.025 0.029 0.025 0.020 0.033 0.037 0.022 0.022 0.021 
Maximum 0.183 0.151 0.365 0.203 0.175 0.608 0.668 0.132 0.134 0.154 
Minimum -0.235 -0.092 -0.163 -0.122 -0.118 -0.293 -0.334 -0.120 -0.157 -0.116 
Skewness -0.018 0.477 1.026 0.751 0.796 2.720 2.348 0.269 0.118 0.421 
Kurtosis 14.602 5.776 19.666 10.360 12.184 60.472 65.466 6.393 7.822 9.423 
J-B 13449* 860.89* 28174* 5638.4* 8681.9* 332978* 392072* 1179.3* 2328.7* 4192.8* 
Q(20) 39.184 44.197 74.862 55.902 77.119 100.520 128.850 42.193 52.843 55.391 
 
[0.006] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] 
ARCH 3.448 12.133 28.833 11.042 7.861 30.954 16.363 12.475 13.934 16.218 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pearson Corr. 0.693 0.700 0.934 0.806 0.708 0.891 0.318 0.469 0.629  
Note. Daily data for the period 16 January 2003 to 28 February 2013. J-B denote the Jarque-Bera statistic for normality. 
Q(k) is the Ljung-Box statistics for serial correlation in squared returns computed with k lags. ARCH denotes Engle’s LM 
test for heteroskedasticity computed using 20 lags. Pearson Corr. is the Pearson correlation between the financial system 
(MSCI) and each financial institution. An asterisk (*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
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Table 2.2 shows that weekly returns for the financial institutions had similar 
characteristics. Specifically, returns on average were approximately zero and their 
standard deviations were larger in an order of several magnitudes, hence, no 
significant trend was observed in the returns. The Banco de Valencia showed greater 
volatility than the other institutions, in terms of the standard deviation and the 
distance between maximum and minimum values. For all the series the Jarque-Bera 
test clearly rejected the null hypothesis of normality. Asymmetry and fat tails in the 
returns were evident in the fact that the kurtosis coefficient was above 3. The 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity-Lagrange multiplier (ARCH-LM) 
statistic indicated that all the return series displayed ARCH effects. Finally, the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for each financial institution with the system was 
positive, with larger institutions taking greater values. 
2.4. Results 
Below we present the marginal model and VaR results for each financial institution 
and then report the CoVaR results obtained using the different approaches. 
2.4.1. Marginal model and VaR results 
The estimation results for the marginal models reflected in Eqs. (2.4)-(2.6) are 
reported in Table 2.4 for all the institutions and overall financial system returns. We 
considered different combinations of the parameters p, r and m for values ranging 
from zero to a maximum lag of two, selecting the most suitable value according to 
the BIC and AIC. We can summarize the evidence on the marginal models as 
follows. Average returns exhibited, in general, no temporal dependence and returns 
volatility was persistent across different financial institutions, with some volatility 
dynamics (for Banesto, Banco Popular, Banco de Valencia and Catalana Occidente) 
described by several lags in the TGARCH model specification. Leverage effects were 
also found for all series with the exception of Banco Popular and Banco de Valencia. 
The estimated degrees of freedom and symmetry parameter values for the skewed 
Student-t distribution confirm that the error terms were not normal and were even 
asymmetric in two cases. 
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Table 2.4: Maximum likelihood estimates. 
 
Banesto Bankinter Bbva Popular Sabadell Santander Valencia Catalana Mapfre MSCI 
Mean    
     
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 
(0.537) (0.459) (0.332) (0.417) (0.584) (0.378) (0.116) (3.963) (0.500) (0.332) 
AR(1) 0.036*   0.055* 0.088*      
 (1.882)   (2.637) (4.683)      
MA(1)   0.069*    -0.062*  -0.070*  
   (3.442)    (-2.515)  (-3.223)  
Variance    
     
 
 
 0.116 0.066 0.053* 0.025* 0.068* 0.098* 0.038 0.003 0.041* 0.020* 
 
(1.553) (1.794) (3.332) (2.385) (3.301) (2.948) (0.060) (0.814) (2.098) (2.958) 
 0.029 0.047* -0.004 0.054* 0.043* -0.008 0.412* 0.140* 0.023* -0.008 
 
(0.773) (2.452) (-0.545) (3.503) (2.440) (-0.848) (4.985) (3.374) (2.196) (-1.038) 
 0.154* 0.894* 0.928* 1.322* 0.919* 0.904* 1.337* 1.399* 0.934* 0.934* 
 (2.077) (28.720) (62.75) (16.330
) 
(57.250) (39.640) (10.950) (10.180) (54.250) (62.81) 
 0.168* 0.120* 0.146* 0.051 0.056* 0.192* -0.023 0.231* 0.074* 0.141* 
 (3.044) (3.565) (6.084) (1.836) (3.121) (4.857) (-0.232) (3.460) (3.741) (5.564) 
Asymmetr
y 0.027 0.044 0.008 0.042 -0.014 -0.048 0.076* 0.055* 0.017 -0.051 
 (1.095) (1.598) (0.276) (1.613) (-0.612) (-1.867) (2.943) (2.146) (0.647) (-1.883) 
Tail 3.955* 5.731* 7.701* 5.282* 3.701* 6.920* 3.398* 4.538* 6.096* 7.994* 
 
(11.230) (8.973) (6.790) (9.416) (11.900) (7.460) (11.240) (9.555) (8.932) (6.630) 
LogLik 6236.66 5782.24 5788.37 6111.80 6453.02 5696.24 5960.89 6201.78 6097.45 6512.05 
LJ 24.050 22.794 28.880 13.224 24.494 19.546 28.646 20.713 28.710 26.185 
 
[0.194] [0.299] [0.068] [0.827] [0.177] [0.487] [0.072] [0.414] [0.071] [0.159] 
LJ 2 6.444 18.669 14.987 22.833 7.437 10.475 3.892 10.551 12.956 8.719 
 [0.989] [0.413] [0.663] [0.088] [0.986] [0.916] [0.691] [0.836] [0.794] [0.966] 
ARCH 0.322 0.902 0.872 1.181 0.447 0.565 0.398 0.545 0.638 0.506 
 
[0.998] [0.585] [0.625] [0.261] [0.983] [0.938] [0.948] [0.949] [0.887] [0.965] 
K-S [0.492] [0.637] [0.950] [0.234] [0.111] [0.548] [0.047] [0.283] [0.701] [0.876] 
CvM [0.597] [0.661] [0.941] [0.247] [0.125] [0.906] [0.115] [0.264] [0.805] [0.817] 
A-D [0.672] [0.693] [0.952] [0.265] [0.144] [0.924] [0.118] [0.277] [0.903] [0.806] 
Note. The table presents the coefficients of the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates and the z statistics (in 
parentheses) for the parameters of the marginal distribution used to calculate the volatility of the series and to 
calculate the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model.
 
LogLik is the log-likelihood value. LJ represents the 
Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in the residual model calculated with 20 lags. LJ2 represents the Ljung-Box 
statistic for serial correlation in the squared residual model calculated with 20 lags. ARCH is Engle’s LM test for the 
ARCH effect in the residuals up to 20th order. K-S, CvM and A-D denote the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramér-von 
Mises and Anderson-Darling test for adequacy of the skewed-t distribution model. P values (in square brackets) below 
0.05 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis. An asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5%. For specific institutions the 
best models are as follows: Banesto, TGARCH(1,2); Banco Popular, TGARCH(2,3); and Banco de Valencia and 
Catalana Occidente, TGARCH(2,1). 
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The last rows of Table 2.4 report information on the goodness-of-fit of our 
marginal models. The Ljung-Box and ARCH statistics indicate that neither 
autocorrelation nor ARCH effects remained in the residuals of the marginal models. 
We also tested the null hypothesis that the standardized model residuals were 
uniform (0,1) by comparing the empirical distribution with the theoretical 
distribution function using the well-known Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S), Cramér-von 
Mises (CvM) and Anderson-Darling (AD) tests. The p-values for these tests, 
reported in last three rows of Table 2.4, indicate that, for either of the marginal 
models, the null of the correct specification of the distribution function could not be 
rejected at the 5% significance level. Overall, our goodness-of-fit tests indicate that 
the marginal distribution models were not mis-specified. 
We computed the VaR for the 95% confidence level 4  for each financial 
institution using information from its marginal model and Eq. (2.7). Figure 2.3 
depicts the temporal dynamics of the VaR for all the institutions, which showed 
similar trends throughout the sample period, with the VaR decreasing considerably 
during the recent global financial crisis and less intensely during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Also, due to financial difficulties experienced at the end of the 
sampling period, the VaR value for the Banco de Valencia turned down since 2011. 
Table 2.5 reports descriptive statistic for the VaR. Larger banks like Santander and 
BBVA had larger mean VaR values (in absolute terms), although not Banco de 
Valencia, given that it was experiencing financial distress. Likewise, VaR volatility 
increased with institution size. 
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics for the value-at-risk at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Banesto Bankinter Bbva Popular Sabadell Santander Valencia Catalana Mapfre 
Mean -0.031 -0.037 -0.039 -0.034 -0.028 -0.042 -0.041 -0.032 -0.033 
Std. Dev. 0.013 0.015 0.023 0.018 0.010 0.027 0.041 0.016 0.013 
Maximum -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.011 -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.007 -0.016 
Minimum -0.169 -0.087 -0.188 -0.102 -0.077 -0.275 -0.647 -0.123 -0.105 
  
                                                 
4 Results for the 97% and 99% confidence levels are available on request. 
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Figure 2.3: Time series plot for value-at-risk at the 95% confidence level. 
 
2.4.2. Quantile regression results 
With the value of the VaR for each financial institution and the set of explanatory 
variables described in the data section, we estimated the CoVaR for the financial 
system using the quantile regression reflected in Eq. (2.3). Table 2.6 reports 
estimates for a 95% confidence level (  and ). Given that the 
quantil regression parameter  was significant and had the expected sign for all the 
financial institutions, the VaR for each institution had a significant impact on the 
VaR of the financial system. Regarding the explanatory variables, we found that 
market volatility and yield curve slope were significant and had the expected sign in 
all cases; other explanatory variables were only significant in some cases; and the 
IBEX-35 returns were non-significant in all the cases. 
For each financial institution the CoVaR value at each time t was computed 
as the estimated value of the corresponding quantile regression. Table 2.9 reports 
descriptive statistics for the CoVaR, showing values that were greater for the banks 
than for the insurance companies and, in general, with values reflecting the size of 
the bank. Likewise, larger banks generated more instability in CoVaR values than 
small banks or insurance companies. 
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Table 2.6: Quantile regression estimates at the 95% confidence level. 
Note. 
The quantile regression coefficients, 
 
are as follows: 
  = coefficient of the quantile regression for the returns of each institution (  
 ), 
  = coefficient of the quantile regression for market volatility (IBEX-35), 
  = coefficient of the quantile regression for the 12-month Treasury bill variation rate, 
  = coefficient of the quantile regression for the yield curve slope, 
  = coefficient of the quantile regression for the credit spread, 
  = coefficient of the quantile regression for the market returns (IBEX-35), 
Numbers in brackets indicate standard error: 
* Significance at 10%. 
** Significance at 5%. 
*** Significance at 1%. 
2.4.3. MGARCH results 
We estimated the DCC model for returns composed of the financial system paired 
with each financial institution. Table 2.7 reports the results for the parameters and 
degrees of freedom, as reflected in Eq. (2.11), for the bivarate Student-t distribution. 
All the parameters were significant, providing consistent evidence in favour of time-
varying dependence and fat tails according to the estimated degrees of freedom. 
Figure 2.4 depicts correlation dynamics for each financial institution, showing that 
institutional interdependence with the general financial system varies according to 
the institution’s size, with no significant change with the onset of the global 
| | | | | |
, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,( ) 12 . ,
s i i s i i s i i s i i s i i s i i
t p t p t p t p t p t pQ x VaR MkVol TrBill Slope cr spread Mkreturns                  
0.01, 
 
            
Banesto 
0.834*** -0.091*** -0.114 -0.156*** -0.072 -0.008 
(0.058) (0.006) (0.219) (0.035) (0.110) (0.023) 
Bankinter 0.637*** -0.111*** 0.179 -0.188*** 0.591*** -0.013 (0.049) (0.008) (0.316) (0.034) (0.101) (0.022) 
BBVA 0.790*** -0.026*** 0.051 -0.100*** -0.202*** -0.014 (0.021) (0.003) (0.096) (0.014) (0.058) (0.009) 
Popular 0.766*** -0.061*** 0.059 0.004 -0.013 -0.038 (0.085) (0.012) (0.375) (0.050) (0.213) (0.027) 
Sabadell 0.719*** -0.134*** 0.049 -0.147*** 0.379** -0.022 (0.048) (0.006) (0.299) (0.034) (0.175) (0.023) 
Santander 0.634*** -0.054*** -0.288*** -0.131*** -0.447*** 0.001 (0.026) (0.004) (0.109) (0.020) (0.044) (0.011) 
Valencia 
0.145*** -0.183*** -0.011 -0.177*** 0.669*** -0.005 
(0.025) (0.007) (0.413) (0.033) (0.143) (0.025) 
Catalana 0.272*** -0.161*** 0.084 -0.306*** 0.485*** -0.007 (0.042) (0.012) (0.615) (0.038) (0.178) (0.028) 
Mapfre 1.017*** -0.043*** -0.219 -0.291*** 0.017 -0.008 (0.087) (0.010) (0.368) (0.034) (0.110) (0.021) 
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financial crisis or of the European sovereign debt crisis. With this correlation 
coefficient and marginal model information we have all the information on the joint 
distribution function of the financial system and the financial institution at each 
time t. Hence, taking the VaR of a given financial institution computed through its 
marginal return model, we can compute the CoVaR value by numerically solving 
Eq. (2.10) for the CoVaR and  and . 
Table 2.7: Dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model estimates. 
 Banesto Bankinter BBVA Popular Sabadell Santander Valencia Catalana Mapfre 
DoF 5.220* 6.110* 6.270* 5.682* 4.850* 5.139* 4.900* 6.294* 7.185 
 (15.65) (14.61) (13.91) (15.21) (18.27) (17.21) (19.49) (13.59) (11.42) 
α 0.056* 0.056* 0.044* 0.038* 0.030* 0.035* 0.017* 0.010* 0.025* 
 (3.71) (5.50) (3.73) (5.23) (3.11) (3.74) (3.20) (3.75) (3.11) 
β 0.917* 0.696* 0.659* 0.696* 0.638* 0.692* 0.686* 0.689* 0.673* 
 (33.10) (51.49) (42.56) (90.82) (71.76) (77.19) (175.60) (314.30) (59.91) 
Note. In accordance with the DCC model, α and β are the parameters estimated with the Student-t 
distributed errors. An asterisk (*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
 
Figure 2.4: Time series plot for dynamic conditional correlation (DCC). 
 
Descriptive statistics for the CoVaR values are reported in Table 2.9. The 
evidence on systemic risk is qualitatively similar to that reported for the quantile 
regression approach, even though the size of the CoVaR was quite different. The 
CoVaR values obtained using the MGARCH approach were considerably reduced 
with respect to those obtained using the quantile regression approach. This is 
consistent with the idea that conditioning on the fact that  and not on 
the fact that  has a quantitative impact on the value of the CoVaR (an 
effect that was also discussed by Girardi and Ergün, 2013).  
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2.4.4. Copula results 
Table 2.8 reports parameter estimates for the nine pairs given by the MSCI Spain 
Financials Index returns matched with each institution’s returns. Both static and 
dynamic copula specifications indicate that all the financial institutions co-moved 
with the general financial index. Parameter estimates for all the static copulas were 
significant, as also was the case for most of the time-varying copula specifications. 
Considering the AIC values corrected for small-sample bias, we found evidence of 
time-varying dependence and lower tail dependence, with the time-varying rotated 
Gumbel copula offering the best fit for all institutions, except for BBVA and 
Catalana Occidente, for which the time-varying Student-t performed better, thereby 
providing evidence of symmetric tail dependence. 
From the best copula specification and following the same two-step procedure 
as described above, we obtained the CoVaR value at the 95% confidence level for 
the financial system conditional on the VaR of each institution at the 95% 
confidence level. We also obtained the CoVaR value using Eq. (2.2). Figure 2.5 
depicts the dynamic behaviour of the estimated CoVaR and CoVaR (in 
percentage) and reports — to enable assessment and comparison of the impact of 
different methodological approaches — the CoVaR values estimated using the 
quantile regression and MGARCH approaches. The graphical evidence for the 
CoVar points to two conclusions. First, trends in the CoVaR values were consistent 
across different financial institutions, with systemic risk increasing around the onset 
of the global financial and the European sovereign debt crises. Significant changes 
also occurred in the CoVaR values in April 2011, when the systemic risk of Spanish 
financial institutions increased due to Portugal requesting a financial bailout. 
Second, there were significant differences in CoVaR values obtained using quantile 
regression as compared to using the MGARCH and copula approaches. Specifically, 
quantile regression CoVaR values were higher and also relatively stable through the 
sampling period, with little variation once the crises broke, indicating that the real 
systemic risk was underestimated. In contrast, MGARCH and copula CoVaR values 
were lower and reflected dynamics that adjusted much better to crisis events; thus, 
values were reduced when the crises broke and increased in more stable periods, 
thereby indicating a better adjustment to the changing economic environment in the 
latter years of the sampling period. 
  


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Table 2.8: Copula model estimates for institutions vs the MSCI Index. 
Panel A: Parameter estimates for time-invariant copulas 
Copula Banesto Bankinter Bbva Popular Sabadell Santander Valencia Catalana Mapfre 
Gaussian           
 
0.661 0.680 0.947 0.742 0.666 0.967 0.438 0.404 0.586 
          
AIC -1375.837 -1485.457 -5458.490 -1918.773 -1404.743 -6575.424 -508.015 -424.749 -1005.770 
Student-t          
 
0.667* 0.692* 0.951* 0.755* 0.684* 0.970* 0.459* 0.411* 0.589* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
 
 
6.175* 5.300* 4.055* 4.907* 4.065* 3.389* 5.426* 12.943* 8.622* 
(1.95) (1.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.41) (0.36) (0.74) (1.81) (0.87) 
AIC -1434.531 -1581.141 -5714.405 -2037.900 -1568.800 -6861.588 -588.128 -437.843 -1043.008 
Gumbel  
 
         
 
 
 
1.749* 1.813* 4.629* 2.057* 1.802* 5.860* 1.385* 1.314* 1.578* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
AIC -1205.439 -1324.791 -5320.482 -1797.433 -1298.704 -6361.999 -469.609 -356.186 -883.238 
Rotated Gumbel          
 
  
 
1.838* 1.915* 4.794* 2.125* 1.903* 6.197* 1.411* 1.336* 1.623* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
AIC -1460.203 -1594.086 -5528.936 -1983.757 -1565.309 -6685.885 -568.721 -422.484 -1019.961 
BB7 
 
         
 
1.428* 1.454* 4.034* 1.738* 1.448* 4.103* 1.233* 1.185* 1.369* 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
1.126* 1.217* 4.263* 1.327* 1.218* 6.311* 0.547* 0.453* 0.798* 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.21) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
AIC -1431.329 -1552.662 -5355.069 -1931.303 -1530.783 -6214.699 -551.679 -415.580 -1018.554 
Plackett          
 9.732* 11.279* 99.679* 15.385* 11.115* 186.395* 4.516* 3.581* 6.682* 
 (0.52) (0.57) (4.53) (0.75) (0.57) (29.81) (0.26) (0.20) (0.35) 
AIC -1387.328 -1567.059 -5534.123 -2016.034 -1525.218 -6787.020 -568.881 -428.177 -981.821 
BB1          
 0.721* 0.753* 0.906* 0.659* 0.763* 1.036* 0.383* 0.322* 0.515* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
 1.348* 1.384* 3.352* 1.612* 1.372* 4.090* 1.195* 1.161* 1.300* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
AIC -1459.027 -1590.462 -5646.838 -2004.665 -1562.220 -6754.743 -563.207 -426.512 -1039.673 












Measuring systemic risk in the Spanish financial system: A CoVaR approach 
37 
Panel B: Parameter estimates for time-varying copulas. 
 Banesto Bankinter Bbva Popular Sabadell Santander Valencia Catalana Mapfre 
TVP-Gaussian          
 
-0.269 0.076 -1.294 -0.517* -0.039* 5.000 0.030 -0.041 -0.144* 
 (1.67) (0.13) (9.37) (0.10) (0.00) (9.58) (0.02) (0.92) (0.07) 
 
0.176 0.300* 0.201 0.184* 0.262* 0.116 0.241* 0.045 0.083* 
 (5.81) (0.06) (0.18) (0.04) (0.01) (2.35) (0.05) (2.46) (0.03) 
 
2.695 2.070* 5.000 3.121* 2.286* -1.022 1.909* 2.200 2.469* 
 (3.73) (0.24) (10.05) (0.17) (0.02) (6.16) (0.08) (1.49) (0.15) 
AIC -1433.80 -1552.50 -5471.60 -1983.83 -1554.62 -6575.19 -636.04 -473.50 -1028.27 
TVP-Student-t         
 -0.198* -0.072 -14.21* -0.657* -0.037* -12.743* 0.059 0.003 2.183 
 (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (5.05) (0.05) (0.02) (2.03) 
 0.131* 0.156* 0.03* 0.103* 0.189* -0.014 0.205* 0.097* 0.249 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) 
 2.543* 2.388* 18.80* 3.354* 2.297* 17.521* 1.843* 2.034* -1.707 
 (0.04) (0.19) (0.00) (0.14) (0.01) (5.20) (0.15) (0.08) (3.55) 
 6.221* 6.677* 5.00* 5.770* 6.666* 3.171* 7.646* 17.118* 9.488* 
 (0.46) (1.14) (0.00) (0.35) (0.68) (0.33) (2.84) (2.18) (1.93) 
AIC -1480.20 -1618.48 -5736.39 -2085.60 -1642.09 -6861.18 -684.12 -481.04 -1046.55 
TVP-Gumbel          
 0.772* 0.595 1.768* 0.946* 1.121* 1.417* 0.675* 0.389 1.505* 
 (0.32) (0.38) (0.17) (0.43) (0.24) (0.04) (0.12) (0.36) (0.20) 
 0.222 0.300* 0.106* 0.198 0.147 0.167* 0.279* 0.329 -0.194 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.03) (0.14) (0.08) (0.00) (0.05) (0.19) (0.11) 
 -1.626* -1.390 -5.000* -2.095* -2.779* -3.801* -1.977* -1.084* -2.060* 
 (0.58) (0.77) (0.57) (0.95) (0.57) (0.39) (0.25) (0.50) (0.29) 
AIC -1306.20 -1456.58 -5464.95 -1957.46 -1538.34 -6626.42 -660.92 -389.85 -925.14 
TVP-Rotated Gumbel         
 0.368* 0.477* 1.162* 0.473* 0.932* 1.480* 0.448* -0.167 1.381 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (2.72) 
 0.370* 0.340* 0.195* 0.336* 0.197* 0.160* 0.358* 0.621* -0.111 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (1.37) 
 -0.761* -1.027* -2.230* -0.868* -2.050* -3.810* -1.425* -0.351* -1.948 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.29) (0.13) (0.14) (0.63) (0.18) (0.13) (2.29) 
AIC -1553.51 -1731.97 -5679.02 -2122.33 -1756.68 -6913.55 -739.91 -447.49 -1066.97 
Notes. The table reports the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for the different copula models for MSCI and the 
series indicated in each column. Standard error values (in brackets) and the AIC values adjusted for small-sample 
bias are provided for the different copula models. The minimum Akaike information criterion (AIC) value indicates 
the best copula fit. For the TVP-Gaussian and TVP-Student-t copulas, q in Eq. (2.14) was set to 10. An asterisk (*) 
indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Figure 2.5 also provides information on CoVaR dynamics, with the value 
remaining relatively stable over the sampling period, but registering sudden 
reductions when dependence between a financial institution and the overall system 
reduced, thereby increasing the value of the CoVaR. In particular, there was a 
significant reduction in CoVaR and  CoVaR for Banco de Valencia towards the 
end of the sampling period when this bank went bankrupt. However, this 
bankruptcy had little impact on the system as a whole, given the decoupling that 
occurred. 
Table 2.9 summarizes descriptive CoVaR and CoVaR statistics for the three 
approaches. The average CoVaR values obtained with the MGARCH model and 
bivariate Student-t density and copula models were similar and much lower than for 
the quantile regression approach. Moreover, fluctuations in the quantile regression 
CoVaR values were much less than for the other two procedures, as confirmed by 
the differences between maximum and minimum values. We can therefore conclude 
that quantile regression underestimates systemic risk. Descriptive statistics for 
CoVaR allow us to conclude that the systemically important financial institutions in 
the Spanish financial sector were BBVA and Santander and that systemic risk 
increases with the size of the financial institution. 
Figure 2.5: Estimates of CoVaR (left axis) and ∆CoVaR (right axis) for the MSCI 
Index with respect to each institution. 
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Figure 2.5: (Continued) 
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Figure 2.5: (Continued) 
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Figure 2.5: (Continued) 
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Figure 2.5: (Continued) 
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Table 2.9: Summary statistics for CoVaR–QR, CoVaR–Student-t, CoVaR–Copula 
and ∆CoVaR—Copula for each institution with the MSCI Index. 
  
Mean Std. Max Min 
Banesto 
CoVaR--QR -0.0257 0.0111 -0.0132 -0.1405 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0605 0.0333 -0.0185 -0.2169 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0626 0.0337 -0.0202 -0.2173 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6742 0.0066 0.6815 0.6287 
Bankinter 
CoVaR--QR -0.0239 0.0097 -0.0101 -0.0556 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0607 0.0328 -0.0189 -0.2056 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0625 0.0333 -0.0209 -0.2102 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6745 0.0113 0.6824 0.5526 
BBVA 
CoVaR--QR -0.0312 0.0181 -0.0121 -0.1486 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0632 0.0339 -0.0210 -0.2226 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0632 0.0338 -0.0212 -0.2226 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6809 0.0009 0.6836 0.6794 
Popular 
CoVaR--QR -0.0262 0.0136 -0.0083 -0.0783 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0617 0.0341 -0.0197 -0.2214 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0630 0.0339 -0.0212 -0.2225 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6781 0.0042 0.6830 0.6508 
Sabadell 
CoVaR--QR -0.0203 0.0070 -0.0105 -0.0550 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0607 0.0341 -0.0167 -0.2200 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0624 0.0340 -0.0155 -0.2211 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6688 0.0352 0.6824 0.1524 
Santander 
CoVaR--QR -0.0265 0.0172 -0.0110 -0.1741 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0632 0.0339 -0.0212 -0.2226 
CoVaR --Copula -0.0632 0.0338 -0.0213 -0.2226 
∆CoVaR --Copula 0.6815 0.0009 0.6842 0.6799 
Valencia 
CoVaR--QR -0.0060 0.0059 -0.0018 -0.0941 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0555 0.0328 -0.0157 -0.2141 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0588 0.0330 -0.0111 -0.2169 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6172 0.0860 0.6810 0.0283 
Catalana 
CoVaR--QR -0.0087 0.0044 -0.0019 -0.0335 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0542 0.0318 -0.0145 -0.2004 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0517 0.0293 -0.0115 -0.1929 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.4332 0.0755 0.5810 0.0504 
Mapfre 
CoVaR--QR -0.0333 0.0132 -0.0161 -0.1072 
CoVaR--Student-t -0.0587 0.0328 -0.0177 -0.2127 
CoVaR--Copula -0.0619 0.0332 -0.0204 -0.2082 
∆CoVaR--Copula 0.6669 0.0172 0.6791 0.4513 
Notes. The table reports descriptive statistic for the CoVaR and CoVaR in percentages for each 
institution at the 95% confidence level, given a VaR level at 95% for the MSCI Index and using 
quantile regression (QR), the multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity-
dynamic conditional correlation (MGARCH-DCC) model with a bivariate Student-t distribution 
and the best copula fits. Std., Max and Min denote standard deviation, maximum and minimum, 
respectively. 

Chapter 2 
44 
Finally, we considered the relationship between the VaR and CoVaR, as 
represented in Figure 2.6. Our results reveal a weak relationship between the 
CoVaR and VaR, calculated using the quantile regression, MGARCH and copula 
approaches — a result that is consistent with that reported by Girardi and Ergün 
(2003). This suggests that the VaR is incapable of determining capital requirements 
for financial institutions that would overcome market risk. 
Figure 2.6: Scatter plot for ΔCoVaR vs VaR. 
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values around the periods of the crises, especially around the recent global financial 
crisis. We also observed that the CoVaR computed using quantile regression was not 
able to capture the dynamics of systemic risk, as it lacked the flexibility to adapt to 
crisis periods when volatility was high; consequently it underestimated systemic risk. 
The MGARCH and copula approaches were more flexible in identifying crisis 
periods with significant reductions in the CoVaR value. We also found that the 
copula approach reflected greater systemic risk than the MGARCH approach; this 
evidence is consistent with the fact that tail dependence is better captured by a 
copula than by a parametric multivariate distribution function. The risk 
contribution of the financial institutions, as evaluated using CoVaR, amounted to 
around 65%. 
Overall, our measurements of systemic risk allow us to conclude that systemic 
risk increased during the financial crisis but not with the same intensity for all the 
studied institutions; it mainly affected larger institutions that assumed increasingly 
systemic importance and were considered to be too interconnected to fail. These 
results have implications for regulatory policy aimed at determining optimal capital 
requirements and cyclical changes in value, mainly for large financial entities.

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Chapter 3 
 
3. Systemic risk in European sovereign debt 
markets: A CoVaR-copula approach 
3.1. Introduction 
The recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has raised concerns about the fragility of 
the debt markets and the potential systemic risk effects of a sovereign default in the 
euro area. Measuring systemic risk among debt markets is crucial to an assessment 
of how the deteriorated financial position of a sovereign market can impair the 
performance of other sovereign debt markets. In this chapter, we quantify systemic 
risk in the European sovereign debt markets before and after the onset of the 
European sovereign debt crisis by computing the conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) 
through copulas, providing thus quantitative evidence regarding how systemic risk 
has changed as a result of the debt crisis. 
One strand of the burgeoning literature on the European sovereign debt crisis 
examines co-movements and drivers of fluctuations in government bond spreads such 
as credit risk, exchange rate movements, specific news, rating changes or the 
probability of some countries exiting the euro area (see, e.g., Manganelli and 
Wolswijk, 2009; Haugh et al., 2009; Schuknecht et al., 2010; Borgy et al., 2011; de 
Santis, 2013; Beestma et al. 2013; Favero, 2013). Another strand of this literature is 
concerned with the spillover effects of the European debt crisis on the financial 
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sector. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) studied contagion between bank and sovereign 
default risk in Europe through asset, collateral and rating channels. Bhanot et al. 
(2014) investigated the impact of changes in Greek sovereign yield spreads on stock 
returns in the financial sector. Similarly, Mink and De Haan (2013) analysed the 
impact of highly volatile Greek bonds on European bank stock prices in 2010. Alter 
and Schuler (2012) examined the relationship between sovereign default risk and 
domestic banks. In addition, using credit default swaps, other studies examined 
sovereign risk contagion among eurozone countries (see, e.g., Missio and Watzka, 
2011; Arezki et al., 2011; Alter and Beyer, 2012; Caporin et al., 2013). However, 
even though systemic risk is an important dimension of contagion that enables to 
quantify the impact of extreme downward movement in one market on other 
markets, no study has yet examined systemic risk in European sovereign debt 
markets and how this risk has changed with the onset of the recent European 
sovereign debt crisis. This chapter attempts to fill this gap, contributing, in 
particular, to the existing literature in two ways. 
First, we characterize the CoVaR systemic risk measure—as proposed by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and generalized by Girardi and Ergün (2013)—in 
terms of copulas. CoVaR captures possible risk spillovers between markets by 
providing information on the value-at-risk (VaR) of a market, conditional on the 
fact that another market is in financial distress. Using copulas, the value of the 
CoVaR can be obtained in a two-step procedure. Given the cumulative probability 
of the VaR of the market in financial distress and the confidence level for the 
CoVaR, we can compute the cumulative probability for the CoVaR from a copula 
function. We then can invert the marginal distribution function for this cumulative 
probability in order to obtain the value of the CoVaR. From a computational point 
of view, this approach is more tractable than other parametric approaches; it is also 
more flexible, given that copula functions, by providing a measure of both average 
dependence and upper and lower tail dependence (joint extreme movements), enable 
the dependence structure of stochastic variables to be fully described. This 
information is crucial to determining the VaR of one variable, which is conditional 
on the fact that another variable takes values below or equal to its own VaR. In 
fact, (lower) tail dependence of a copula function naturally provides this 
information, but at the limit. 
Second, for a sample of sovereign bond benchmark price indices for France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, for GIIPS economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) and for an overall sovereign bond price index for the European Economic 
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and Monetary Union (EMU), for the period January 2000 to October 2012, we 
provide evidence of strong co-movement between European debt markets and the 
EMU index before the onset of the European debt crisis. All sovereign debt markets 
shared a similar trend in systemic risk, which was very similar in size across 
markets. However, with the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis, we find 
evidence of the decoupling of debt markets in such a way that GIIPS markets 
negatively correlate, on average, with the EMU index returns, displaying, in general, 
market independence at the tails. As a result, systemic risk for the GIIPS markets, 
with the exception of Spain, was reduced, whereas systemic risk for the non-crisis 
countries experienced a significant upsurge as a result of a high degree of co-
movement with the EMU index. Finally, we examined the systemic risk impact of 
the Greek debt market on other European debt markets, finding that before the 
Greek debt crisis, Greek systemic risk was relatively low and different across 
countries. However, after crisis onset, Greek systemic risk increased for the countries 
in crisis, especially for Portugal, where systemic risk tripled overall. For countries 
not in crisis the systemic impact of the Greek debt crisis was less, given that the 
debt markets of these countries decoupled from the Greek market. 
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows: in Section 3.2 we outline 
the copula approach to the CoVaR, in Section 3.3 we present data and in Section 
3.4 we discuss the results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Methodology 
With the aim of quantifying systemic risk between assets, institutions or markets, 
different systemic risk measures have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., 
Huang et al., 2009; Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009; Acharya et al., 2010; Allen et al., 
2010; Zhou, 2010, Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Brownlees and Engle, 2011; Billio 
et al., 2012; Girardi and Ergün, 2013; Gravelle and Li, 2013). Given that VaR is 
arguably the most widely employed risk measure by investors, financial institutions 
and regulators, in this study we evaluate systemic risk between European debt 
markets using the CoVaR measure proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
and generalized by Girardi and Ergün (2013). 
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3.2.1. CoVaR and copulas 
The CoVaR for the European debt market is the VaR for the European debt market 
as a whole, conditional on the fact that a given debt market is in financial distress. 
Let d
t
R  be the returns for the debt market as a whole and let j
t
R  be the returns for 
debt market j. The CoVaR, formally defined as the  -quantile of the conditional 
distribution of d
t
R , is as follows: 
 d d j j j
t t t t
R CoVaR R VaR|, ,Pr( | )     , (3.1) 
where j
t
VaR ,  is the VaR for debt market j, measuring the maximum loss that debt 
market j may experience for a confidence level 1    and a specific time horizon, 
that is, the  -quantile of the return distribution for the debt market j: 
j j
t t
R VaR ,Pr( )   . Therefore, computing the CoVaR consists of determining the 
quantile of a conditional distribution, or, alternatively, of an unconditional bivariate 
distribution if we express Eq. (3.1) as: 
 
d d j j j
t t t t
j j
t t
R CoVaR R VaR
R VaR
|
, ,
,
Pr( , )
Pr( )
 

 
 

. (3.2) 
Given that j j
t t
R VaR ,Pr( )   , the CoVaR in Eq. (3.2) can be expressed as: 
 d d j j j
t t t t
R CoVaR R VaR|, ,Pr( , )     . (3.3) 
Girardi and Ergün (2013) proposed to compute for the CoVaR in Eq. (3.3) by 
numerically solving a double integral: 
 
d j j
t t
CoVaR VaR d j d j
t t t t t
R R R Rf d d
|
, , ( , ) 
 
    (3.4) 
for given levels of  ,   and j
t
VaR , ; and where 
d j
t t t
R Rf ( , ) is the bivariate density of 
d
t
R  and j
t
R . 
In this chapter we propose to compute the CoVaR through copulas.5 Note that 
Eq. (3.3) can be expressed in terms of the joint distribution function of d
t
R  and j
t
R , 
d j
t t
R R
F
,
, as: 
                                                 
5 For further analysis on copulas, see Joe (1997) and Nelsen (2006). An overview of copula 
applications to finance can be found in Cherubini et al. (2004). Mainik and Schaanning 
(2012) provide the first representation of the CoVaR in terms of copulas. 
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 d j
t t
d j j
t tR R
F CoVaR VaR|, ,,
( , )
 
  , (3.5) 
and that, according to Sklar’s (1959) theorem, the joint distribution function of two 
continuous variables can be expressed in terms of a copula function. Hence, Eq. (3.5) 
can be written as: 
 C u v( , )   , (3.6) 
where C(·,·) is a copula function, d
t
d j
tR
u F CoVaR |,( )  and j
t
j
tR
v F VaR ,( )  and where 
d
t
R
F  and j
t
R
F  are the marginal distribution functions of dtR  and 
j
t
R , respectively. 
Given its copula representation in Eq. (3.6), the CoVaR can be computed from that 
equation through copulas in a two-step procedure: 
1) We obtain the value of d
t
d j
tR
u F CoVaR |,( ) . Since C u v( , )   , where  ,   and v 
are given (note that v   ), from the copula function specification we can solve 
to determine the value of u . 
2) Taking u , we can obtain the CoVaR value as the quantile of the distribution of 
d
t
R , with a cumulative probability equal to u , by inverting the marginal 
distribution function of d
t
R : d
t
d j
t R
CoVaR F u| 1, ( )


 . 
Computing the CoVaR through copulas has two main advantages. First, since 
copulas allow separate modelling of the marginals and dependence structures, they 
offer great flexibility in modelling marginals. This flexibility is crucial for the 
computation of VaR and the modelling of dependence structures with different tail 
dependence characteristics, such as the tail independence and symmetric or 
asymmetric tail dependence that is especially relevant for the computation of the 
CoVaR measure. Furthermore, copulas are useful when the joint distribution 
function is not elliptical, when the traditional dependence measure given by the 
linear correlation coefficient is insufficient to describe the dependence structure (see 
Embrechts et al. 2003). This is especially relevant when the bivariate Gaussian or 
Student-t distributions (both widely used in multivariate generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models) do not adequately represent the 
joint distribution function of the data. Second, computation of the CoVaR using 
copulas is computationally more tractable than obtaining the value of CoVaR using 
Eq. (3.4), as the equation requires numerical resolution of a double integral and VaR 
computation for the financially distressed market. Note that, using a copula 
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characterization of the CoVaR, we only need information on the cumulative 
probability for the VaR and not the value of the VaR itself. 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Girardi and Ergün (2013) define the 
systemic risk contribution of a particular market j as the delta CoVaR ( CoVaR), 
which is the difference between the VaR of the European debt market as a whole 
conditional on the distressed state of market j ( j j
t t
R VaR , ) and the VaR of the 
European debt market as a whole conditional on the benchmark state of market j, 
considering it as the median of the return distribution of market j, or, alternatively, 
the VaR for an 0.5  . The systemic risk contribution of market j is thus defined 
as: 
 d j d j d j d j
t t t t
CoVaR CoVaR CoVaR CoVaR| | | , 0.5 | , 0.5, , ,
 
  
   . (3.7) 
3.2.2. Marginal distribution and copula models 
The marginal models and copula specifications we used to compute the CoVaR 
measure for the European sovereign debt markets are described as follows. 
For the marginal models, following Bhanot et al. (2014), we consider that the 
conditional mean of the market returns for a European debt market j are given as a 
function of common and specific factors. Common factors are given by interbank 
interest rate changes, measured by changes in the Euribor rate (E), with a dummy 
variable (CRISIS) denoting periods before and after the onset of the European 
sovereign debt crisis as 0 and 1, respectively. Included as specific factors are the 
stock market index returns (
j t
r , ) and market volatility ( j tvol , ) for each country and 
lagged values for the debt market returns. Thus, the marginal model for market j is 
specified as: 
 
p
j j
t j j h t h j j t j j t j t j t j t
h
R R r vol E Crisis,0 , , , ,
1


              , (3.8) 
with 
j t j t j t
z, , ,   , where j t
2
,  is the conditional variance, given by a threshold 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (TGARCH) specification 
(Zakoian, 1994; Glosten et al., 1993): 
 
r m m
j,t j j,k j,t k j,h j,t h j,h j,t h j t
k h h
b a d Crisis2 2 2
1 1 1
  
  
            , (3.9) 
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where j  is a constant, j,t k
2
  is the GARCH component and j,t h  is the 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) component and where   
captures leverage effects. If   0 , then the future conditional variance will 
proportionally increase more following a negative shock than following a positive 
shock of the same magnitude. The crisis dummy variable is included in the volatility 
specification to take into account the potential effect of the sovereign debt crisis on 
volatility. 
j t
z ,  is a i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and unit variance that 
follows a Hansen’s (1994) skewed-t density distribution. It is given by: 
 
j t
j t
bz a
j t
j t
bz a
j t
bc z a b
f z
bc z a b
,
,
( 1) 2
2
1
,2 1
, ( 1) 2
2
1
,2 1
1
( ; , )
1
 

 
 

 
                
   
         
, (3.10) 
where   and   are the degrees of freedom parameter ( 2     ) and the 
symmetric parameter ( 1 1    ), respectively. The constants a, b and c are given 
by  a c 214


  , b a2 2 21 3    ,    c 12 2( 2)
       . This distribution 
converges to the standard Gaussian as 0   and  , and to the symmetric 
Student-t distribution as 0   and   is finite. 
We used seven different copula specifications to capture different 
characteristics of dependence, as follows:  
1) The bivariate Gaussian is the most commonly employed distribution in the 
finance literature. It is defined by  1 1NC (u,v; ) (u), (v)      , where   is the 
bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function with correlation   
between X and Y and where 1(u)  and 1(v)  are standard normal quantile 
functions. It has no tail dependence. 
2) The Student-t is useful for capturing symmetric tail dependence. It is given by 
 
 
   1 1STC (u,v; , ) T(t (u), t (v)) , where T is the bivariate Student-t cumulative 
distribution function with degree-of-freedom parameter   and  correlation   and 
where 1t (u)

 and 1t (v)

 are the quantile functions of the univariate Student-t 
distribution with degree-of-freedom parameter  . 
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3) The Gumbel copula is asymmetric and displays upper tail dependence and lower 
tail independence. It is given by    
   
          
1
GC (u,v; ) exp logu log v . Note 
that the two variables are independent when   1 . 
4) The rotated Gumbel copula displays upper tail independence and lower tail 
dependence. It is given by        RG GC (u,v; ) u v 1 C (1 u,1 v; ) . 
5) The BB7 copula  allows for different degrees of upper and lower tail dependence. 
It is defined as: 
    
1
1
BB7C (u, v; , ) 1 1 1 1 u 1 1 v 1

 
 
 
      
                      
, (3.11) 
with,   1   0 . 
6) The Plackett copula is a symmetric copula which, like the Gaussian copula, 
exhibits tail independence, even though the dependence for large joint realizations 
is less than for the Gaussian copula. It is given by: 
 
 
                         
 
2
P
1
C (u,v; ) 1 1 u v 1 1 u v 4 1 uv
2 1
. (3.12) 
7) The Clayton-Gumbel or BB1 copula allows for asymmetric tail dependence. It is 
specified as 
    
1
1
CGC (u, v; , ) u 1 v 1 1



 
 
   
        
   
, (3.13) 
with   0 ,   1 . 
In addition, we considered possible time-varying dependence by allowing the 
parameters of some copulas to vary according to a specific evolution equation. For 
the Gaussian and the Student-t copulas, we specified the linear dependence 
parameter t  so that it evolves according to a model with 1 autoregressive term and 
q moving-average terms, that is, an ARMA(1,q)-type process (Patton, 2006):  
  qt t t j t jq j (u ) (v )            1 110 1 1 2 1 , (3.14) 
where   x x(x) e e

    
1
1 1  is the modified logistic transformation that keeps the 
value of t  in (-1,1). The dependence parameter is explained by a constant, 0 , by 
an autoregressive term, 1 , and by the average product over the last q observations 
of the transformed variables, 2 . For the Student-t copula, 
1(x)  is substituted by 
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

1t (x) . Similarly, we consider time-varying dependence for the Gumbel and its 
rotated version by assuming that their parameters follow the dynamics represented 
by the following equation: 
 
q
t t t j t jq j
u v11 1       . (3.15) 
Overall, the copula family considered here can be classified as either symmetric 
copulas with tail dependence (Student-t and time-varying Student-t copulas) or tail 
independence (Gaussian, time-varying Gaussian and Plackett) or as asymmetric 
copulas with tail dependence (Gumbel, rotated Gumbel, BB7, BB1, time-varying 
Gumbel and rotated Gumbel). 
The parameters of the marginal and copula models are estimated using a two-
step procedure called inference for the margins (Joe and Xu, 1996). The likelihood 
function is given by: 
 d j
t t
d j d j
t t t t tR R
R R c u v f R f R( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )f , (3.16) 
where c(u,v) is the copula density and d
t
d
tR
f R( )  and j
t
j
tR
f R( )  are the marginal 
densities of d
t
R  and j
t
R , respectively. The log likelihood function can thus be 
decomposed as the sum of the log likelihood function of the marginals plus the log 
likelihood of the copula density. Thus, in a first step, we estimate the parameters of 
the marginal distributions separately by maximum likelihood and, in a second step, 
we estimate the parameters of the copula by solving the following problem: 
 


  
T
t t
t 1
ˆ ˆargmax  ln c(u , v ; ) , (3.17) 
where   are the copula parameters and d
t
d
t R t d
ˆû F (R ; )   and j
t
j
t t jR
ˆv̂ F (R ; )   are 
pseudo-sample observations for the copula. Under standard regularity conditions, 
this two-step estimation is consistent and the parameter estimates are 
asymptotically efficient and normal (see Joe, 1997). The number of lags in the mean 
and variance equations for each series is selected according to the Akaike 
information criteria (AIC) and the performance of the different copula models is 
evaluated using the AIC adjusted for small-sample bias, as in Breymann et al. 
(2003) and Reboredo (2011; 2013). 
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3.3. Data 
We empirically evaluated systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets by 
considering weekly data for sovereign bond benchmark price indices for France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, GIIPS markets and the overall sovereign bond price 
index for the EMU. Benchmark bond price indices were sourced from Datastream 
for 10-year maturities covering the period 7 January 2000 to 26 October 2012. Thus, 
we evaluated the VaR of the European sovereign debt market, represented by the 
EMU, conditional on the fact that a specific European debt market was in financial 
distress. 
Figure 3.1 displays the benchmark bond price return dynamics (computed on a 
continuous compounding basis) for all the debt markets considered, and also for the 
EMU index returns, showing differences in the size and timing of price movements 
(especially relevant after the onset of the debt crisis at the end of 2009). Price 
volatility significantly changed for the GIIPS markets with the onset of the debt 
crisis, whereas volatility dynamics for the non-crisis countries (Germany, France and 
the Netherlands) remained relatively stable. Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics 
for bond price returns. The average returns were similar across different debt 
markets and the corresponding standard deviations were larger for GIIPS markets 
than for the non-crisis markets. Also, differences between the maximum and 
minimum price returns show that price ranges were greater for GIIPS. Negative 
values for skewness were more pronounced for Greece than for the other debt 
markets (suggesting a greater probability of large decreases), with Ireland, Italy and 
Spain showing positive skewness. All return series showed high values for the 
kurtosis statistic, consistent with fat tails in the returns distributions; in fact, the 
Jarque-Bera test strongly rejected the normality of the unconditional distribution for 
all the series. The Ljung-Box statistic suggested the presence of serial correlation 
only in GIIPS returns. The autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity-Lagrange 
multiplier (ARCH-LM) statistic indicated that ARCH effects could be found in all 
the returns series. Finally, the results of the Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips 
and Perron (1988) non-stationarity tests and the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) 
stationarity test confirm that all debt return series were stationary. 
For the explanatory variables, we obtained weekly data on stock market 
indices for each country from Datastream, and also on the Eurostoxx 50 index for 
the EMU. Stock market volatility for each index at any time was computed as the 
standard deviation of the daily returns in a backward window of three months. Data 
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for the Euribor at one year were also sourced from Datastream. Figure 3.2 depicts 
the stock price return dynamics, showing an abrupt change around the onset of the 
debt crisis that was common to all stock markets. This fact is corroborated by the 
behaviour of the market volatility data depicted in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.1: Time series plot of weekly bond returns for selected countries and the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Portugal
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Spain
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
EMU
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for sovereign bond price returns. 
 
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain EMU 
Mean 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Std. Dev. 0.008 0.008 0.030 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.020 0.011 0.008 
Maximum 0.039 0.029 0.236 0.119 0.082 0.032 0.127 0.079 0.029 
Minimum -0.032 -0.027 -0.290 -0.103 -0.043 -0.034 -0.137 -0.049 -0.027 
Skewness -0.063 -0.073 -2.401 0.393 1.168 -0.166 -0.034 1.061 -0.072 
Kurtosis 4.400 3.315 36.985 20.451 14.600 4.101 17.367 13.574 3.317 
J-B 54.9* 3.3* 32788.7* 8493.9* 3897.4* 36.8* 5744.9* 3237.6* 3.4* 
Q(20) 21.673 23.546 113.950 35.907 46.847 24.583 101.330 42.140 23.804 
 [0.359] [0.263] [0.000] [0.016] [0.001] [0.218] [0.000] [0.003] [0.251] 
ARCH 7.288 7.106 11.084 12.955 3.901 6.176 10.025 8.404 7.086 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ADF -28.21* -28.14* -15.24* -24.37* -26.86* -27.52* -19.46* -30.86* -28.16* 
PP -28.19* -28.13* -23.32* -24.34* -26.84* -27.52* -25.86* -30.68* -28.15 
KPSS 0.06 0.10 0.50 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.10 
Notes. Weekly data for the period 14 January 2000 to 26 October 2012. EMU indicates European Economic 
and Monetary Union debt returns. J-B denotes the Jarque-Bera statistic for normality. Q(k) is the Ljung-
Box statistics for the serial correlation in returns computed with k lags. ARCH denotes Engle’s LM test for 
heteroskedasticity computed using 20 lags. For these tests, p values are reported in square brackets. ADF, 
PP and KPSS are the empirical statistics of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit root test, the Phillips-
Perron (1988) unit root test, and the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity test, respectively. An asterisk 
(*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%. 
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Figure 3.2: Time series plot of weekly market index returns for indices for selected 
countries and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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Figure 3.3: Time series plot of weekly market volatility returns for selected countries 
and the Eurostoxx 50. 
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Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for stock market return volatility and 
interest rate changes. Average volatility is similar across stock markets, with all 
volatility series exhibiting positive skewness and kurtosis, uncorrelated volatility and 
ARCH effects. The main features of log changes in the interest rate series are 
negative skewness, kurtosis and ARCH effects. 
Finally, we considered the crisis dummy variable, identifying two sample 
periods: before and after the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis (hereafter, 
the pre- and post-onset periods, respectively), assigning the values 0 to the pre-onset 
period and 1 to the post-onset period. The crucial point here was to determine the 
date when the European sovereign debt crisis started. Following Bhanot et al. 
(2014), we took this date to be November 2009. This was when investors became 
concerned regarding the quality of Greek debt, in response to the Greek government 
revealing that its debt amounted to 12.7% of gross domestic product, a figure 
considerably superior to the previously announced figure of 6.7%. The fact that the 
impact of the crisis was different across debt markets is likely to affect the 
dependence relationship between markets. Table 3.4 illustrates how the values of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient changed with the advent of the crisis. The lower 
triangular matrix shows that the correlation coefficient was positive and high for all 
the market pairs; however, the upper triangular matrix shows how correlation 
coefficients changed dramatically with the onset of the debt crisis: GIIPS negatively 
correlated with the EMU index, whereas France, Germany and the Netherlands 
continued to show high dependence on this index. Furthermore, linear dependence of 
the Greek market with the other markets changed, which decoupled from the non-
crisis markets and reduced dependence on the other countries in crisis. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for stock market returns. 
 
France 
CAC40 
Germany 
DAX40 
Greece 
ATHEX 
Ireland 
ISEQ 
Italy 
MIB30 
Netherlands 
AEX 
Portugal 
PI20 
Spain 
IBEX35 
EMU 
Eurostoxx 50 
Mean -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Std. Dev. 0.033 0.035 0.040 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.027 0.034 0.030 
Maximum 0.135 0.149 0.196 0.134 0.194 0.136 0.085 0.118 0.136 
Minimum -0.251 -0.243 -0.203 -0.317 -0.244 -0.288 -0.206 -0.238 -0.264 
Skewness -0.814 -0.553 -0.288 -1.707 -0.915 -1.081 -1.212 -0.766 -1.016 
Kurtosis 9.322 8.067 6.192 16.100 9.648 11.866 10.072 7.872 13.876 
J-B 1186.26 748.69 292.93 5100.83 1323.28 2317.97 1555.68 726.07 3407.52 
Q(20) 45.444 34.658 30.672 45.025 39.934 36.632 30.402 37.335 64.862 
 [0.001] [0.022] [0.060] [0.001] [0.005] [0.013] [0.064] [0.011] [0.000] 
ARCH 3.550 5.868 4.848 5.541 5.462 2.616 4.563 4.344 3.718 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes. See Table 3.1 notes.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for market volatility and Euribor at 1 year. 
 
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain EMU Euribor 1y 
Mean 0.103 0.106 0.116 0.094 0.100 0.100 0.076 0.102 0.261 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.045 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.052 0.035 0.044 0.106 0.001 
Maximum 0.263 0.247 0.234 0.302 0.250 0.281 0.205 0.248 0.813 0.003 
Minimum 0.044 0.045 0.047 0.034 0.035 0.040 0.024 0.041 0.116 -0.003 
Skewness 1.280 1.178 0.426 2.066 0.915 1.497 1.272 0.855 1.540 -0.468 
Kurtosis 4.712 3.740 2.130 8.599 3.374 4.855 5.467 3.790 6.238 6.835 
J-B 264.06* 169.69* 41.27* 1347.99* 97.15* 345.17* 349.50* 98.70* 556.05* 433.73* 
Q(20) 7600.1 8054.8 8983.6 9428.9 8098.5 7964.8 7634.3 7518.3 5613.7 442.53 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
ARCH 2382.7 1974.5 1047.3 3307.9 1831.2 3532.8 2140.5 2212.1 69.9 9.6 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Notes. See Table 3.1 notes. 
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Table 3.4: Pearson correlation coefficients. 
 
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain EMU 
France  0.69 -0.09 0.09 0.22 0.80 -0.02 0.23 0.69 
Germany 0.95  -0.36 -0.10 -0.19 0.93 -0.16 -0.09 1.00 
Greece 0.81 0.78  0.27 0.26 -0.28 0.29 0.22 -0.36 
Ireland 0.82 0.80 0.85  0.40 0.00 0.51 0.35 -0.10 
Italy 0.89 0.87 0.91 0.86  -0.08 0.29 0.75 -0.19 
Netherlands 0.95 0.96 0.86 0.86 0.92  -0.12 0.00 0.93 
Portugal 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.94  0.25 -0.16 
Spain 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.95  -0.09 
EMU 0.95 1.00 0.78 0.80 0.87 0.96 0.89 0.94  
Notes. EMU indicates European Economic and Monetary Union. The lower triangular matrix reports 
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient in the pre-onset period and the upper triangular matrix shows the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient in the post-onset period. 
3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Marginal model results 
Table 3.5 displays estimation results for the marginal models specified in Eqs. (3.8)-
(3.10) for sovereign debt returns. Marginal models were estimated by considering 
different combinations of the parameters p, r and m for values ranging from zero to 
a maximum lag of two; the most suitable model was selected according to AIC 
values. The evidence reported in Table 3.5 indicates that stock market returns had a 
negative impact on sovereign debt returns for all debt markets except Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal; stock market volatility, meanwhile, had no significant 
impact on average returns except for French debt returns and for the EMU index. 
Interest rate dynamics had a significant negative impact on debt returns in all series. 
The results for the crisis dummy variable indicate that the sovereign debt crisis 
negatively impacted average returns only in Greece and Portugal. Regarding debt 
return volatility, the empirical results confirm that volatility was persistent across 
different debt markets and leverage effects were hardly observed (Ireland, Italy and 
Spain were the exceptions). Consistent with the descriptive evidence on non-
normality and fat tails reported in Table 3.1, the estimated values for the degrees of 
freedom and the symmetry parameter of the skewed Student-t distribution confirm 
that the error terms are not normal and in some cases are asymmetric. 
We also checked the goodness-of-fit of our marginal models. The last rows of 
Table 3.5 indicate that neither autocorrelation nor ARCH effects remain in the 
residuals of the marginal models. Furthermore, we tested for the adequacy of the 
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skewed-t distribution model, testing the null hypothesis that the standardized model 
residuals were uniform (0,1) by comparing the empirical distribution and the 
theoretical distribution function using the well-known Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
Cramér-von Mises and Anderson-Darling tests. The p-values for these tests, reported 
in last three rows of Table 3.5, indicate that, for either of the marginal models, the 
null of the correct specification of the distribution function could not be rejected at 
the 5% significance level. Overall, our goodness-of-fit tests indicate that the marginal 
distribution models were not mis-specified, so the copula model could correctly 
capture dependence between debt markets. 
3.4.2. Copula model results 
We considered the potential effects of the European sovereign debt crisis on 
dependence by estimating copula models for the pre- and post-onset periods, 
delimitating both periods according to the information reported by the crisis dummy 
variable. We also considered the systemic risk of each country for the European debt 
market as a whole and the systemic risk of Greece—the main country affected by 
the debt crisis—for other European debt markets. For the pre-onset and post-onset 
periods we estimated eight copula pairs for the EMU index returns and each 
country’s debt index returns; we also estimated seven copula pairs for the Greek 
debt index returns and the debt market returns for each of the other countries. 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the copula model results for the EMU paired with 
each European country in the pre- and post-onset periods, respectively. The evidence 
from both static and time-varying copulas indicate that all the debt markets 
strongly co-moved with the EMU index, providing consistent evidence of tail 
dependence and time-varying (TVP) dependence. In fact, according to the AIC 
values, TVP-rotated Gumbel copula and the Student-t offered the best fit for all 
markets, meaning that there was lower tail dependence and, in one case, symmetric 
tail dependence. Table 3.7 reports the results for the post-onset period, showing how 
the shape of dependence changed completely. With the onset of the crisis, European 
debt markets decoupled: GIIPS debt markets moved in the opposite direction to the 
general debt index, whereas the non-crisis countries (France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) continued to strongly co-move (mainly Germany) with the EMU index 
as in the pre-onset period. Tail dependence results also indicated that Greece and 
Portugal decoupled from the EMU index under extreme market movements, since, 
according to the AIC, the best copula fit displayed tail independence (the Gaussian 
copula for Greece and the Plackett copula for Portugal). The other countries in 
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crisis displayed lower symmetric tail dependence — as represented by the TVP-
Student-t copula — in the post-onset period compared to the pre-onset period. For 
the non-crisis countries, tail dependence also changed, with France and the 
Netherlands showing lower tail independence and with Germany showing 
asymmetric tail dependence. Obviously, such changes in the dependence structure, 
and in particular in tail dependence, have implications for systemic risk that will be 
considered below. 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report results for the copula models for Greece paired with 
each European country in the pre- and post-onset periods. The evidence provided by 
the static and TVP copulas shows that the Greek debt market strongly co-moved 
with all the European debt markets, indicating lower tail dependence and upper tail 
independence. According to the AIC, the TVP-rotated Gumbel copula was the 
model that best fit all countries, with the exception of Italy, where the TVP-Gumbel 
copula offered the best fit, displaying upper tail dependence and lower tail 
independence with Greece. Table 3.9 reports dependence results for the post-onset 
period, showing that Greek debt market dependence on other European markets 
completely changed with the onset of the debt crisis. The Greek market decoupled 
from the non-crisis countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands), moving in the 
opposite direction on average and showing independence at the tails. The Greek 
debt market continued to co-move with the other countries in crisis in the post-onset 
period, although the intensity of co-movement decreased considerably. According to 
the AIC, the best copula fit revealed that, in times of extreme downturns, the Greek 
debt market did not co-move with the Irish, Italian, Portuguese or Spanish debt 
markets. There was also upper tail independence with the Greek market for all these 
markets except Portugal. It is important to point out that, according to our copula 
results, the Greek crisis at its depth did not have any spillover effect on the general 
EMU market index, given that this index is mainly based on non-crisis countries. 
This evidence is consistent with the results reported in Bhanot et al. (2014) for a 
multivariate GARCH model. 
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Table 3.5: Parameter estimates for the marginal distribution models. 
 
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain EMU 
Mean    
     
 
0
  0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (2.18) (1.99) (0.85) (0.37) (1.77) (1.58) (2.10) (1.96) (2.04) 
AR(1) -0.112* -0.091*  -0.042   -0.125* -0.121* -0.094* 
 (-2.64) (-2.18)  (-1.00)   (-3.07) (-2.99) (-2.27) 
Euribor -4.726* -4.388* -4.754* -4.957* -4.673* -4.429* -5.017* -4.824* -4.574* 
 (-8.97) (-9.03) (-11.24) (-9.78) (-11.60) (-9.70) (-10.47) (-11.28) (-9.07) 
EMU Index -0.068* -0.069* -0.003 -0.013 -0.012 -0.068* -0.014 -0.026* -0.091* 
 (-5.74) (-6.30) (-0.39) (-1.06) (-0.91) (-5.91) (-1.05) (-2.33) (-6.21) 
Market Vol. -0.011* -0.009 -0.003 0.000 -0.008 -0.007 -0.015 -0.008 -0.005* 
 (-1.92) (-1.93) (-0.45) (0.05) (-1.68) (-1.29) (-1.82) (-1.49) (-2.03) 
Dummy 0.001 0.001 -0.012* -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.003* -0.001 0.001 
 (1.197) (1.50) (-4.32) (-0.90) (-0.23) (1.49) (-2.16) (-1.33) (1.72) 
Variance    
     
 
  1.968* 1.531* 0.035* 0.019* 1.291* 1.870* 0.014* 0.015* 1.567* 
 (2.35) (2.35) (3.74) (2.16) (2.54) (2.073) (3.05) (2.64) (2.27) 
1

 0.087* 0.085* 0.034 -0.003 0.000 0.087* 0.038 0.010 0.094* 
 (3.04) (2.68) (0.50) (-0.08) (0.01) (2.543) (1.47) (0.38) (2.72) 
1

 0.867* 0.885* 0.851* 0.884* 0.890* 0.863* 0.886* 0.882* 0.879* 
 (29.61) (37.38) (21.51) (20.26) (40.50) (24.11) (48.30) (33.18) (34.66) 
  0.002 -0.020 0.158 0.162* 0.166* 0.005 0.104 0.147* -0.028 
 (0.04) (-0.49) (1.29) (3.45) (3.37) (0.094) (1.840) (2.226) (-0.65) 
Dummy 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (32.81) (99.43) (87.63) (151.6) (42.44) (75.75) (227.2) (186.3) (93.75) 
Asymmetry -0.034 -0.116* -0.165* -0.115* -0.117 -0.073 -0.127* -0.144* -0.091 
 (-0.61) (-2.31) (-2.68) (-2.12) (-1.85) (-1.26) (-1.93) (-2.48) (-1.69) 
Tail 6.827* 8.538* 3.348* 5.257* 6.424* 8.390* 5.614* 7.252* 8.489* 
 
(72.08) (39.20) (4.02) (14.36) (105.6) (117.2) (39.93) (83.69) (128.8) 
LogLik 2404.47 2412.65 2120.94 2259.65 2390.82 2428.22 2203.12 2332.55 2414.79 
LJ 18.129 16.061 24.227 16.418 29.691 19.782 18.374 19.710 17.921 
 
[0.514] [0.653] [0.233] [0.629] [0.075] [0.472] [0.498] [0.412] [0.528] 
LJ
2
 22.954 23.810 27.523 27.278 15.443 19.416 21.691 12.057 26.933 
 
[0.192] [0.161] [0.051] [0.074] [0.631] [0.367] [0.246] [0.844] [0.080] 
ARCH 1.065 1.403 1.456 1.365 0.826 0.969 0.939 0.603 1.549 
 
[0.383] [0.113] [0.090] [0.133] [0.682] [0.498] [0.537] [0.912] [0.060] 
K-S [0.986] [0.946] [0.967] [0.892] [0.882] [0.903] [0.940] [0.948] [0.531] 
C-vM [0.990] [0.864] [0.938] [0.812] [0.989] [0.926] [0.989] [0.996] [0.740] 
A-D [0.992] [0.911] [0.963] [0.896] [0.998] [0.907] [0.992] [0.999] [0.806] 
Note. The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates and the z statistics (in parentheses) for the 
parameters of the marginal distribution models given by Eqs. (8)-(10).
 
LogLik is the log-likelihood value. LJ 
denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in the residual model calculated with 20 lags. LJ2 
denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in the squared residual model calculated with 20 lags. 
ARCH is Engle’s LM test for the ARCH effect in the residuals up to 20th order. K-S, C-vM and A-D denote 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramér-von Mises and Anderson-Darling tests for adequacy of the skewed-t 
distribution model. P values (in square brackets) below 0.05 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis. An 
asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5%. EMU indicates European Economic and Monetary Union.  
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Table 3.6: Estimates for copula models in the period before crisis onset. European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) vs. selected countries. 
Panel A: Parameter estimates for time-invariant copulas. 
Copula France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Gaussian          

 0.936* 0.981* 0.834* 0.835* 0.868* 0.943* 0.880* 0.909* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
AIC -1067.493 -1680.860 -603.613 -608.745 -713.692 -1123.293 -756.375 -890.382 
Student-t          

 0.952* 0.983* 0.858* 0.868* 0.881* 0.948* 0.897* 0.916* 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
  
 
 
1.828* 3.510* 2.841* 2.322* 4.214* 2.495* 3.247* 3.646* 
(0.26) (0.80) (0.53) (0.36) (0.99) (0.36) (0.59) (0.82) 
AIC -1266.306 -1760.424 -688.291 -724.814 -759.001 -1214.324 -824.799 -936.630 
Gumbel  
 
        
  
 
 
4.674* 7.955* 2.764* 2.840* 3.001* 4.593* 3.174* 3.528* 
(0.18) (0.30) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) 
AIC -1117.217 -1687.119 -619.432 -643.766 -715.031 -1115.740 -748.857 -865.385 
Rotated Gumbel        
  
 
 
4.971* 7.969* 2.809* 2.862* 2.981* 4.759* 3.270* 3.662* 
(0.19) (0.30) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) 
AIC -1186.789 -1688.961 -644.116 -657.189 -704.506 -1166.714 -784.269 -901.423 
BB7 
 
        
  4.162* 4.929* 2.421* 2.563* 2.801* 4.116* 2.711 3.073* 
 
(0.15) (0.00) (0.25) (0.18) (0.29) (0.22) (2.14) (0.49) 
  4.770* 8.747* 2.051* 1.930* 1.877* 4.461* 2.469* 2.937* 
 
(0.27) (0.03) (0.39) (0.18) (0.22) (0.31) (1.22) (0.85) 
AIC -1136.301 -1604.134 -633.823 -645.491 -696.002 -1131.798 -748.137 -870.589 
Plackett          
  134.543* 294.951* 31.904* 40.619* 37.994* 110.522* 46.854* 56.622* 
 (13.34) (32.99) (3.49) (4.60) (3.25) (15.88) (4.46) (5.43) 
AIC -1256.681 -1691.174 -672.451 -733.420 -755.312 -1189.036 -827.383 -921.424 
BB1         
  1.051* 0.827* 0.679* 0.599* 0.479* 0.947* 0.730* 0.783* 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) 
  3.264* 5.876* 2.150* 2.268* 2.496* 3.282* 2.433* 2.668* 
 (0.21) (0.34) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14) (0.16) 
AIC -1198.671 -1746.093 -660.372 -677.892 -739.670 -1187.867 -796.358 -918.379 
  


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Panel B: Parameter estimates for time-varying copulas. 
Copula France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
TVP-Gaussian         
0  0.697 -0.611 -1.198* -0.870 -1.749 -1.050 -1.836 -1.484 
 (4.02) (17.72) (0.03) (70.06) (66.30) (22.01) (10.09) (452.12) 
1  0.111 0.422 0.309* 0.443 0.078 -0.132 0.249 -0.007 
 (0.06) (1.64) (0.02) (5.03) (2.76) (0.33) (0.27) (2.44) 
2  2.796 5.000 4.087* 3.658 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
 (4.29) (16.58) (0.05) (106.19) (73.45) (23.11) (11.74) (501.79) 
AIC -1064.763 -1691.338 -628.580 -656.319 -710.828 -1121.542 -762.466 -886.352 
TVP-Student         
0  7.669* 44.715 5.629* 7.100* 9.028* -0.050 6.440 7.761 
 (0.93) (115.39) (1.03) (1.09) (1.94) (0.11) (6.81) (20.72) 
1  -0.017 0.001 -0.082 -0.051 -0.091 0.337 -0.289 -0.031 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.28) (0.29) (0.11) 
2  -3.975* -40.634 -3.406* -5.000* -6.974* 0.934 -3.260 -5.000 
 (1.07) (117.53) (1.20) (1.21) (2.22) (1.16) (7.34) (22.96) 
  1.951* 3.508* 2.344* 2.084* 3.822* 5.032* 11.020* 3.518 
 (0.29) (1.18) (0.37) (0.29) (0.84) (2.14) (5.62) (2.04) 
AIC -1269.201 -1756.383 -688.087 -723.210 -755.618 -1214.939 -275.838 -932.676 
TVP-Gumbel         
 1.412* 1.744* 1.661* 1.449* 1.238* 1.353* 1.603* 1.892 
 (0.11) (0.24) (0.41) (0.29) (0.61) (0.10) (0.40) (1.13) 
  0.172* 0.138* 0.095 0.148* 0.176 0.179* 0.112 0.049 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.12) (0.01) (0.08) (0.21) 
  -4.429* -5.000* -4.880* -4.422* -3.295 -4.174* -4.757* -5.000 
 (0.88) (1.82) (1.48) (1.17) (2.08) (0.84) (1.56) (4.11) 
AIC -1275.875 -1730.546 -698.930 -768.086 -766.341 -1198.528 -799.470 -903.540 
TVP-Rotated Gumbel        
 1.320* 1.702* 1.316* 1.457* 0.773* 1.264* 1.461* 1.696* 
 (0.06) (0.23) (0.25) (0.21) (0.05) (0.09) (0.21) (0.36) 
  0.180* 0.144* 0.167* 0.149* 0.266* 0.186* 0.147* 0.111 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) 
  -3.451* -5.000* -3.716* -4.494* -1.664* -3.172* -4.309* -5.000* 
 (0.53) (2.52) (0.99) (0.91) (0.32) (0.67) (0.91) (1.47) 
AIC -1335.555 -1757.076 -725.442 -782.999 -766.521 -1237.901 -842.849 -963.021 
Notes. The table reports the ML estimates for the different copula models for the EMU index returns and debt 
index returns for the European countries indicated. Standard error values (in brackets) and Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) values adjusted for small-sample bias are provided for the different copula models. 
The minimum AIC value (in bold) indicates the best copula fit. For the TVP-Gaussian and TVP-Student-t 
copulas, q in Eq. (3.13) was set to 10. An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.7: Estimates for copula models in the period after crisis onset. European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) vs. selected countries. 
Panel A: Parameter estimates for time-invariant copulas. 
Copula France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Gaussian  
   
  
 
  
  0.679* 0.994* -0.370* -0.156* -0.182* 0.914* -0.194* -0.103 
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) 
AIC -94.074 -686.627 -20.824 -1.812 -3.188 -279.631 -3.928 0.364 
Student-t          
  0.684* 0.994* -0.362* -0.175* -0.154 0.916* -0.192* -0.108 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) 
  
 
 
10.311 17.672 59.756 5.179* 5.393 11.644 7.905 3.810* 
(7.53) (13.18) (643.5
2) 
(2.43) (2.86) (20.36) (4.69) (1.57) 
AIC -93.371 -685.348 -18.805 -5.746 -5.473 -278.957 -4.300 -4.192 
Gumbel  
 
        
  
 
 
1.821* 13.132* 1.000* 1.000* 1.000* 3.475* 1.000* 1.000* 
(0.12) (0.88) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.08) 
AIC -89.144 -666.026 2.026 2.026 2.026 -263.297 2.026 2.026 
Rotated Gumbel         
  
  
1.838* 13.029* 1.000* 1.005* 1.000* 3.558* 1.000* 1.000* 
(0.12) (0.87) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09) (0.24) (0.09) (0.09) 
AIC -88.574 -666.476 2.026 1.973 2.026 -267.907 2.026 2.026 
BB7  
 
        
  1.666* 5.733* 1.001* 1.001* 1.001* 3.113* 1.001* 1.001* 
 
(0.19) (0.30) (0.21) (0.38) (0.35) (0.17) (0.38) (0.43) 
  0.913* 10.474* 0.001 0.001 0.001 2.635* 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.21) (0.95) (0.99) (0.95) (0.95) (0.17) (0.95) (0.94) 
AIC -88.226 -588.400 4.261 4.109 4.159 -258.116 4.178 4.119 
Plackett         
  9.939* 665.125* 0.366* 0.507* 0.606* 48.488* 0.540* 0.700* 
 (2.00) (130.30) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (10.71) (0.13) (0.18) 
AIC -94.752 -648.064 -15.609 -4.192 -2.079 -270.526 -4.663 0.164 
BB1         
  0.403* 0.924* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.675* 0.001 0.001 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.84) (0.87) (0.87) (0.22) (0.85) (0.86) 
  1.568* 9.389* 1.001 1.001 1.001 2.720* 1.001 1.001 
 (0.15) (1.04) (0.66) (0.57) (0.58) (0.28) (0.64) (0.59) 
AIC -92.345 -686.060 4.327 4.135 4.188 -274.670 4.215 4.132 
  


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Panel B: Parameter estimates for time-varying copulas. 
Copula France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
TVP-Gaussian         
0  2.916 5.000 -0.845 -0.185 -0.290 5.000 -0.388 -0.003 
 (41.03) (83.18) (0.49) (0.18) (2.50) (8.76) (1.36) (0.27) 
1  0.116 0.015 -0.372 -0.248 1.130 -0.284 -0.148 1.201* 
 (5.85) (25.41) (0.48) (0.22) (0.86) (0.38) (0.47) (0.33) 
2  -2.000 1.000 0.126 1.160 -2.000 -1.761 0.116 -2.000* 
 (63.09) (56.93) (1.02) (0.77) (5.33) (9.33) (6.93) (0.05) 
AIC -90.021 -682.559 -17.566 0.373 -9.741 -276.408 -0.009 -4.988 
TVP-Student         
0  1.595 106.808 -0.838* -0.021 -0.044 6.440 -0.583 -0.070 
 (2.07) (161.24) (0.26) (0.03) (0.04) (6.81) (1.24) (0.12) 
1  -0.195 0.155 -0.362 -0.110* 0.181 -0.289 -0.099 0.299 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.29) (0.06) (0.14) (0.29) (0.37) (0.23) 
2  0.363 -101.562 0.132 2.159* 1.600* -3.260 -0.817 0.807 
 (2.71) (161.13) (0.66) (0.10) (0.48) (7.34) (6.21) (0.93) 
  6.862 17.439 100.000* 5.309* 4.833* 11.020* 7.982 4.420* 
 (5.16) (19.73) (0.00) (1.48) (1.93) (5.62) (5.82) (1.88) 
AIC -89.577 -681.335 -15.464 -8.163 -15.034 -275.838 -0.194 -6.759 
TVP-Gumbel         
 2.167* 1.984* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.771* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.62) (0.23) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.21) (1.00) (1.00) 
  -0.154 0.123* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.258* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.21) (0.02) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.04) (1.00) (1.00) 
  -5.000* -4.619 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.107 0.000 0.000 
 (1.25) (2.46) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.76) (1.00) (1.00) 
AIC -112.068 -663.314 6.175 6.163 6.167 -263.027 6.169 6.163 
TVP-Rotated Gumbel        
 0.847 2.920 0.000 -1.399* 0.000 0.633* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.48) (1.82) (1.00) (0.53) (1.00) (0.10) (1.00) (1.00) 
  0.252 0.052 0.000 1.001 0.000 0.286* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.13) (0.13) (1.00) (0.62) (1.00) (0.02) (1.00) (1.00) 
  -2.317 -5.000 0.000 1.248 0.000 -0.655 0.000 0.000 
 (1.24) (12.52) (1.00) (0.95) (1.00) (0.39) (1.00) (1.00) 
AIC 1.000 -662.873 6.173 4.807 6.161 -267.848 6.161 6.160 
Notes. See Table 3.6 notes. 
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Table 3.8: Estimates for the copula models in the period before crisis onset. Greece 
vs. country. 
Panel A: Parameter estimates for time-invariant copulas. 
Copula France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Gaussian         
  0.856* 0.834* 0.916* 0.932* 0.867* 0.944* 0.915* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
AIC -671.901 -602.133 -932.624 -1035.026 -707.130 -1128.174 -925.587 
Student-t         
  0.878* 0.857* 0.940* 0.949* 0.880* 0.952* 0.931* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  
 
 
2.318* 3.061* 1.343* 1.521* 2.287* 2.489* 2.094* 
(0.43) (0.57) (0.16) (0.19) (0.34) (1.01) (0.29) 
AIC -772.265 -682.688 -1147.700 -1200.938 -784.636 -1213.367 -1044.899 
Gumbel  
 
       
  
 
 
3.060* 2.743* 4.266* 4.647* 3.065* 4.812* 3.960* 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.15) 
AIC -704.236 -616.276 -982.597 -1073.074 -710.077 -1125.291 -932.318 
Rotated Gumbel        
  
 
 
3.035* 2.798* 4.496* 4.766* 3.148* 4.971* 4.200* 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) 
AIC -710.350 -640.877 -1049.016 -1108.588 -745.980 -1165.662 -1002.412 
BB7 
 
       
  2.836 2.399* 3.639* 4.126* 2.692* 5.275* 3.353* 
 
(3.81) (0.23) (0.25) (0.01) (0.22) (0.04) (0.17) 
  2.143* 2.029* 4.483* 4.269* 2.553* 5.074* 4.036* 
 
(0.29) (0.14) (0.41) (0.03) (0.17) (0.00) (0.23) 
AIC -712.089 -630.231 -1022.834 -1068.123 -740.602 -1126.389 -969.510 
Plackett         
  43.107* 31.535* 125.294* 143.040* 44.410* 117.270* 82.852* 
 (6.44) (3.10) (6.78) (14.70) (3.60) (11.82) (5.60) 
AIC -763.799 -666.266 -1137.193 -1209.029 -768.939 -1190.713 -1030.318 
BB1         
  0.609* 0.674* 1.093* 0.861* 0.806* 0.925* 1.068* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.23) 
  2.425* 2.140* 2.942* 3.409* 2.290* 3.474* 2.750* 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22) 
AIC -740.509 -656.994 -1061.755 -1130.593 -763.160 -1190.198 -1011.073 
  


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Panel B: Parameter estimates for time-varying copulas. 
Copula France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
TVP-Gaussian 
    
   
0  -1.143* -0.985 -0.919 -1.901 -1.879* -1.539 -1.903 
 (0.25) (5.23) (16.77) (16.31) (0.51) (9.56) (17.24) 
1  0.440* 0.345 0.548* 0.822 0.291* 0.524* 0.767 
 (0.08) (1.29) (0.15) (0.63) (0.09) (0.11) (72.88) 
2  4.000* 3.793 4.001 5.000 5.000* 5.000 4.947 
 (0.36) (7.57) (18.01) (16.49) (0.67) (10.02) (14.72) 
AIC -709.982 -626.195 -957.491 -1098.490 -728.252 -1147.538 -977.912 
TVP-Student        
0  -3.095* 6.465* 10.266* 1.176 -0.437* 9.047 1.124* 
 (1.13) (1.56) (2.04) (1.02) (0.17) (9.20) (0.38) 
1  0.092 -0.089 -0.008 -0.003 -0.020* -0.025 0.953* 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.40) 
2  6.556* -4.405* -7.175* 2.656* 3.725* -5.540 -1.600 
 (1.37) (1.80) (2.13) (1.09) (0.21) (9.64) (0.85) 
  3.479* 2.610* 1.265* 1.485* 1.945* 2.302* 10.749 
 (0.63) (0.54) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.45) (5.90) 
AIC -781.633 -680.461 -1147.196 -1202.745 -789.062 -1209.952 -41.941 
TVP-Gumbel        
 1.422* 1.580* 1.418* 1.536* 0.957* 1.454* 1.425* 
 (0.30) (0.25) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.30) (0.17) 
  0.159* 0.109* 0.173* 0.158* 0.233* 0.164* 0.169* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
  -4.270* -4.563* -4.650* -5.000* -2.314* -4.206* -4.543* 
 (1.28) (0.93) (0.58) (0.30) (0.54) (1.54) (0.89) 
AIC -823.898 -695.634 -1211.396 -1325.291 -783.531 -1227.545 -1069.085 
TVP-Rotated Gumbel       
 1.291* 1.392* 1.399 1.529* 0.888* 1.361* 1.320* 
 (0.17) (0.30) (0.81) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) 
  0.184* 0.147* 0.173* 0.158* 0.242* 0.178* 0.181* 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  -3.924* -3.791* -4.229 -5.000* -1.869* -3.879* -3.645* 
 (0.85) (1.10) (6.10) (0.47) (0.50) (0.88) (0.42) 
AIC -828.722 -718.430 -1246.123 -1321.561 -810.422 -1285.344 -1116.245 
Notes. See Table 3.6 notes.  
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Table 3.9: Estimates for the copula models in the period after crisis onset. Greece vs. 
country. 
Panel A: Parameter estimates for time-invariant copulas. 
Copula France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Gaussian        
  -0.061 -0.377* 0.473* 0.417* -0.264* 0.470* 0.400* 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
AIC 1.432 -21.754 -37.308 -27.601 -9.276 -36.665 -24.910 
Student-t         
  -0.059 -0.368* 0.449* 0.384* -0.258* 0.440* 0.377* 
 
(0.20) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
  
 
 
500.000 37.902 100.000 32.619 500.000 8.075 22.329 
(1377.3
5) 
(36.14) (81.42) (89.61) (1758.78) (6.33) (38.08) 
AIC 3.629 -19.772 -35.395 -25.960 -7.196 -36.803 -23.631 
Gumbel  
 
       
  
 
 
1.000* 1.000* 1.344* 1.269* 1.000* 1.372* 1.270* 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
AIC 2.026 2.026 -34.138 -25.111 2.026 -40.190 -23.783 
Rotated Gumbel        
  
 
1.000* 1.000* 1.350* 1.280* 1.000* 1.367* 1.269* 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 
AIC 2.026 2.026 -28.568 -22.014 2.026 -30.844 -18.434 
BB7  
 
       
  1.001* 1.001* 1.294* 1.229* 1.001* 1.402* 1.235* 
 
(0.46) (0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.29) (0.12) (0.11) 
  0.001 0.001 0.307* 0.299* 0.001 0.252* 0.261* 
 
(0.93) (0.99) (0.11) (0.11) (0.97) (0.12) (0.12) 
AIC 4.172 4.261 -31.717 -25.525 4.235 -38.020 -21.565 
Plackett         
  0.925* 0.353* 4.171* 3.110* 0.523* 4.276* 3.170* 
 (0.19) (0.08) (0.90) (0.69) (0.12) (0.94) (0.68) 
AIC 1.887 -16.633 -33.880 -20.940 -5.663 -34.341 -23.500 
BB1         
  0.001 0.001 0.149 0.187 0.001 0.092 0.131 
 (0.85) (0.84) (0.12) (0.13) (0.84) (0.12) (0.12) 
  1.001 1.001 1.267* 1.188* 1.001 1.325* 1.211* 
 (0.62) (0.66) (0.09) (0.08) (0.64) (0.10) (0.08) 
AIC 4.188 4.327 -33.753 -25.888 4.284 -38.826 -22.940 
  


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Panel B: Parameter estimates for time-varying copulas. 
Copula France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
TVP-Gaussian 
    
   
0  -0.081 -0.805 1.725* 0.336 -0.891 1.077 0.175 
 (0.13) (0.88) (0.81) (0.71) (0.54) (0.81) (0.30) 
1  -0.367 -0.335 0.244 -0.062 -0.751 1.530 -0.144 
 (0.56) (0.47) (0.29) (0.17) (0.67) (1.25) (0.19) 
2  0.719 0.246 -1.946 1.314 -0.604 -2.000 1.792* 
 (1.62) (2.06) (1.56) (1.72) (1.55) (1.34) (0.63) 
AIC 4.684 -18.442 -33.568 -23.856 -6.916 -44.739 -22.290 
TVP-Student        
0  -0.110 -0.807 1.836* 0.321 -0.891 1.124* 1.723* 
 (0.34) (0.85) (0.58) (0.65) (1.24) (0.38) (0.47) 
1  0.150 -0.325 0.595* -0.053 -0.753 0.953* -0.322 
 (0.35) (0.41) (0.15) (0.15) (0.59) (0.40) (0.49) 
2  -2.153* 0.225 -2.583* 1.338 -0.601 -1.600 -2.000* 
 (0.05) (2.10) (0.50) (1.64) (5.29) (0.85) (0.65) 
  499.046 53.091 51.820 35.602 500.000 10.749 25.178 
 (826.55) (307.10) (182.00) (101.05) (1772.87) (5.90) (39.80) 
AIC 7.628 -16.369 -32.884 -21.919 -4.767 -41.941 -19.824 
TVP-Gumbel        
 0.000 0.000 2.251* 1.283 0.000 0.757 1.079 
 (1.00) (1.00) (0.32) (0.79) (1.00) (0.99) (0.64) 
  0.000 0.000 -0.750* -0.182 0.000 0.241 -0.169 
 (1.00) (1.00) (0.10) (0.45) (1.00) (0.40) (0.43) 
  0.000 0.000 -2.665 -1.947 0.000 -1.904 -1.301 
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.64) (1.15) (1.00) (1.75) (0.92) 
AIC 6.167 6.174 -32.556 -24.977 6.172 -47.444 -21.348 
TVP-Rotated Gumbel       
 0.000 0.000 0.515 1.018 0.000 0.622* 0.669 
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.04) (1.27) (1.00) (0.24) (1.67) 
  0.000 0.000 0.300 -0.290 0.000 0.316* 0.012 
 (1.00) (1.00) (0.49) (0.94) (1.00) (0.08) (1.19) 
  0.000 0.000 -1.396 -0.430 0.000 -1.871* -0.647 
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.70) (1.11) (1.00) (0.66) (1.13) 
AIC 6.164 6.173 -28.235 -18.030 6.170 -38.570 -14.679 
Notes. See Table 3.6 notes. 
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3.4.3. CoVaR results 
Using the best copula fit for the pre- and post-onset periods, and following the two-
step procedure described above, we computed the CoVaR at the 99% confidence 
level ( 0.01  ) for the European sovereign debt market, conditional on the VaR for 
the sovereign debt returns of different countries at the 99% confidence level             
( 0.01  ).6 
Figure 3.4 depicts the results for the CoVaR and  CoVaR (in percentage) 
dynamics in the pre- and post-onset periods (delimited by a vertical line). For each 
figure that represents the systemic risk of each country, we also included information 
on the CoVaR, as computed using the methodology proposed by Girardi and Ergün 
(2013). Thus, taking a bivariate dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model 
with a bivariate Student-t density for the standardized residuals of the marginal 
models in Eqs. (3.8)-(3.10), and taking the value of VaR 7  for the market under 
distress, we numerically solved Eq. (3.4). We could thus visualize the differences 
between the copula approach and the approach used by Girardi and Ergün (2013) to 
compute the CoVaR and so assess the impact of copula modelling on the CoVaR 
values. 
Figure 3.4 indicates that, in the pre-onset period, all European debt markets 
experienced a similar trend in terms of systemic risk, with the size of this risk very 
similar across debt markets. Furthermore, the CoVaR measure clearly captured the 
impact of the dot-com bubble and the subprime crisis on systemic risk with 
significant reductions in the CoVaR values. The  CoVaR dynamics were similar, 
displaying significant increases around the time of the dot-com bubble and recent 
global financial crises. Table 3.10 provides a descriptive analysis for the CoVaR and 
 CoVaR measures (in percentages) across debt markets. The results for the pre-
onset period corroborate the graphical evidence: across debt markets, average 
CoVaR and CoVaR values were similar and standard deviations were of a similar 
magnitude. Descriptive statistics for the CoVaR values also indicate very similar 
results, irrespective of whether the CoVaR was computed through a bivariate  
  
                                                 
6 Results at the 95% confidence level are available on request. 
7 The VaR values for any European debt market j at any time t is computed from the 
marginal models as j 21,t t , j,tVaR t ( )

  
     , where t  and 
2
j,t  are the conditional 
mean and standard deviation of the debt returns computed according to Eqs. (3.8)-(3.9) and 
where 1,t ( )

 
  denotes the  -quantile of the skewed Student-t distribution in Eq. (3.10). 
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Figure 3.4: CoVaR (left axis) and ∆CoVaR (right axis) estimates for the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with respect to selected 
countries. 
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Figure 3.4: (Continued) 
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Figure 3.4: (Continued) 
 
 
 
  
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
-0.09
-0.07
-0.05
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
Italy
CoVaR Copula CoVaR Student-t ∆CoVaR
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
-0.09
-0.07
-0.05
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
Netherlands
CoVaR Copula CoVaR Student-t ∆CoVaR
Systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets: A CoVaR-copula approach 
81 
Figure 3.4: (Continued) 
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Student-t distribution or using a copula approach. Thus, regarding the pre-onset 
period, the copula approach to the CoVaR only had computational, not modelling, 
advantages, given that co-movement between debt markets and the EMU index was 
very high, with tail dependence also high for all copula specifications. In fact, there 
is no significant difference between the tail dependence arising from the TVP-
rotated Gumbel copula (the best copula fit for almost all the markets) and the lower 
tail dependence arising from the Student-t copula. As a result, the CoVaR values for 
these two copula specifications did not differ too much, as Table 3.10 reports. 
Regarding the post-onset period, the dynamics of the estimated CoVaR—as 
displayed in Figure 3.4 to the right of the vertical line and according to the 
descriptive statistics in Table 3.10—indicate that values increased for the GIIPS, 
with the exception of Spain. This is consistent with the fact that the debt markets of 
countries in crisis decoupled from other debt markets after the onset of the European 
sovereign debt market crisis. In fact, the dependence structure drastically changed in 
that the tail dependence of the pre-onset period dissipated after the onset of the debt 
crisis. The rise in the CoVaR values indicate that the systemic risk of the crisis 
countries was reduced, a finding corroborated by the behaviour of the  CoVaR 
values, which, in some cases, dropped to negative values as a result of opposite 
movement between the country in question and the EMU index returns. In the case 
of Spain, lower tail dependence with the EMU index persisted, so CoVaR values 
dropped, thus furnishing evidence of an increase in systemic risk in the Spanish 
sovereign debt market. This result is consistent with the concerns of government 
authorities and financial media; it is also consistent with the fact that the Spanish 
debt market could be the drive-belt for the debt crisis in peripheral countries, 
bringing its repercussions to the hard core of Europe and generalizing the crisis to all 
European debt markets. In contrast, for the non-crisis countries, the CoVaR values 
dropped significantly, indicating that French, German and Dutch debt market risk 
became more systemic than in the pre-onset period. This result was a consequence of 
their decoupling from debt markets after the onset of the debt crisis; it was also due 
to the fact that the markets continued to strongly co-move with the EMU index. 
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Table 3.10: Summary CoVaR and CoVaR statistics for the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) and selected countries. 
  Before crisis onset  After crisis onset 
Country Method Mean Std. Max Min  Mean Std. Max Min 
France 
Student-t -3.566 0.979 -1.325 -7.914  -4.914 0.748 -3.314 -7.290 
Copula -3.568 0.979 -1.325 -7.915  -4.086 0.650 -2.112 -5.560 
∆CoVaR 100.70 40.42 487.64 43.26  61.32 23.03 119.87 6.90 
Germany 
Student-t -3.569 0.979 -1.325 -7.915  -5.131 0.806 -3.396 -7.856 
Copula -3.569 0.979 -1.325 -7.914  -5.131 0.806 -3.396 -7.856 
∆CoVaR 100.71 40.42 487.68 43.26  96.77 10.39 137.42 75.64 
Greece 
Student-t -3.536 0.958 -1.313 -7.825  -2.810 0.495 -1.585 -4.556 
Copula -3.560 0.966 -1.325 -7.877  -0.897 0.302 -0.092 -1.916 
∆CoVaR 100.56 40.46 487.67 43.25  -48.43 8.56 -33.43 -88.59 
Ireland 
Student-t -3.511 0.924 -1.313 -7.576  -2.154 1.713 0.000 -6.862 
Copula -3.534 0.936 -1.325 -7.803  -3.001 1.149 -0.896 -6.704 
∆CoVaR 99.98 40.86 487.72 2.56  54.28 18.96 120.16 5.07 
Italy 
Student-t -3.566 0.979 -1.324 -7.913  -5.129 0.806 -3.394 -7.853 
Copula -3.568 0.978 -1.325 -7.904  -3.490 1.063 -0.231 -6.337 
∆CoVaR 100.69 40.42 487.66 43.25  66.13 26.43 118.17 -47.64 
Netherlan
ds 
Student-t -3.566 0.979 -1.324 -7.913  -5.129 0.806 -3.394 -7.853 
Copula -3.569 0.979 -1.325 -7.915  -5.130 0.806 -3.395 -7.855 
∆CoVaR 100.71 40.42 487.64 43.26  96.73 10.39 137.36 75.60 
Portugal 
Student-t -3.556 0.973 -1.313 -7.893  -2.691 0.480 -1.491 -4.386 
Copula -3.568 0.978 -1.325 -7.912  -1.916 0.391 -0.887 -3.285 
∆CoVaR 100.69 40.42 487.65 43.25  -6.75 0.95 -4.95 -10.82 
Spain 
Student-t -3.562 0.977 -1.320 -7.893  -3.253 0.942 -0.622 -6.540 
Copula -3.568 0.977 -1.325 -7.911  -3.793 0.896 -1.760 -6.890 
∆CoVaR 100.70 40.42 487.65 43.26  78.65 13.56 125.20 43.60 
Notes. The table reports descriptive CoVaR and  CoVaR statistics (percentages) at the 99% 
confidence level for the EMU and the VaR at the 99% level for selected countries in the pre- and post-
onset periods using the best copula fit and the multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model with bivariate Gaussian and Student-t distributions. Std., Max 
and Min denote standard deviation, maximum and minimum, respectively. 
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Empirical evidence for the post-onset period also revealed differences for 
CoVaR measures computed using different methods. In general, for the non-crisis 
countries, dependence continued to be strong after the onset of the debt crisis, with 
lower tail dependence changing in some cases. Tail dependence for France was lower, 
explaining the differences between the copula approach and the bivariate Student-t 
approach that can be observed in Figure 3.4 and in Table 3.10. However, tail 
dependence for Germany remained high through different copula specifications, so 
there was no almost difference between the CoVaR values obtained through the BB1 
copula or the Student-t approach. This evidence was similar for the Netherlands, 
with no significant differences. 
Results for the countries in crisis in the post-onset period (Figure 3.4) provide 
striking evidence of differences in CoVaR values as computed using different 
approaches. These differences can be explained in terms of (lower) tail dependence: 
for the Greek and Portuguese markets there was tail independence, so the CoVaR 
values were reduced with respect to the values obtained using a bivariate Student-t 
distribution. Also, when there was (lower) tail dependence, as for the Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish debt markets, CoVaR values computed using the copula 
approach differed with respect to the values for the bivariate Student-t distribution. 
Hence, one of the advantages of using copulas to compute the CoVaR lies in the fact 
that copulas offers more flexibility in terms of fitting dependence (and particularly 
tail dependence) than parametric bivariate distributions; consequently, they yield a 
more accurate CoVaR measure. 
Overall, our results can be summarized as follows. Before the onset of the debt 
crisis, the dynamics and extent of systemic risk in European sovereign debt markets 
were similar, evidence consistent with high co-movement or coupling between debt 
markets. However, debt markets decoupled with the onset of the debt crisis, with 
crisis countries even displaying negative dependence. As a result, systemic risk 
decreased for the GIIPS debt markets, although not for Spain, and systemic risk 
increased for the non-crisis countries. 
Our results have implications for investors in debt markets. First, evidence 
regarding decoupling after the onset of the crisis indicates that investors could find 
hedging opportunities using sovereign debt instruments; this would not have been 
possible before the crisis given the coupling between debt markets. Furthermore, our 
results regarding tail independence and reductions in systemic risk indicate that, 
after the onset of the debt crisis, investors could achieve downside risk reductions 
with a portfolio that included sovereign debt from different countries, mainly for 
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sovereign debt markets that moved independently or in the opposite direction to the 
EMU index. 
3.4.3.1. Systemic risk in the Greek debt market 
Given that Greece was the leading protagonist of the European sovereign debt crisis, 
we estimated the CoVaR and  CoVaR values for each European debt market 
conditional on the VaR of the Greek debt market in order to evaluate the systemic 
impact of the Greek crisis and its differential effects across debt markets before and 
after the onset of the crisis. 
The dynamics of the CoVaR and CoVaR for all debt markets in the pre- and 
post-onset periods (delimited by a vertical line) are depicted in Figure 3.5. As with 
Figure 3.4, for each country we included information on the CoVaR computed using 
the methodology proposed by Girardi and Ergün (2013). The graphical evidence 
indicates that Greek systemic risk was low and relatively stable in the pre-onset 
period. The impact of the global financial crisis is reflected in an abrupt fall in the 
CoVaR value. Summary statistics for the CoVaR and CoVaR (in percentages) for 
the pre-onset period, as reported in Table 11, confirm that the systemic risk of the 
Greek debt market for other European debt markets was, on average, lower for the 
non-crisis countries than for the crisis countries. 
However, Greek systemic risk drastically changed from the onset of the Greek 
debt crisis, with the CoVaR value associated with the crisis countries experiencing a 
huge reduction. In contrast, non-crisis countries experienced an increase in the 
CoVaR value given that they decoupled from the Greek market. Moreover, CoVaR 
volatility increased substantially for the countries in crisis as a result of the 
uncertainty of the debt markets and the implementation of stabilization policies as 
formulated by the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
provoking sudden changes in investor expectations. This evidence on systemic risk 
dynamics is consistent with the idea that the crisis had spillover effects on countries 
with weak economic fundamentals, and also had contagion effects, given that 
countries like France, Germany and the Netherlands—with no great economic 
difficulties—reduced their conditional VaR. As for the crisis countries, Portugal 
experienced the greatest impact, with a fall in its CoVaR values of up to -15% on 
average, followed by Ireland (-13%), Spain (-7.6%) and Italy (-5.9%). This evidence 
suggests that the Greek debt crisis particularly affected Portugal. This is consistent 
with the concerns of the financial media regarding fears that the Greek crisis could 
rapidly extend to Portugal. 
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Table 3.11: Summary CoVaR statistics for selected European debt markets and 
Greece. 
  Before crisis onset  After crisis onset 
Country Method Mean Std. Max Min  Mean Std. Max Min 
France 
Student-t -3.980 1.080 -1.680 -10.249  -3.658 1.312 -1.573 -8.207 
Copula -4.023 1.119 -1.688 -10.274  -1.876 0.716 -0.244 -4.275 
∆CoVaR 114.24 43.10 550.10 4.81  -7.96 2.38 -5.54 -32.22 
Germany 
Student-t -3.621 0.945 -1.271 -8.041  -2.776 0.451 -1.699 -4.437 
Copula -3.643 0.950 -1.284 -8.031  -0.871 0.289 0.060 -1.784 
∆CoVaR 101.31 43.90 597.29 44.24  -49.84 9.18 -33.79 -106.74 
Ireland 
Student-t -5.560 2.175 -2.777 -15.875  -9.927 8.789 0.000 -36.085 
Copula -5.581 2.188 -2.830 -15.958  -13.335 5.624 -4.798 -29.465 
∆CoVaR 146.57 43.82 702.18 89.91  79.62 1.86 84.25 72.99 
Italy 
Student-t -4.402 1.786 -1.641 -14.113  -7.399 3.086 -3.624 -15.844 
Copula -4.252 1.724 -0.563 -13.585  -5.962 2.502 -3.027 -12.845 
∆CoVaR 111.88 28.45 321.86 22.50  59.53 2.30 66.84 47.97 
Netherlands 
Student-t -3.520 1.052 -1.282 -10.208  -3.083 0.754 -1.689 -5.313 
Copula -3.547 1.051 -1.341 -10.226  -1.157 0.357 -0.048 -2.382 
∆CoVaR 100.28 39.38 513.80 44.45  -33.56 6.99 -22.27 -91.58 
Portugal 
Student-t -5.330 2.321 -2.399 -18.431  -23.683 8.277 -6.366 -42.892 
Copula -5.335 2.324 -2.405 -18.432  -15.167 4.916 -3.932 -28.369 
∆CoVaR 135.06 27.30 355.42 82.11  44.68 21.55 95.68 1.14 
Spain 
Student-t -4.203 1.625 -1.692 -14.474  -9.511 2.915 -4.271 -16.290 
Copula -4.214 1.630 -1.696 -14.484  -7.612 2.402 -3.424 -13.192 
∆CoVaR 111.00 32.44 457.41 62.43  52.23 3.07 61.98 45.01 
Notes. The table reports descriptive CoVaR and  CoVaR statistics (percentages) at the 99% confidence level 
for the EMU and the VaR at the 99% level for Greece in the pre- and post-onset periods using the best copula 
fit and the multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model with 
bivariate Gaussian and Student-t distributions. Std., Max and Min denote standard deviation, maximum and 
minimum, respectively. 
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Figure 3.5: CoVaR (left axis) and ∆CoVaR (right axis) estimates for Greece with 
respect to selected countries. 
 
 
 
  
-7.0
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
-0.09
-0.07
-0.05
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.09
Germany
CoVaR Copula CoVaR Student-t ∆CoVaR
Chapter 3 
88 
Figure: 3.5: (Continued) 
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Figure: 3.5: (Continued) 
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Figure: 3.5: (Continued) 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
The recent European sovereign debt market crisis has raised investor and regulator 
concerns regarding the transmission of risk and contagion effects of a potential 
sovereign default in the euro area across debt markets. We measured systemic risk 
for European debt markets using the CoVaR measure, as proposed by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) and generalized by Girardi and Ergün (2013). The CoVaR is 
the VaR of a market conditional on the financial distress of another market, where 
financial distress is measured as the return of the distressed market taking values less 
or equal to its VaR. We computed the CoVaR using copulas given that the (lower) 
tail dependence of a copula function itself provides reliable information on the 
CoVaR. Copulas provide a flexible modelling dependence framework, since they 
provide information on both average and tail dependence; this information is crucial 
to determining the CoVaR value. Computing the CoVaR through copulas, which is 
not computationally cumbersome, involves a two-step procedure. First, from the 
copula function, the cumulative probability for the CoVaR is computed using 
information on the cumulative probability of the VaR of the market in financial 
distress and the confidence level for the CoVaR. Next, the marginal distribution 
function for this cumulative probability of the CoVaR is inverted in order to obtain 
the value of the CoVaR. Using a sample of sovereign bond benchmark price indices 
for France, Germany, the Netherlands and the GIIPS economies and an overall 
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2012, we calculated the systemic risk of the debt markets for each country and the 
systemic risk of the Greek debt market for other European debt markets for the 
periods before and after the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis. Our results 
indicate that European debt markets strongly co-moved in the period before the 
onset of the debt crisis and that systemic risk trends were similar across markets. 
However, after the onset of the crisis, European debt markets decoupled and GIIPS 
markets correlated negatively with the EMU index and displayed lower tail 
dependence. As a result, systemic risk changed dramatically and the value of the 
CoVaR increased. In contrast, for non-risk countries co-movement did not 
substantially change, even though systemic risk increased. We also analysed the 
systemic risk impact of Greek debt, finding that the risk for other European debt 
markets was low and stable before crisis onset. However, thereafter the systemic risk 
of Greek debt increased, mainly with regard to the other countries in crisis and with 
a particularly negative effect on the Portuguese market. The systemic risk of Greek 
debt for the non-crisis countries was reduced as a result of decoupling between the 
Greek debt market and the debt markets of the non-crisis countries. 
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Chapter 4 
4. A Vine-copula CoVaR approach to 
systemic sovereign debt risk for the 
financial sector 
4.1. Introduction 
How would a sovereign default impact on a country’s financial system? Does 
sovereign default in one country impact on the financial systems of other countries? 
In view of the recent global financial and European debt crises, the answers to such 
questions have acquired great importance for investors, regulators and researchers. 
We measured the systemic effect of domestic sovereign debt distress on 
domestic financial systems in European countries in the aftermath of recent financial 
and debt crises. We also measured the systemic effect of potential Greek debt 
distress on the financial systems of other European countries for the same period. 
Recent research has shown that systemic risk in financial markets increases 
considerably in times of crises and has adverse effects that extend to the real 
economy (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). The links between financial crises and 
sovereign debt distress have been specifically documented by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009b, 2010) in relation to sovereign distress spreading to financial systems when 
banks hold substantial government debt in their portfolios (as happened in Italy, 
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Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain).8 Furthermore, sovereign debt portfolios of 
banks in European countries have been demonstrated to show a growing ‘home 
bias’, thereby increasing domestic sovereign holdings with sovereign solvency risk 
(Battistini, et al., 2014) while reinforcing the ‘diabolic loop’ between sovereign 
distress and bank solvency (Brunnermeier et al., 2011). Therefore, accurately 
quantifying how a potential sovereign default in the eurozone could impair the 
performance of a financial system has practical interest for both investors and 
regulators. 
Over the last few years, researchers have developed an increasing number of 
systemic risk measures to account for the impact of failure of a financial institution 
on an entire financial system and vice versa. To capture possible risk spillovers 
between markets, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed using conditional 
value-at-risk (CoVaR), a measure that provides information on the value-at-risk 
(VaR) of a market conditional on the fact that another market is in financial 
distress. This measure was later generalized by Girardi and Ergün (2013) by 
considering the VaR of a market conditional on the fact that another market’s 
returns take values less than or equal to its VaR. Other authors have proposed 
alternative risk measures based on marginal expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 
2010), extreme value theory (De Jonghe, 2010; Zhou, 2010), principal component 
analysis (Billio et al., 2012; Kritzman et al., 2011), default probabilities (Lehar, 
2005; Huang et al., 2009; Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009; Huang et al., 2012; Gray 
and Jobst, 2010; Jin and Nadal De Simone, 2014), distance to default (Saldías, 2013) 
and network analysis (see, e.g., Halaj and Kok Sorensen, 2013; Allen et al., 2010; 
Tarashev et al., 2010).9 
We chose CoVaR because VaR is arguably the risk measure most widely used 
by investors, financial institutions and regulators. We characterized CoVaR systemic 
risk in terms of copulas (Mainik and Schaanning, 2012). Firstly, to account for the 
effects of domestic sovereign debt risk on the domestic financial system, we 
employed bivariate copulas so that CoVaR could be obtained in a two-step 
procedure. Thus, for the confidence level for CoVaR and the cumulative probability 
of the VaR for the domestic sovereign debt market, we could compute CoVaR 
cumulative probability from a copula function. We then inverted the marginal 
                                                 
8 Other channels of transmission of sovereign risk to financial institutions such as collateral, 
rating or guarantee channels were also identified by BIS (2011). 
9 Bisias et al. (2012) offer a comprehensive review on systemic risk measurement. 
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distribution function for this cumulative probability in order to obtain CoVaR. 
Secondly, to account for the systemic impact of a potential Greek sovereign debt 
default on the financial system of other European countries, taking into account the 
link between domestic financial and sovereign debt markets we extended the copula 
CoVaR representation to a multivariate setting by considering the vine-copula 
approach, which allows systemic risk to be assessed using a hierarchical dependence 
construction given by a set of bivariate copulas. In this way, we could take into 
account dependence between the Greek sovereign market and the sovereign and 
financial systems of other countries; hence, the impact of sovereign default—in the 
domestic or Greek or both markets—on the financial system could be obtained in a 
three-step procedure: (1) for the given cumulative VaR probability and for the 
CoVaR confidence level, we computed the cumulative probability for the VaR 
referring to the domestic sovereign debt market from a copula function; (2) using 
the information obtained, we computed the cumulative CoVaR probability from a 
copula function; and finally, (3) we inverted the marginal distribution function for 
this cumulative probability in order to obtain CoVaR. 
We measured the impact of sovereign debt default on the financial systems for 
both eurozone core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) for the 
period 2000 to 2012. Our results point to substantial differences in the systemic 
impact of sovereign debt on financial systems in the periods before and after crisis 
onset. Thus, before the outbreak of either the financial or debt crises (but mainly 
before the debt crisis), we observed that sovereign debt had a positive systemic risk 
impact in the sense that the financial system VaR increased; this increase can be 
explained in terms of the diversification effect of sovereign debt on bank portfolios. 
The Greek sovereign debt played a diversification role across financial systems in the 
entire eurozone excluding Portugal. However, with the onset of the European debt 
crisis domestic sovereign debt was observed to have a negative systemic impact on 
domestic financial systems. Not surprisingly, this effect was common to all the 
peripheral countries. As for the core countries, sovereign debt played a 
diversification role similar to that observed prior to the outbreak of the debt crisis. 
This differentiated sovereign debt impact can be explained in terms of the 
decoupling of debt markets across the eurozone; thus, negative effects on peripheral 
sovereign debt markets were not transmitted to core country sovereign debt 
markets. Furthermore, in examining the systemic impact of Greek sovereign debt 
distress on the financial systems of other countries, we found that although all 
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European financial systems were affected, they were affected to different degrees. 
For core countries Greek sovereign debt continued to play a diversification role 
(even though the intensity was less and more varied); whereas for peripheral 
countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, Greek sovereign systemic effects 
exacerbated the risk associated with their financial systems. 
This study adds to the burgeoning literature on the European sovereign debt 
crisis regarding links between sovereign debt markets and domestic and general 
financial sectors. De Bruyckere et al. (2013), for instance, examined contagion 
between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe through asset, collateral and 
rating channels. Bhanot et al. (2014) investigated how stock returns in the financial 
sector in crisis and non-crisis European countries were affected by the yield spreads 
for Greek sovereign debt. Mink and De Haan (2013) studied the impact of highly 
volatile Greek bonds on European bank stock prices in 2010. Alter and Schuler 
(2012) examined the relationship between sovereign default risk and domestic 
banking risk. For credit default swaps, other studies examined sovereign risk 
contagion among eurozone countries (e.g., Missio and Watzka, 2011; Arezki et al., 
2011; Alter and Beyer, 2012; Caporin et al., 2013) and the effects of sovereign debt 
default risk on the financial stability of the eurozone (Radev, 2012). However, 
underrepresented in this literature is examination of the systemic impact of domestic 
sovereign distress on domestic financial systems or the impact of Greek sovereign 
debt distress on the financial systems of other countries. This chapter fills this gap 
by attempting to quantify CoVaR for financial and sovereign debt crises using 
procedures based on copulas and vine copulas.  
The remainder of the chapter is laid out as follows: in Section 4.2 we outline 
the copula and vine-copula approaches to CoVaR, in Section 4.3 we present our data 
and in Section 4.4 we discuss the results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2. Methodology 
We quantified the systemic impact of the sovereign debt market on the financial 
system using the CoVaR measure as introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
and generalized by Girardi and Ergün (2013). CoVaR for the financial system of a 
country is VaR for the financial system conditional on the fact that the sovereign 
debt market is in financial distress. Let f
t
x  be the returns for the financial system at 
time t and let d
t
x  be the returns for the sovereign debt market at time t. Hence, 
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CoVaR for a confidence level of (1 )   can be formally characterized as the  -
quantile of the conditional distribution of f
t
x  as follows: 
 f f d d d
t t t t
x CoVaR x VaR|, ,Pr( | )     , (4.1) 
where d
t
VaR ,  denotes the VaR of the debt market that measures the maximum loss 
that may be experienced by the sovereign debt market for a confidence level 1    
at time t. Formally, it is the  -quantile of the return distribution for the debt 
market: d d
t t
x VaR ,Pr( )   . 
We can compute CoVaR by determining the quantile of a conditional 
distribution or by using the quantile of an unconditional bivariate distribution, given 
that Eq. (4.1) can be written as: 
 
f f d d d
t t t t
d d
t t
x CoVaR x VaR
x VaR
|
, ,
,
Pr( , )
Pr( )
 

 
 

, (4.2) 
or alternatively as: 
 f f d d d
t t t t
x CoVaR x VaR|, ,Pr( , )     . (4.3) 
4.2.1. CoVaR with copulas 
To obtain CoVaR from Eq. (4.3), we used copulas to characterize the joint 
distribution function.10 Eq. (4.3) can be expressed in terms of the joint distribution 
function of f
t
x  and d
t
x , 
f d
F , , as 
f d d
f d t t
F CoVaR VaR|, , ,( , )    ; furthermore, Sklar’s 
(1959) theorem relates the joint distribution function and the copula as follows: 
 f d
f d t t f d
F x x C u u, ( , ) ( , ) , (4.4) 
where C(·,·) is a copula function, f
f f t
u F x( )  and d
d d t
u F x( )  and where 
f
F  and 
d
F  
are the marginal distribution functions of f
t
x  and d
t
x , respectively. Consequently, we 
can express Eq. (4.3) in terms of copulas as: 
  f d df t d tC F CoVaR F VaR|, ,( ), ( )    . (4.5) 
Hence, CoVaR can be computed from Eq. (5) using a simple two-step procedure: 
                                                 
10 For further analysis on copulas, see Joe (1997) and Nelsen (2006). An overview of copula 
applications to finance can be found in Cherubini et al. (2004). Mainik and Schaanning 
(2012) provide the first representation of CoVaR in terms of bivariate copulas. 
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(1) We obtain the value of f d
f t
F CoVaR |,( )  from Eq. (4.5). Given that f dC u u( , )   , 
where  ,   and 
d
u  are given (note that 
d
u   ), from the copula function 
specification we can solve to determine the value of f d
f f t
u F CoVaR |,( ) . 
(2) From u  we can obtain CoVaR as the quantile of the distribution of f
t
x , with a 
cumulative probability equal to u , by inverting the marginal distribution function 
of f
t
x : f d
t f f
CoVaR F u| 1, ( )


 . 
The use of copulas to obtain CoVaR is appealing because of their flexibility, 
compared to parametric bivariate functions, in allowing separate modelling of the 
marginals and the dependence structure. This is crucial because marginals and 
dependence functions may have different tail dependence characteristics that may 
affect CoVaR. Furthermore, computing CoVaR using the above two-step procedure 
is simple and only requires information on the confidence levels. In fact, tail 
dependence information from copulas naturally provides a measure of CoVaR, even 
though it does so at the limits. 
4.2.2. CoVaR with vine copulas 
Copula CoVaR provides useful information in a bivariate setup. However, since we 
wanted to consider systemic risk affecting several markets—i.e., the impact of Greek 
debt distress on the financial system and on other debt markets—we needed to 
consider dependence in more than two dimensions. We thus considered vine 
copulas,11 since these account for a multivariate distribution that combines three or 
more marginal distributions in a joint distribution. Vine copulas are multivariate 
copulas that are generated through a hierarchical construction that is decomposed 
into a cascade of bivariate copulas called pair-copulas, where each bivariate pair-
copula captures conditional dependence between two variables. Thus, a vine 
construction requires pairs of original variables and pairs of conditional distributions 
of recomputed variables to be modelled. 
Since we wished to analyse the systemic impact of a distressed sovereign debt 
market (Greece) and foreign debt markets on national financial systems, we 
                                                 
11 In the statistical literature vine copulas were introduced by Joe (1997) and were extended 
by Aas et al. (2009) for risk management purposes. Some applications of vine copulas in 
finance include, among others, Chollete et al. (2009), Aas and Beng (2009), Low et al. (2013) 
and Weiß and Supper (2013). 
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considered a vine copula with three variables. Let d
t
x *  be the returns for the foreign 
debt market at time t with distribution function d
d t d
F x u** *( )  . According to 
Bedford and Cooke (2001), the joint density of financial, national and foreign debt 
returns can be expressed as the product of the marginal densities and a set of 
conditional bivariate copulas as: 
 
   
 
f d d f d d d f d
f d d f d d d f d f d
d d f d d
d d d d f d d
f x x x c F x x F x x c F x F x
c F x F x f x f x f x
* * * *
, | * | * | * , * *
* *
, * * *
( , , ) ( | ), ( | ) ( ), ( )
( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

                    
, (4.6) 
where c(·,·) denotes the copula density and f(·) the marginal densities and where 
f d d
c , | *  is referred to as the pair-copula. The conditional distribution functions in Eq. 
(4.6) for any two random variables x and y can be obtained as (Joe, 1997): 
 x y
C F x F y
F x y
F y
, ( ( ), ( ))( | )
( )



. (4.7) 
The decomposition in Eq. (4.6) is a canonical or C-vine copula model where the 
initial node of the vine copula hierarchical structure is given by the returns of the 
foreign debt market;  alternatively, the decomposition in Eq. (4.6) is given by a D-
vine copula model like that represented in Figure 4.1, where each edge corresponds 
to a bivariate copula density and the first three T1 (upper) nodes correspond to the 
marginals. We adopted this hierarchical structure as we were interested in the 
systemic impact of the Greek national debt market on the financial system, given 
specific foreign debt market circumstances, or the systemic effect of sovereign Greek 
debt distress on the financial systems of other countries. 
Figure 4.1: A D-Vine copula hierarchical structure 
 
Now, in this multivariate conditional setup, CoVaR is given by: 
  f f d d d d d dt t t t tx CoVaR x VaR x| , * | * *, ,Pr | ,     , (4.8) 
which can be expressed in terms of the conditional joint distribution function as
 f d d d df d d t tF CoVaR VaR| , * | *, | * , ,,    . Hence, to obtain CoVaR from the vine-copula 
f d* d
f,d* d*,d
(f, d*) (d*, d)
(f, d|d*)
T1
T2
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specification, we have to take into account information provided by the conditional 
joint distribution function of f
t
x  and d
t
x , given, in terms of the copula, as: 
    f d d df d d f d d f d d dF x x x x C u u u u* *, | * , | * * *( | ),( | ) ( | ),( | ) . (4.9) 
Thus, CoVaR can be obtained from the vine copula using a three-steep procedure: 
(1) For given values of  , 
d
u    and 
d
u *  and for the copula specification in Eq. 
(4.9) we can solve to determine the value of 
f d
u u *( | ). 
(2) From the value of 
f d
u u *( | )  we obtain the value of fu  by solving from the 
conditional distribution of f
t
x  given by Eq. (4.7). 
(3) From 
f
u  we obtain CoVaR as the quantile of the distribution of ftx , with a 
cumulative probability equal to u , by inverting the marginal distribution function 
of f
t
x : f d d
t f f
CoVaR F u| , * 1, ( )


 . 
Following this three-step procedure we obtain information on CoVaR of the 
financial system in a given country in a situation of debt market distress, taking into 
account the foreign debt market situation. Furthermore, we can also consider the 
CoVaR of the financial system under two other market scenarios: (1) both national 
and foreign debt markets are distressed ( d d
t t
x VaR ,  and 
d d
t t
x VaR* *, ); (2) only 
the foreign debt market is distressed ( d d
t t
x VaR* *, ). In the first case, the returns in 
both debt markets are below or equal to their VaR figures, so 
d
u    and 
d
u *   , 
where 1    is the confidence level for the VaR of the foreign debt market. The 
estimation procedure is identical to the three-steep procedure described above except 
regarding the value of 
d
u * . In the second case, we only have information on du *    
and for that information we have to obtain the value of 
d
u  from the bivariate 
copula for both debt markets. Once we have this information we follow the three-
step procedure described above. 
4.2.3. Marginal distribution and copula models 
The marginal models and copula specifications used to compute the CoVaR 
measures are described as follows. 
To account for the usual characteristics of financial return distributions, such 
as leverage, fat tails and asymmetries, we considered that the conditional mean and 
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variance of returns (
t
r ) are given by an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
model with p and q lags specified as: 
 
p q
t j t j j t h t
j h
r r0
1 1
 
 
          , (4.10) 
where 
t t t
z    and where 
t
2  is the conditional variance, given by a threshold 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (TGARCH) specification 
(Zakoian, 1994; Glosten et al., 1993): 
 
r m m
t k t k h t h h t h
k h h
b a2 2 2
1 1 1
  
  
          , (4.11) 
where   is a constant, t k
2
  is the GARCH component and t h  is the ARCH 
component. The parameter   captures asymmetric effects in such a way that when 
  0 , the future conditional variance will proportionally increase more following a 
negative shock than following a positive shock of the same magnitude. 
t
z  is a zero 
mean and unit variance i.i.d. random variable that follows a Hansen’s (1994) 
skewed-t density distribution given by: 
 
 
 
t
t
bz a
t
t
bz a
t
bc z a b
f z
bc z a b
( 1) 2
2
1
2 1
( 1) 2
2
1
2 1
1
( ; , )
1
 

 
 

 
  
    
      
 
     
  
, (4.12) 
where   and   are the degrees of freedom parameter ( 2     ) and the 
symmetric parameter ( 1 1    ), respectively. The constants a, b and c are given 
by  a c 214


  , b a2 2 21 3     and    c 12 2( 2)
       . This distribution 
converges to the standard Gaussian as 0   and as  , and to the symmetric 
Student-t distribution as 0   and   is finite. 
We used seven different copula specifications to capture different 
characteristics of dependence: tail independence (Gaussian and Plackett), symmetric 
tail dependence (Student-t) and asymmetric tail dependence (Gumbel, Rotated 
Gumbel, BB7 and Symmetric Joe-Clayton (SJC)). Table 4.1 summarizes the main 
features of all the static and dynamic copula functions that were employed in the 
empirical analysis. 
We estimated the parameters of the marginal and bivariate copula models 
following the inference function for margins procedure (Joe and Xu, 1996), which 
consists of first estimating the parameters of the marginal distributions separately 
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using maximum likelihood and then estimating the parameters of the copula using 
the pseudo-sample observations for the copula given by the probability integral 
transformation of the standardized residuals for the marginals. For the vine copula 
(second tree of Figure 4.1), we recomputed the pseudo-sample observations through 
the copulas estimated for the first tree. This sequential estimation procedure was 
introduced by Aas et al. (2009) and later examined in Hobæk Haff (2013). The 
number of lags in the mean and variance equations for each series was selected 
according to the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and the different copula models 
were evaluated using the AIC adjusted for small-sample bias, as in Breymann et al. 
(2003) and Reboredo (2011; 2013). 
4.3. Data 
We empirically examined the systemic risk effect of sovereign debt distress on the 
financial sector by considering six eurozone core countries (Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE) and Netherlands (NL)) and four 
peripheral countries (Italy (IT), Greece (GR), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES)). For 
each country we considered weekly data for benchmark bond price indices for 10-
year maturities and for the MSCI financial price index. Data were sourced from 
Datastream and Bloomberg and cover the period 23 December 1999 to 25 May 2012. 
With this data we evaluated the following: (1) the impact of a distress event in one 
country’s debt market on its financial sector as represented by the MSCI financial 
index; (2) the impact of a distress event in the Greek debt market on the banking 
sector of other European countries; and (3) the impact of a simultaneous distress 
event in the Greek and domestic debt markets on the domestic financial system. 
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Table 4.1: Copula models. 
Name Copula Parameter Structure dependence 
Gaussian  1 1NC (u,v; ) (u), (v)         No tail dependence. 
U L 0     
Student-t 1 1STC (u,v; , ) T(t (u), t (v))      ,   Symmetric tail dependence: 
 U L 12 t 1 1 / 1            
Gumbel 
   
   
          
1
GC (u,v; ) exp logu log v  
  1  Asymmetric tail dependence: 
L 0  , 
1
U 2 2     
Rotated Gumbel        RG GC (u,v; ) u v 1 C (1 u,1 v; )    1  Asymmetric tail dependence: 
L 0  , 
1
U 2 2     
BB7 
   
1
1
BB7C (u,v; , ) 1 1 1 1 u 1 1 v 1

 
 
 
      
               
       
 
1  , 
0   
Asymmetric tail dependence: 
1
L 2

  , 
1
U 2 2     
Plackett 
 
           
2
P
1
C (u,v; ) 1 1 u v 1 1 u v 4 1 uv
2 1
              
 
 
0  , 
1   
No tail dependence. U L 0     
SJC  U L U L U LSJC JC JCC (u,v; , ) 0.5 C (u,v; , ) C (1 u,1 v; , ) u v 1               
where     U21/ log 2 ,     L21/ log , JCC ( )  is similar to BB7C ( )  
U (0,1)   
L (0,1)   
Upper and lower tail 
independence: U 0   and L 0   
Notes. We also captured time-varying dependence by assuming that copula parameters change over time. For the Gaussian and Student-t copulas, we assumed an 
ARMA(1,q)-type process (Patton, 2006) for the linear dependence parameter 
t
 : q 1 11 (u ) (v )j 1t 1 0 1 t 1 2 t i t iq
               
, where    x x(x) e e
1
1 11

      is the modified 
logistic transformation that keeps the value of 
t
  in (-1,1). For the Student-t copula, 1(x)  is replaced by 1t (x)

. We considered time-varying dependence for the 
Gumbel and Rotated Gumbel copulas by assuming that the parameters reflect the dynamics given by the following equation: q u vt t j t i t iq
1
1 1           . Finally, we 
considered time-varying dependence for the symmetrized Joe-Clayton (SCJ) copula by assuming that U qU 1 u vj 1t 2 0,U 1,U t 1 2,U t i t iq
 
            
 and
L qL 1 u vj 1t 2 0,L 1, L t 1 2,L t i t iq
 
            
, where  x(x) e
1
1 12

   is the logistic transformation used to keep U and L in (0,1)
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3, which display the benchmark bond and MSCI price 
dynamics for all ten countries considered in our analysis, show differences in the size 
and timing of price movements in debt markets and the financial sector that become 
especially relevant after the onset of the debt crisis at the end of 2009. Price 
volatility changed significantly around the period of the recent global financial crisis 
for the MSCI index and around the period of the European debt crisis for debt price 
benchmarks, to degrees that differed significantly across core and peripheral 
countries. A superficial inspection of the data shows that co-movement between debt 
and financial sectors was different across countries and also changed with the onset 
of the debt crisis. Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for bond and financial price 
returns computed on a continuous compounding basis. Average returns were 
similarly close to zero in all the debt and financial markets and standard deviations 
were larger for the financial markets than for the debt markets. Also, differences in 
maximum and minimum values show that price ranges were greater for financial 
markets than for debt markets and greater for peripheral countries than for core 
countries. Negative values for skewness were common across markets and countries, 
with the exception of the Belgian, Italian and Spanish debt markets. All return 
series showed fat tails; the kurtosis statistic took high values and the Jarque-Bera 
test strongly rejected the normality of the unconditional distribution for all the 
series. The Ljung-Box statistic indicated that some return series displayed temporal 
correlation, whereas the ARCH-Lagrange multiplier (ARCH-LM) statistic indicated 
that ARCH effects could be found in all the return series. 
Finally, in order to take into account the effects of the European sovereign 
debt crisis on expected returns and on volatility, we considered a crisis dummy 
variable in the mean and the variance of the marginal models that identified sample 
periods for before (value set to 0) and after (value set to 1) the onset of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. The crucial point here was to determine when the 
European sovereign debt crisis started. Following Bhanot et al. (2014), we took this 
date to be November 2009, as this was when investors became concerned regarding 
the quality of Greek debt; this concern developed in response to the Greek 
government’s revelation that its deficit amounted to 12.7% of gross domestic 
product and not the previously announced 6.7%. The fact that the impact of the 
crisis was different across debt markets is likely to have affected the dependence 
relationships between markets. 
  
A Vine-copula CoVaR approach to systemic sovereign debt risk for the financial… 
105 
Figure 4.2: Time series plot of weekly sovereign bond price indices. 
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Figure 4.3: Time series plot of weekly MSCI financial price indices. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics by country. 
Panel A: Sovereign bond returns 
 
AT BE FI FR DE GR IT NL PT ES 
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
SD 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.022 0.032 0.009 0.008 0.019 0.010 
Maximum 0.046 0.091 0.026 0.039 0.135 0.293 0.082 0.027 0.127 0.079 
Minimum -0.036 -0.079 -0.029 -0.032 -0.142 -0.287 -0.043 -0.029 -0.137 -0.038 
Skewness -0.250 0.217 -0.178 -0.065 -1.487 -1.428 0.917 -0.191 -0.253 1.195 
Kurtosis 6.352 23.528 3.873 4.446 16.739 44.200 14.986 3.722 20.809 14.658 
J-B 310.6* 11400.* 24.03* 56.98* 5343.9* 46122.* 3975.8* 18.05* 8583.1* 3829.6* 
Q(20) 62.252 74.578 26.007 26.139 24.095 128.27 51.085 24.729 106.01 29.106 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.166] [0.161] [0.238] [0.000] [0.000] [0.212] [0.000] [0.086] 
ARCH 10.417 15.579 5.390 8.485 6.275 17.654 4.750 5.330 9.929 10.900 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Panel B: MSCI financial index returns 
 
AT BE FI FR DE GR IT NL PT ES 
Mean 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
SD 0.053 0.051 0.041 0.049 0.046 0.060 0.044 0.065 0.043 0.046 
Maximum 0.240 0.193 0.158 0.195 0.230 0.255 0.228 0.238 0.181 0.181 
Minimum -0.559 -0.474 -0.236 -0.242 -0.344 -0.273 -0.243 -0.536 -0.251 -0.252 
Skewness -2.253 -1.657 -0.643 -0.361 -0.578 -0.236 -0.904 -1.382 -0.744 -0.657 
Kurtosis 25.812 16.381 6.780 6.667 9.697 6.140 8.634 14.291 7.886 7.218 
JB 14620.* 5138.4* 431.21* 377.61* 1248.9* 272.6* 946.7* 3654.2* 705.3* 527.75* 
Q(20) 57.325 51.874 23.286 29.874 31.819 34.312 40.792 53.924 41.351 31.039 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.275] [0.072] [0.045] [0.024] [0.004] [0.000] [0.003] [0.055] 
ARCH 6.349 6.527 4.879 12.142 5.958 8.175 7.166 8.644 11.381 8.497 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.275] [0.072] [0.045] [0.024] [0.004] [0.000] [0.003] [0.055] 
Notes. Weekly data for the period 23 December 1999 to 25 May 2012. JB denotes the Jarque-Bera statistic for 
normality. Q(k) is the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in squared returns computed with k lags. ARCH 
denotes Engle’s LM test for heteroskedasticity computed using 20 lags. An asterisk (*) indicates rejection of the 
null hypothesis at 5%. 
Table 4.3 provides information on the Pearson correlation between debt and 
financial returns for all the countries examined for the entire sample and for the 
periods before and after the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis (dated 
according to the dummy variable). It can be observed that linear dependence 
significantly changed for peripheral countries and Belgium, with correlation changing 
from negative to positive values; for these countries the diversification effect of 
sovereign debt dissipated with the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. However, for 
core countries we observed that the negative correlation values persisted after the 
onset of the crisis. The fact that the diversification role of sovereign debt was not 
changed in this case by the debt crisis has implications for CoVaR as we will discuss 
below. 
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Table 4.3: Pearson correlation between financial returns and sovereign debt returns 
by country. 
 AT BE FI FR DE GR IT NL PT ES 
All series -0.07 0.00 -0.23 -0.21 -0.36 0.27 0.14 -0.24 0.20 0.04 
Before crisis onset -0.13 -0.19 -0.19 -0.25 -0.30 -0.04 -0.13 -0.20 -0.07 -0.21 
After crisis onset 0.07 0.34 -0.37 -0.11 -0.56 0.39 0.52 -0.41 0.31 0.40 
4.4. Empirical results 
4.4.1. Marginal model results 
We estimated the marginal models in Eqs. (4.10)-(4.12) for sovereign debt and 
financial returns, taking the values of the parameters p, q, r and m as those that 
minimize the AIC values for possible lag values ranging from zero to a maximum of 
two. The evidence reported in Table 4.4 indicates that average sovereign debt 
returns displayed no serial correlation and were not affected by the outbreak of the 
debt crisis, except in Greece and Portugal, where impact was negative. The 
empirical volatility estimates confirm that volatility was persistent across different 
national markets and that leverage effects were hardly observed, except in Belgium, 
Finland and Italy. Our results also indicate that debt markets became more volatile 
with the onset of the debt crisis, as reflected by the positive significant effect of the 
dummy variable in the volatility equation. The estimates for the degrees of freedom 
and for the symmetry parameter of the skewed Student-t distribution confirm that 
error terms, as reported in Table 4.1, were not normal and were asymmetric, 
thereby providing evidence on the usefulness of the skewed Student-t distribution in 
modelling asymmetries in the marginals. 
Table 4.5 reports the empirical results for the marginal distribution for the 
MSCI financial returns. Average financial returns showed no correlation and were 
negatively affected by the debt crisis, except in Austria, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Estimates indicate that volatility was persistent and that leverage 
effects were common across financial markets at the 10% significance level. Evidence 
was also found—consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.1—of 
asymmetries and fat tails in the financial return distributions. The last rows of 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show statistics for the goodness-of-fit of the marginal models, 
indicating that neither autocorrelation nor ARCH effects remained in the residuals. 
We also checked the adequacy of the skewed-t distribution model by testing the null 
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hypothesis that the standardized model residuals were uniform (0,1). To that end, 
we employed the well-known Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramér-von Mises and 
Anderson-Darling tests, which compare the empirical and theoretical distributions of 
the standardized residuals. 
The P values for these tests (in the last three rows of Tables 4.2 and 4.3) 
indicate that the null hypothesis of correct specification of the distribution functions 
could not be rejected at the 5% significance level. Thus, evidence from the goodness-
of-fit tests indicates that the marginal distribution models were not mis-specified, 
indicating, in turn, that the copula model could correctly capture dependence 
relationship between markets. 
4.4.2. Copula model results 
We estimated the bivariate copula models reported in Table 4.1 for each country for 
the MSCI financial and sovereign debt return pairs using, as observations, the 
probability integral transform of the standardized residuals from the marginal 
models. The best copula model was that which yielded the best AIC value corrected 
for small-sample bias. In the interest of brevity only graphical evidence is provided.12 
Figure 4.4 shows the estimated parameter values, with parameter dynamics 
represented throughout the sample period for the best copula model fit. Our results 
indicate that static copulas offered a good fit for the core countries (Austria, 
Finland, France and Germany) for which tail independence existed between the 
financial sector and the domestic sovereign debt market. For the remaining two core 
countries (Belgium and the Netherlands), we found dependence to be time-varying 
and well captured by a Gaussian copula and therefore pointing to no evidence of tail 
dependence. The empirical estimates also showed that dependence was negative in 
both Belgium and Netherlands before the onset of the European sovereign debt 
crisis; thereafter, however, dependence continued to be negative for the Netherlands 
but turned positive for Belgium. Regarding the peripheral countries, our evidence for 
dependence pointed to a distinctive pattern in the pre- and post-onset sovereign 
debt crisis periods. Before the outbreak of the crisis, all the peripheral countries 
displayed time-varying negative dependence, as captured by the Student-t copula. 
The evidence for symmetric tail dependence indicated greater co-movement between 
the financial sector and sovereign debt markets for peripheral countries compared to 
the core countries showing evidence of tail independence. Moreover, this evidence 
                                                 
12 Full information on copula model estimations is available on request. 
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indicates that the safe-haven characteristics of sovereign debt differed widely across 
European countries. In considering the post-onset debt crisis period, dependence 
between financial sector and sovereign debt markets changed radically in the 
peripheral countries, turning this dependence positive and also pointing to positive 
tail dependence. 
Table 4.4: Marginal distribution model. Parameter estimates for sovereign debt returns 
by country. 
 
AT BE FI FR DE GR IT NL PT ES 
Mean    
     
  
0
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.001) (0.899) (0.772) (0.935) (1.006) (1.381) (0.653) (1.307) (0.837) (0.931) 
Dummy 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.012* -0.001 0.001 -0.005* -0.002 
 (0.293) (-0.504) (1.285) (0.685) (1.306) (-4.304) (-1.133) (1.392) (-2.884) (-1.656) 
Variance    
     
  
  2.405* 3.632* 1.440* 2.407 1.934* 0.023 1.748* 2.088* 0.025* 2.428 
 
(2.023) (2.221) (2.663) (1.679) (2.840) (1.265) (2.838) (2.420) (2.615) (1.950) 
Dummy 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (132.7) (181.5) (3.180) (7.253) (1.730) (2.812) (22.200) (6.970) (311.3) (154.4) 
1
  0.097* 0.008 0.104* -0.063 0.016 -0.046 -0.033* -0.017 0.052 0.041 
 
(3.325) (0.521) (4.654) (-1.234) (0.409) (-1.764) (-2.630) (-0.654) (1.406) (1.501) 
1
  0.869* 0.808* 0.899* 0.839* 0.897* 0.850* 0.904* 0.867* 0.873* 0.875* 
 (25.370) (19.170) (50.600) (17.610) (46.250) (33.570) (47.090) (32.940) (27.340) (19.410) 
  -0.019 0.206* -0.062* 0.130 -0.008 0.146 0.262* 0.059 0.076 0.090 
 (-0.484) (2.221) (-2.019) (1.957) (-0.146) (0.648) (3.046) (1.126) (1.293) (1.276) 
Asymetry -0.143* -0.144* -0.117* -0.113* -0.112* -0.092 -0.106* -0.108* -0.131* -0.103* 
 (-2.859) (-2.807) (-2.597) (-2.391) (-2.396) (-1.649) (-2.168) (-2.166) (-2.453) (-1.985) 
Tail 13.610* 12.010* 303.905* 
188.795
* 238.863* 6.314 7.025* 
187.282
* 6.718* 9.315* 
 
(143.4) (35.56) (336.9) (176.2) (487.3) (0.283) (77.62) (54.01) (34.63) (79.89) 
LogLik 2268.04 2245.77 2295.66 2256.66 2252.98 2080.39 2255.70 2280.07 2096.94 2208.03 
LJ 17.297 21.544 15.271 19.709 17.380 23.790 21.467 16.569 17.922 20.713 
 
[0.634] [0.366] [0.761] [0.476] [0.628] [0.252] [0.370] [0.681] [0.593] [0.414] 
LJ 2 25.371 23.941 25.771 26.038 23.612 24.936 24.873 20.870 24.303 21.002 
 [0.115] [0.091] [0.105] [0.053] [0.130] [0.096] [0.098] [0.184] [0.145] [0.279] 
ARCH 1.182 1.139 1.193 1.082 1.269 1.305 1.347 0.957 0.961 1.021 
 
[0.263] [0.305] [0.254] [0.365] [0.193] [0.168] [0.143] [0.514] [0.515] [0.435] 
K-S [0.470] [0.466] [0.390] [0.692] [0.507] [0.859] [0.951] [0.893] [0.732] [0.821] 
C-vM [0.855] [0.734] [0.560] [0.826] [0.685] [0.750] [0.962] [0.921] [0.876] [0.870] 
A-D [0.928] [0.881] [0.637] [0.884] [0.744] [0.784] [0.986] [0.918] [0.952] [0.944] 
Notes. The table presents the maximum likelihood estimates and z statistics (in parentheses) for the parameters 
of the marginal models described in Eqs. (4.10)-(4.12) for sovereign debt returns.
 
LogLik is the log-likelihood 
value. LJ represents the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in the residual model calculated with 20 lags. LJ2 
represents the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation in the squared residual model calculated with 20 lags. 
ARCH is Engle’s LM test for the ARCH effect in residuals up to 20th order. K-S, C-vM and A-D denote the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramér-von Mises and Anderson-Darling tests for adequacy of the skewed-t distribution 
model. P values (in square brackets) below .05 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis. An asterisk (*) indicates 
significance at 5%. 
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Table 4.5: Marginal distribution model. Parameter estimates for MSCI financial index 
returns by country. 
 
AT BE FI FR DE GR IT NL PT ES 
Mean    
     
  
0
  0.002 -0.002* 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(1.816) (-2.195) (0.986) (0.308) (-0.193) (0.285) (0.413) (-0.347) (-0.075) (0.436) 
Dummy -0.005 -0.004* 0.000 -0.006* -0.002 -0.023* -0.008* -0.004 -0.013* -0.010* 
 (-1.466) (-3.564) (0.107) (-5.385) (-1.667) (-3.087) (-2.495) (-1.293) (-2.321) (-9.237) 
Variance    
     
  
  0.311* 0.320* 1.387 0.470* 0.573* 0.812* 0.309* 0.413* 0.141 0.323* 
 
(2.825) (3.934) (1.520) (4.008) (2.354) (2.263) (3.375) (2.880) (1.828) (3.952) 
Dummy 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (24.48) (605.1) (-12.43) (2,126.) (298.1) (2.449) (413.9) (221.8) (3.438) 
(2,543.0
) 
1
  0.022 -0.131* -0.004 -0.072* -0.046* 0.039 -0.034 0.001 0.040 -0.098* 
 
(0.844) (-4.408) (-0.089) (-3.444) (-4.043) (1.754) (-1.055) (0.045) (1.283) (-4.921) 
1
  0.886* 0.976* 0.825* 0.882* 0.877* 0.878* 0.899* 0.854* 0.865* 0.937* 
 
(38.350
) (106.40) (8.154) (41.910) (19.550) (23.050) (19.280) (28.570) (39.270) (47.080) 
  0.144* 0.249* 0.184 0.315* 0.240* 0.079* 0.172* 0.269* 0.201* 0.243* 
 (3.577) (5.889) (1.875) (6.663) (3.511) (2.299) (3.731) (4.423) (3.215) (8.007) 
Asymetry -0.119* -0.281* -0.181* -0.240* -0.206* 0.002 -0.308* -0.240* -0.034 -0.243* 
 (-2.217) (-5.427) (-2.633) (-3.578) (-3.034) (0.030) (-4.544) (-3.651) (-0.618) (-3.522) 
Tail 9.932* 6.607* 4.987* 12.954 10.209* 8.243* 9.074* 10.919* 4.108* 12.031* 
 
(23.930
) 
(5.797) (5.387) (1.792) (2.658) (3.297) (3.139) (2.872) (5.621) (2.223) 
LogLik 1228.30 1234.31 1241.51 1205.01 1224.85 1038.06 1302.31 1115.94 1344.75 1245.05 
LJ 29.994 29.200 29.200 22.446 15.402 16.179 23.276 30.962 19.642 12.304 
 
[0.070] [0.084] [0.848] [0.317] [0.753] [0.705] [0.275] [0.056] [0.353] [0.905] 
LJ 2 12.597 14.862 18.958 4.091 5.437 7.826 12.736 18.251 16.612 4.774 
 [0.815] [0.671] [0.394] [1.000] [0.998] [0.981] [0.807] [0.439] [0.550] [0.999] 
ARCH 0.589 0.600 0.702 0.180 0.288 0.377 0.599 0.891 0.778 0.216 
 [0.921] [0.914] [0.826] [1.000] [0.999] [0.994] [0.915] [0.599] [0.742] [1.000] 
K-S [0.887] [0.657] [0.657] [0.706] [0.569] [0.424] [0.390] [0.792] [0.466] [0.686] 
C-vM [0.896] [0.637] [0.651] [0.797] [0.653] [0.598] [0.444] [0.670] [0.632] [0.631] 
A-D [0.939] [0.741] [0.786] [0.859] [0.783] [0.683] [0.541] [0.723] [0.715] [0.731] 
Notes. See Table 4.4. 
The results of the vine-copula model estimates are reported in Figures 4.5-4.7. 
Figure 4.5 displays the dynamics of the parameter estimates for the domestic 
financial system and sovereign Greek debt return pairs. For all the countries, time-
varying copula models offered a better fit than the static copula models. We also 
observed a significant change in dependence for Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain with the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis: the 
dependence parameter increased significantly, marking a change that was consistent 
with the relative importance of sovereign Greek debt for bank portfolios in those 
countries. However, for the other European countries (Austria, Finland, France and 
Germany), dependence was not significantly affected by the debt crisis. Only 
Austria, Finland and the Netherlands showed evidence of tail independence.  
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Figure 4.4: Times series plots for parameter estimates of the best copula fits between 
domestic financial systems and sovereign debt returns. 
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Figure 4.6 displays the dynamics of the parameter estimates for the best 
copula model fit between the domestic sovereign debt and sovereign Greek debt 
return pairs. The evidence was conclusive in the period before the onset of the global 
financial crisis: all the debt markets strongly co-moved with the sovereign Greek 
debt market. However, thereafter—and mainly in the aftermath of the Greek debt 
crisis—European debt markets decoupled from the Greek market (markets in the 
core countries more so than in the peripheral countries), with dependence continuing 
to be positive, although less intense, in the peripheral countries. Of the core 
countries, Belgium was a particular case in that it exhibited high tail dependence at 
a specific times after the Greek crisis; a similar pattern was also observed for the 
Netherlands. 
Figure 4.7 displays the dynamics of the parameter estimates for the best pair-
copula model for domestic financial and sovereign debt returns conditional on 
sovereign Greek debt returns:  f d d f d f d d d d dc F x x F x x, | * | * * | * *( | ), ( | ) . The empirical 
evidence is consistent with the evidence reported for the copula linking domestic 
financial and sovereign debt returns. Evidence on tail independence was found for all 
the core countries except Austria and Belgium. Dependence was static for Finland, 
France and the Netherlands but was time-varying for Austria, Belgium and 
Germany. Moreover, for Austria and Germany, dependence did not experience 
significant changes with the onset of the European debt crisis; in Belgium, 
dependence turned positive after 2011. Regarding peripheral countries, evidence of 
time-varying dependence was found for Italy and Spain and evidence of static 
dependence was found for Portugal. Dependence increased in the aftermath of the 
European debt crisis in Italy and, to a lesser extent, in Spain. 
4.4.3. Systemic risk results 
Using the best copula and vine-copula fits, we obtained the CoVaR for each time 
period following the two- and three-step procedures described above. We obtained 
CoVaR at the 95% confidence level ( 0.05  ), conditional on the VaR for sovereign 
debt returns at the 95% confidence level ( 0.05   or/and 0.05  ). 13  Below we 
present the results for CoVaR using bivariate copulas and then using vine copulas. 
  
                                                 
13 Results at the 99% confidence level, which were consistent with the results reported here, 
are available on request. 
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Figure 4.5: Times series plots for parameter estimates of the best copula fits between 
domestic financial systems and sovereign Greek debt returns. 
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Figure 4.6: Times series plots for parameter estimates of the best copula fits between 
domestic sovereign and Greek sovereign debt returns. 
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Figure 4.7: Times series plots for parameter estimates of the best copula fits between 
domestic financial systems and domestic sovereign debt returns 
conditional on sovereign Greek debt returns. 
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Figure 8 depicts the results for CoVaR dynamics throughout the sample 
period, with the post-onset financial and debt crisis periods indicated as shaded 
areas. For each figure representing the systemic risk of domestic sovereign debt for 
the financial systems for each country, we also included information on the financial 
system VaR so as to allow comparisons between VaR and CoVaR data. For each 
country in Table 6, the first two rows provide information on average VaR and 
CoVaR for the entire sample and for the pre- and post-onset European sovereign 
debt crisis periods (dated according to the dummy variable). Our evidence shows 
that, in the pre-crisis period, domestic sovereign debt played a diversification role for 
domestic financial systems in the eurozone, as indicated by CoVaR figures that were 
greater than VaR figures. This was particularly relevant for the core countries where 
systemic risk reductions were greater than for the peripheral countries. This 
evidence confirms the diversification role played by sovereign debt across European 
countries in the pre-crisis period, with the intensity of this role varying across 
countries depending on the degree of dependence between sovereign and financial 
sector returns and the weight of sovereign debt in bank portfolios. 
As our copula results show, dependence between domestic financial systems 
and sovereign debt markets changed in a different way across countries on the 
outbreak of the sovereign Greek debt crisis that had an impact on systemic risk. 
Figure 4.8 shows that sovereign debt for the core countries continued to play a 
diversification role for the financial system, given that CoVaR figures were, in 
general, greater than VaR figures; the only exception was Belgium, where, from the 
end of 2010, sovereign debt distress increased VaR. Table 4.6 shows, in fact, that 
average CoVaR figures were below the average VaR figures for all the core countries 
(except Belgium). However, for the peripheral countries, the opposite effect was 
observed: the systemic impact of sovereign debt increased considerably for Greece, 
Italy and Portugal, while remaining relatively stable for Spain. This evidence is 
consistent with the change in dependence observed for peripheral countries after the 
onset of the debt crisis; an increase in (positive) dependence swept away the 
diversification effects of domestic sovereign debt on domestic financial systems. 
  
Chapter 4 
118 
Figure 4.8: VaR(f) and CoVaR(f|d) 
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Figure 4.8: (Continued) 
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Figure 4.8: (Continued) 
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Figure 4.8: (Continued) 
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Figure 4.8: (Continued) 
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Table 4.6: CoVaR results. 
  
All Series 
 
Before Crisis Onset 
 
After Crisis Onset 
  
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
Austria VaR (f) -0.068 (0.037) 
 
-0.063 (0.036) 
 
-0.088 (0.034) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.056 (0.030) 
 
-0.052 (0.029) 
 
-0.074 (0.028) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.057 (0.031) 
 
-0.052 (0.027) 
 
-0.076 (0.037) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.061 (0.037) 
 
-0.055 (0.033) 
 
-0.085 (0.043) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.058 (0.035) 
 
-0.052 (0.032) 
 
-0.081 (0.038) 
Belgium VaR (f) -0.080 (0.043) 
 
-0.075 (0.046) 
 
-0.099 (0.021) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.059 (0.041) 
 
-0.048 (0.025) 
 
-0.100 (0.060) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.063 (0.036) 
 
-0.056 (0.030) 
 
-0.089 (0.046) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.058 (0.048) 
 
-0.040 (0.023) 
 
-0.124 (0.058) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.066 (0.045) 
 
-0.051 (0.030) 
 
-0.124 (0.046) 
Finland VaR (f) -0.065 (0.020) 
 
-0.066 (0.021) 
 
-0.060 (0.018) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.047 (0.015) 
 
-0.048 (0.015) 
 
-0.044 (0.013) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.047 (0.015) 
 
-0.048 (0.015) 
 
-0.043 (0.014) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.048 (0.017) 
 
-0.048 (0.016) 
 
-0.048 (0.019) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.052 (0.017) 
 
-0.052 (0.016) 
 
-0.049 (0.019) 
France VaR (f) -0.078 (0.044) 
 
-0.073 (0.045) 
 
-0.095 (0.035) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.055 (0.031) 
 
-0.052 (0.032) 
 
-0.069 (0.025) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.058 (0.035) 
 
-0.055 (0.036) 
 
-0.072 (0.027) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.057 (0.042) 
 
-0.051 (0.040) 
 
-0.081 (0.039) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.062 (0.042) 
 
-0.057 (0.042) 
 
-0.083 (0.039) 
Germany VaR (f) -0.071 (0.036) 
 
-0.071 (0.038) 
 
-0.071 (0.023) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.042 (0.021) 
 
-0.042 (0.023) 
 
-0.043 (0.014) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.031 (0.016) 
 
-0.032 (0.017) 
 
-0.027 (0.009) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.015 (0.023) 
 
-0.013 (0.023) 
 
-0.024 (0.019) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.040 (0.027) 
 
-0.041 (0.029) 
 
-0.036 (0.018) 
Greece VaR (f) -0.091 (0.046) 
 
-0.072 (0.028) 
 
-0.164 (0.024) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.105 (0.080) 
 
-0.068 (0.033) 
 
-0.246 (0.043) 
Italy VaR (f) -0.069 (0.037) 
 
-0.060 (0.035) 
 
-0.103 (0.023) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.075 (0.060) 
 
-0.053 (0.035) 
 
-0.163 (0.054) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.070 (0.045) 
 
-0.056 (0.031) 
 
-0.120 (0.053) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.070 (0.065) 
 
-0.043 (0.024) 
 
-0.173 (0.071) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.067 (0.056) 
 
-0.044 (0.028) 
 
-0.154 (0.050) 
Netherlands VaR (f) -0.091 (0.052) 
 
-0.085 (0.052) 
 
-0.117 (0.042) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.049 (0.033) 
 
-0.047 (0.034) 
 
-0.059 (0.029) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.070 (0.045) 
 
-0.064 (0.044) 
 
-0.091 (0.042) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.066 (0.056) 
 
-0.050 (0.046) 
 
-0.128 (0.050) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.070 (0.056) 
 
-0.055 (0.046) 
 
-0.130 (0.051) 
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Portugal VaR (f) -0.064 (0.044) 
 
-0.050 (0.031) 
 
-0.121 (0.042) 
 CoVaR (f|d) -0.075 (0.067) -0.048 (0.029) -0.180 (0.067) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.076 (0.055) 
 
-0.059 (0.040) 
 
-0.139 (0.058) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.101 (0.078) 
 
-0.071 (0.043) 
 
-0.216 (0.074) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.078 (0.066) 
 
-0.052 (0.033) 
 
-0.179 (0.067) 
Spain VaR (f) -0.073 (0.038) 
 
-0.066 (0.038) 
 
-0.099 (0.021) 
 
CoVaR (f|d) -0.067 (0.043) 
 
-0.057 (0.038) 
 
-0.107 (0.037) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) -0.066 (0.035) 
 
-0.057 (0.030) 
 
-0.100 (0.029) 
 
CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) -0.065 (0.045) 
 
-0.052 (0.037) 
 
-0.113 (0.043) 
 
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) -0.068 (0.043) 
 
-0.057 (0.037) 
 
-0.111 (0.037) 
Notes. The table reports descriptive VaR and CoVaR statistics at the 95% confidence level for domestic financial sectors and 
sovereign debt markets for selected countries in the overall sample and in the pre- and post-onset crisis periods using the best 
copula fit. CoVaR(f|d) denotes the CoVaR of the financial system conditional on the fact that the sovereign debt market is in 
distress; CoVaR(f|d = 0.05,d*) denotes the same but takes into account the effect of the sovereign Greek debt market situation. 
CoVaR(f|d,d* = 0.05) denotes the CoVaR of the financial system given the situation in the domestic debt market and 
conditional on the fact that the sovereign Greek debt market is in distress; finally, CoVaR(f|d = 0.05,d* = 0.05) denotes the 
CoVaR of the financial system conditional on the fact that the domestic and sovereign Greek debt markets are in distress. 
Values reported are mean and standard deviations (SD). 
 
Figure 4.9 depicts CoVaR dynamics throughout the sample period for the 
vine-copula model, whose CoVaR was computed under three scenarios: (1) the 
CoVaR of the domestic financial system given domestic sovereign distress 
(represented by d = 0.05) and the current situation in the Greek debt market (not 
necessarily in distress); (2) the CoVaR of the domestic financial system given the 
domestic sovereign debt market situation (not necessarily in distress) and the 
sovereign Greek debt market in distress (represented by d* = 0.05); and (3) the 
CoVaR of the domestic financial system when domestic and Greek sovereign debt 
markets are both in distress (represented by d = 0.05 and d* = 0.05, respectively). 
Average CoVaR data for the three scenarios for the entire sample and in the pre- 
and post-onset European sovereign debt crisis periods are provided in the last three 
rows for each country in Table 4.6. Our results indicate that the systemic effect of a 
potential Greek sovereign debt default on the financial system of Austria, Finland, 
France and Germany was negligible, as CoVaR computed under scenarios (1) and 
(2) were no different from the CoVaR obtained without considering the impact of 
Greek sovereign debt. This evidence is consistent with the fact that the Greek debt 
market decoupled from the debt markets and financial systems of those core 
countries (as shown by our previous copula results). Note also that the weight of the 
Greek sovereign debt in the bank portfolios of those countries was relatively low 
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(Battistini et al., 2014). However, for Belgium and Netherlands the systemic impact 
of the Greek sovereign debt crisis was different: CoVaR figures under scenarios (2) 
and (3) were lower than for the CoVaR figures obtained without considering the 
impact of Greek sovereign debt. For Belgium, this evidence was a consequence of the 
change in the dependence relationship between Greek sovereign debt, domestic debt 
and financial systems; for the Netherlands, this was also the consequence of Dutch 
investments in sovereign Greek debt (see Blundell-Wignall and Slovik, 2010). 
Regarding the peripheral countries, the systemic impact of sovereign Greek debt 
distress had a limited impact in Spain, given that the CoVaR under scenarios (2) 
and (3) did not differ greatly from the CoVaR obtained when the impact of Greek 
sovereign debt was not considered. For Italy and Portugal, however, systemic 
impact was patent. 
Figure 4.9: Results for CoVaR (f|d = 0.05,d*), CoVaR (f|d,d* = 0.05) and CoVaR 
(f|d = 0.05,d* = 0.05). 
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Figure 4.9: (Continued)
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Figure 4.9: (Continued) 
 
 
  
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11
France
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05)
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11
Germany
CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*) CoVaR (f|d,d*=0.05) CoVaR (f|d=0.05,d*=0.05)
Chapter 4 
128 
Figure 4.9: (Continued) 
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Figure 4.9: (Continued) 
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Overall, our CoVaR results indicate that: (1) domestic sovereign debt had a 
systemic impact on domestic financial systems across European countries that was 
positive in the sense of increasing financial system VaR; (2) this systemic effect 
changed with the onset of the European debt crisis in peripheral countries like 
Greece, Italy and Portugal, where the systemic impact of sovereign debt increased, 
thereby reducing financial system CoVaR; (3) the systemic impact of a potential 
Greek debt default was mainly limited to Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Portugal; and finally, (4) for the remaining countries this event does not add much 
value with respect to the CoVaR figures obtained without considering the impact of 
the Greek sovereign debt. 
4.4.4. Statistical test 
Empirical evidence reported in Section 4.3 describes systemic risk behaviour before 
and after crisis onset with no testing of statistical significance. Below we use 
statistical significance testing to draw robust conclusions on sovereign debt systemic 
risk for financial systems. We compared cumulative distribution for VaR and/or 
CoVaR data using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) bootstrapping test as proposed by 
Abadie (2002) and applied by Bernal et al. (2014) to compare CoVaR figures. This 
test measures the difference between two cumulative quantile functions relying on 
the empirical distribution function and without considering any underlying 
distribution function. It is defined as: 
    mn x m n
mn
KS sup F x G x
m n
1
2 
  
 
, (4.13) 
where  mF x  and  nG x  are the cumulative VaR or CoVaR distribution functions, 
respectively, and n and m are the size of the two samples. With this statistic we 
tested four hypotheses, both before and after crisis onset: 
 Hypothesis 1: H0: CoVaR(f|d) > VaR(f) 
 Hypothesis 2: H0: CoVaR(f|d) > CoVaR(f|d=0.05,d*) 
 Hypothesis 3: H0: CoVaR(f|d) > CoVaR(f|d,d*=0.05) 
 Hypothesis 4: H0: CoVaR(f|d) > CoVaR(f|d=0.05,d*=0.05) 
The first hypothesis examines whether sovereign debt contributes to downside risk 
in the financial system, whereas the remaining hypotheses examine whether systemic 
risk in one country is affected by the Greek debt market under normal or 
exceptional circumstances (denominated scenarios (1)-(3) above). Table 4.7 reports 
results for the KS statistic and the associated bootstrap p-values under the null 
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hypothesis, yielding statistical evidence that is fully consistent with the empirical 
evidence described in Section 4.3. 
Table 4.7: Significant test for differences in risk measures. 
  Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 
  Stat p-value Stat p-value Stat p-value Stat p-value 
Austria Before crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.033 0.567 0.024 0.724 0.033 0.544 
 After crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.098 0.271 0.008 0.988 0.008 0.990 
Belgium Before crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.010 0.950 0.285 0.000 0.031 0.601 
 After crisis onset 0.256 0.000 0.158 0.032 0.000 0.999 0.023 0.925 
Finland Before crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.056 0.194 0.109 0.002 0.021 0.782 
 After crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.105 0.219 0.030 0.873 0.030 0.874 
France Before crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.017 0.842 0.085 0.022 0.027 0.652 
 After crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.030 0.878 0.023 0.923 0.015 0.964 
Germany Before crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.308 0.000 0.816 0.000 0.101 0.004 
 After crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.752 0.000 0.722 0.000 0.526 0.000 
Greece Before crisis onset 0.081 0.031       
 After crisis onset 0.895 0.000       
Italy Before crisis onset 0.010 0.949 0.041 0.413 0.213 0.000 0.291 0.000 
 After crisis onset 0.617 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.150 0.046 0.248 0.000 
Netherlands Before crisis onset 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.999 0.083 0.029 0.000 0.999 
 After crisis onset 0.008 0.988 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.999 
Portugal Before crisis onset 0.029 0.636 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.999 0.002 0.997 
 After crisis onset 0.504 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.113 0.179 
Spain Before crisis onset 0.010 0.950 0.025 0.718 0.106 0.003 0.015 0.878 
 After crisis onset 0.128 0.110 0.113 0.173 0.045 0.751 0.023 0.924 
Note. The bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests whether the values of different risk measures follow (or not) the 
same cumulative distribution function (CDFs) in the pre- and post-onset crisis periods. The null hypotheses are 
considered as follows:  
Hypothesis 1 = H0: CoVaR(f|d) > VaR(f) 
Hypothesis 2 = H0: CoVaR(f|d) > CoVaR(f|d=0.05,d*) 
Hypothesis 3 = H0: CoVaR(f|d) > CoVaR(f|d,d*=0.05) 
Hypothesis 4 = H0: CoVaR(f|d) > CoVaR(f|d=0.05,d*=0.05). 
4.5. Conclusions 
We have provided empirical evidence, for the periods before and after the onset of 
the recent financial and debt crises, of (1) the systemic impact of domestic sovereign 
debt distress on domestic financial systems in European countries and (2) the 
potential systemic impact of a distressed Greek debt market on the financial systems 
of other European countries. We measured systemic risk using the CoVaR measure, 
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as proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and generalized by Girardi and 
Ergün (2013). CoVaR measures VaR for a financial system conditional on the fact 
that the debt market is in distress. We computed CoVaR data using both bivariate 
and vine-copula models, given that copulas can flexibly account for dependence, 
most especially for tail dependence, which is crucial to determining CoVaR data. To 
estimate CoVaR, we adopted (1) a two-step procedure that accounted for the 
impact of domestic debt distress on domestic financial systems, and (2) a three-step 
procedure that—taking into account the link between domestic financial and 
sovereign debt markets—accounted for the systemic impact of a potential Greek 
default on the financial systems of other European countries. 
Using a sample of MSCI financial and sovereign bond benchmark indices for 
six eurozone core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) and four peripheral countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) for 
the period 2000 to 2012, we estimated copula and vine-copula models—in order to 
characterize the dependence structure between financial and sovereign debt 
markets—and then computed CoVaR figures. Our evidence indicates that there were 
substantial differences in the systemic impact of sovereign debt in the periods before 
and after the onset of the European debt crisis. In the pre-onset period sovereign 
debt was observed to have a positive systemic risk effect in reducing financial system 
VaR. This impact can be explained in terms of the diversification effect of sovereign 
debt on bank portfolios, with even Greek sovereign debt playing a diversification 
role across financial systems in the eurozone, except in Portugal. However, in the 
post-onset crisis period the picture was quite different, with domestic sovereign debt 
having a negative systemic impact on domestic financial systems as CoVaR fell. This 
evidence was found for all the peripheral countries; as for the core countries, 
sovereign debt continued to play a diversification role, having a positive impact on 
CoVaR. This positive impact can be explained by the fact that the negative impact 
of the sovereign debt crisis was not fully transmitted to the core countries. 
Regarding the systemic impact of Greek sovereign debt distress on the financial 
systems of other countries, we found all financial systems in Europe to be affected, 
but to differing degrees. For core countries, after the onset of the debt crisis, Greek 
sovereign debt continued to play a diversification effect, although this effect was less 
intense and more varied. In the four peripheral countries, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, the systemic effects of Greek sovereign debt distress exacerbated 
financial system risk. 
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Anexo: resumen en castellano 
Las crisis financieras, que se manifestaron de manera peculiar a principios del siglo 
XXI, están afectando al sistema financiero mundial en sus estructuras 
fundamentales. Entre estas crisis podemos destacar la explosión de la burbuja 
tecnológica (2000), la crisis de las hipotecas subprime (2007) y, por último, los 
recientes problemas de las deudas soberanas en Europa (2010). Estas crisis han 
revelado la complejidad del sistema financiero global y la rapidez de la propagación 
del riesgo entre los mercados. Así, tanto inversores, reguladores como investigadores 
están muy interesado en desarrollar una medida veraz y precisa del riesgo de 
trasmisión entre activos y entre mercados. Desde la óptica de los inversores, que 
tratan de diseñar una cartera correctamente divesificada, el riesgo de contagio es 
esencial dado que ello provoca un cambio en relación de dependencia entre los 
mercado. Desde el punto de vista de los reguladores, la propagación del riesgo es 
importante en la medida que permite focalizar la atención en el mantenimiento y 
desarrollo de nuevas regulaciones tales que permitan intrerrumpir el proceso de 
transmisón de riesgos, aplicar impuestos a las transacciones, o bien aplicar 
restricciones en el tipo de transacciones realizadas en los mercados, tales como las 
ventas en descubierto. No obstante, reconociendo las importantes deficiencias en la 
supervisión financiera, la Comisión Europea y el Banco Central Europeo (BCE) 
crearon la Junta Europea de Riesgo Sistémico (JERS) a finales de 2010 con el 
objetivo de supervisar a nivel macro prudencial el sistema financiero Europeo y 
prevenir y mitigar cualquier riesgo de propagación dentro del sistema financiero. 
En la literatura financiera se ha caracterizado el riesgo sistémico desde ópticas 
diversas. Así, De Bandt y Hartmann (2000) lo definen "como el riesgo de sufrir 
efectos sistémicos en el sentido fuerte", donde el "sentido fuerte" significa la difusión 
de noticias sobre una institución que tiene un impacto adverso sobre uno o más 
instituciones sanas de manera secuencial. Por otro lado, Furfine (2003) distingue 
entre dos tipos de riesgo sistémico: "El primer tipo es el riesgo de que uno shock 
financiero provoca a un conjunto de mercados o de instituciones a fallar 
simultáneamente en su funcionamiento eficiente; mientras que el segundo tipo de 
sistémico se refiere al riesgo de que el fallo de una o un pequeño número de 
instituciones se transmitirán a los demás debido a los vínculos financieros explícitos 
entre las instituciones". Sobre la base del modelo teórico propuesto por Diamond y 
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Dybvig (1983), Acharya (2009) definen el riesgo sistémico "como el riesgo de quiebra 
conjunta resultante de la correlación de los rendimientos en el lado del activo de los 
balances de los bancos". Billio et al. (2010) argumenta que "el riesgo sistémico puede 
realizarse como una serie de incumplimientos correlacionados entre las instituciones 
financieras, que ocurre en un lapso de tiempo corto que consecuentemente provoca 
una retirada de liquidez y la pérdida generalizada de confianza en el sistema 
financiero en su conjunto". Las dos últimas definiciones introducen la idea de que la 
inversión común entre los bancos genera correlación y "efecto manada", lo que genera 
el riesgo sistémico. El Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), el Banco de Pagos 
Internacionales (BPI), el Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera (FSB) y el BCE centran 
su atención en particular sobre las consecuencias del riesgo sistémico para la 
economía real. Así, el FMI, BIS, FSB (2009) afirman que el riesgo sistémico es "la 
interrupción en el flujo de los servicios financieros que (1) es causado por un 
deterioro en la totalidad o en partes del sistema financiero; y (2) tiene el potencial 
de tener consecuencias negativas graves para la economía real". El BCE (2009) 
conceptualiza el riesgo sistémico como un "riesgo de que la inestabilidad financiera se 
vuelve tan extendida que afecta el funcionamiento del sistema financiero hasta el 
punto que el crecimiento económico y el bienestar social sufren materialmente". Las 
anterior lista de definiciones apunta a la complejidad del tema y el desafío que 
enfrentan los inversores, los reguladores y los investigadores en el intento de medir la 
complejidad y la dinámica del riesgo sistémico. 
En los últimos años, los investigadores han desarrollado una serie de medidas 
de riesgo sistémico que se refieren a diferentes canales de propagación de riesgos 
sistémicos. Se pueden identificar tres medidas principales: (1) medidas de riesgo 
sistémico que capturan el efecto contagio y la exposición entre las instituciones; (2) 
las medidas de riesgo sistémico que cuantifican el efecto dominó entre el sector 
financiero y la economía real; y (3) las medidas de riesgo sistémico entre los sectores 
financiero y público y viceversa. 
La primera categoría se refiere al riesgo de una quiebra de una institución 
financiera que tiene un efecto contagio o dominó sobre otras instituciones a través de 
las transacciones e interconexiones que unen estas instituciones. Muchos 
investigadores han centrado su atención en este tipo de propagación de riesgos. 
Segoviano y Goodhart (2009) crearon un índice de estabilidad bancaria que evalúa la 
dependencia interbancaria para los eventos extremos. Acharya et al. (2010) 
utilizaron una medida sistémicas y marginales del expected shortfall (ES) para 
cuantificar el riesgo y la contribución individuales de las instituciones financieras al 
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riesgo. Allen et al. (2010) propusieron una medida de riesgo sistémico agregado - 
denominado CATFIN - para predecir la disminución de la actividad crediticia 
bancaria agregada con seis meses de antelación. Huang, Zhou y Zhu (2009, 2010, 
2012) propusieron una medida de distress insurance premium (DIP). Adrian y 
Brunnermeier (2011) propusieron el valor en riesgo condicional (CoVaR) para 
capturar posibles efectos del riesgo de rebosamiento entre las instituciones 
financieras. Del mismo modo, Brownless y Engle (2012) desarrollaron una medida de 
riesgo sistémico, denominada SRISK, que representa la cantidad de capital necesario 
para restaurar los recursos propios mínimos requeridos. Billio et al. (2012) 
propusieron cinco medidas de riesgo sistémico para capturar el contagio y los efectos 
de exposiciones en la relaciones entre las instituciones financieras. Girardi y Ergün 
(2013) propusieron un nuevo enfoque para cuantificar el CoVaR utilizando para ello 
la densidad conjunta para el sistema financiero y los rendimientos de la institución 
financiera. Finalmente, Halaj et al. (2013) sugirió una simple medida de análisis de 
red, llamado el índice de probabilidad sistémica (SPI). 
Respecto a las medidas del efecto dominó, varios autores han desarrollado una 
medida de riesgo sistémico basado en la interdependencia entre el sector financiero y 
la economía real. Reinhart y Regoff (2009a) mostraron que el riesgo sistémico en los 
mercados financieros aumenta en los períodos de crisis y tiene efectos adversos que 
se extienden a la economía real. Giesecke y Kim (2011) desarrollaron el modelo de 
intensidad de los impagos (DIM) para capturar los efectos indirectos a través de la 
compleja red de relaciones con la economía real. De Nicolò y Lucchetta (2010) 
propusieron un modelo de PIB-en-riesgo para cuantificar el impacto entre la 
macroeconomía, los mercados financieros y los intermediarios. 
Por último, en relación con el riesgo sistémico generado entre los sectores 
público y financiero, Reinhart y Rogoff (2009b, 2010) documentaron como se 
propaga la situación de estrés de la deuda soberana en el sistema financiero cuando 
los bancos mantienen una cantidad sustancial de deuda pública en su cartera. Alter 
y Schuler (2012) examinaron la relación entre el riesgo de quiebra de la deuda 
soberana y los bancos nacionales. Mink y De Haan (2013) analizaron el impacto de 
la elevada volatilidad de los bonos griegos sobre los precios de las acciones bancarias 
europeas en 2010, mientras que De Bruyckere et al. (2013) estudiaron el contagio 
entre los bancos y el riesgo de quiebra soberana en Europa a través de los canales de 
activos, garantías y calificación. Bhanot et al. (2014) investigaron el impacto de los 
cambios en los diferenciales de rendimiento de la deuda soberana griega sobre los 
rendimientos de las acciones en el sector financiero. Finalmente, Battistini et al. 
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(2014) demostraron que las carteras de deuda soberana de los bancos europeos 
revelaron un aumento en las posiciones en deuda nacional durante la crisis reciente, 
con las tendencia de la deuda soberana doméstica a crecer en línea con el riesgo de 
solvencia soberana. 
Además, también se han propuesto medidas alternativas de riesgo, distintas de 
los incluidas en las tres categorías mencionadas anteriormente. Así, Engle y 
Manganelli (2004) desarrollaron el modelo autorregresivo conditional para medir el 
valor en riesgo (CAViaR) proponiendo el uso de la regresión cuantil para capturar el 
comportamiento en las colas de los rendimientos. Por otra parte, De Jonghe (2010) 
utilizó la teoría del valor extremo para medir la exposición al riesgo sistémico de los 
bancos. Asimismo, Zhou (2010) utilizó la teoría de valores extremos multivariante 
para cuantificar el riesgo sistémico, analizando la relación entre el tamaño de la 
institución y su importancia sistémica. Finalmente, Krizman et al. (2011) 
desarrollaron una medida de riesgo sistémico llamado el ratio de absorción que se 
basa en el análisis de componentes principales (ACP). 
Considerando diferentes medidas propuestas en literatura, en esta tesis el 
análisis se centrado en la medida de riesgo sistémico dada por el CoVaR (Adrian y 
Brunnermeier, 2011; Girardi y Ergün, 2013). De acuerdo con Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011), /s iCoVaR   es el VaR del sistema financiero en su conjunto, 
denotado por s, condicionado al hecho de que una institución i se encuentra en una 
situación de stress financiero medido por su VaR, i iX VaR . Además, estos autores 
también definen la contribución del riesgo sistémico de una institución como la 
diferencia entre el CoVaR bajo una situación de la stress financiero y el CoVaR en 
una situación de normalidad, lo que denominan como delta CoVaR ( CoVaR ). 
Recientemente, Girardi y Ergün (2013) propoene calcular el CoVaR asumiendo que 
el evento condicionado a un stress financiero es i iX VaR . Esta metodología 
considera el estrés de manera más severa, capturando así la información que está por 
debajo de las colas pesadas de la distribución de probabilidad de los rendimientos.  
Los objetivos de investigación en esta tesis - potencialmente de interés para los 
inversores, los reguladores y los investigadores en la misma medida - son los 
siguientes: 
1. Cuantificar el riesgo sistémico para las entidades financieras españolas teniendo en 
cuenta el efecto cuantitativo sobre el valor en riesgo condicional (CoVaR) con el fin 
de evaluar cómo la posición de fragilidad financiera de una institución financiera 
particular podría poner en peligro el funcionamiento de otras instituciones 
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financieras, pudiendo así determinar la cantidad de capital regulatorio que una 
institución financiera necesitaría para cubrir su exposición a este tipo de riesgo. 
2. Examinar el riesgo sistémico en los mercados de deuda soberana europeos y 
evaluar cómo este riesgo cambió con el inicio de la reciente crisis de la deuda 
soberana. El fin es determinar cómo el deterioro de la situación financiera en un 
mercado particular de deuda puede alterar el funcionamiento de otros mercados de 
deuda. 
3. Medir el impacto sistémico de la deuda soberana doméstica en una situación de 
estrés sobre el sistema financiero nacional de los países de la zona Euro y de una 
potencial situación de dificultad en el mercado de deuda griega sobre los sistemas 
financieros de otros países del Euro durante la reciente crisis financiera y de deuda, 
con el fin de comprender cuál ha sido el impacto de una situación de peligro de la 
deuda nacional sobre el sistema financiero nacional y el impacto de una situación de 
dificultad de la deuda soberana griega sobre otros sistemas financieros. 
Para dar cumplimiento a estos objetivos, la tesis se organiza del siguiente 
modo. En el capítulo 1 se proporciona un breve repaso de las medidas cuantitavas 
del riesgo sistémico presente en la literatura. En el capítulo 2 se cuantifica el riesgo 
sistémico generado por las principales entidades financieras españolas en la reciente 
crisis financiera mundial y en la crisis europea de la deuda soberana. Para ello, se 
cuantifica el CoVaR utilizando la regresión cuantil, el modelo multivariante 
generalizado de heteroscedasticidad condicional autorregresiva (MGARCH) y las 
funciones cópula. También se describe un nuevo enfoque basado en la cópula para 
calcular el valor del CoVaR, dado que la cópula son modeladores flexibles de la 
distribución conjunta y son particularmente útiles para caracterizar el 
comportamiento de las colas que nos proporciona información crucial para el cálculo 
del CoVaR. En el capítulo 3 se estudia el riesgo sistémico en los mercados de deuda 
soberana en Europa antes y después del inicio de la crisis de la deuda griega, 
considerando, como medida de riesgo sistémico el CoVaR caracterizado y calculado 
usando cópulas. Finalmente, en el capítulo 4 se investiga - utilizando la medida del 
CoVaR caracterizado y calculado usando cópulas y vine cópulas – el efectos sitémico 
del mercado de dedua soberana sobre los sistemas financieros nacionales en Europa, 
así como el riesgo sistémico de una potencial dificultad en el mercado de deuda 
griega sobre los sistemas financieros de otros países europeos antes y después del 
inicio de las recientes crisis financieras y de la deuda. 
Los resultados obtenidos indican que: 
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1. La medida CoVaR para el riesgo sistémico muestra tendencias que son 
consistentes para todas las instituciones financieras españolas en todo el periodo de 
muestreo, teniendo valores bajos en los períodos de las crisis, principalmente en 
torno a la crisis financiera mundial reciente. También se observa que el CoVaR 
calculado utilizando la regresión cuantil no es capaz de capturar la dinámica del 
riesgo sistémico ya que carece de la flexibilidad necesaria para adaptarse a los 
períodos de crisis en los que la volatilidad es alta, subestimando así el riesgo 
sistémico. Los enfoques MGARCH y cópula son más flexibles en la identificación de 
los períodos de crisis, con reducciones significativas en el valor CoVaR. También se 
observa que las funciones cópula reflejan un mayor riesgo sistémico que el enfoque 
MGARCH. Esta evidencia es consistente con el hecho de que la dependencia de la 
cola es capturada por una cópula mejor que por una función de distribución 
paramétrica multivariante. En general, las mediciones de riesgo sistémico nos 
permiten concluir que el riesgo sistémico aumentó durante la crisis financiera, pero 
no con la misma intensidad para todas las instituciones estudiadas; afectando 
principalmente a las instituciones más grandes que asumían cada vez más 
importancia sistémica y se consideraban demasiado interconectadas para quebrar. 
Estos resultados tienen implicaciones para la política regulatoria dirigida a 
determinar los requisitos de capital óptimas y los cambios cíclicos en valor, sobre 
todo para las grandes entidades financieras. 
2. Los resultados del análisis del riesgo sistémico para los mercados de deuda 
soberana europea indican que estos mercados estuvieron altamente conectados en el 
período anterior a la crisis de la deuda y que las tendencias temporales del riesgo 
sistémicos fueron similares en todos los mercados. Sin embargo, tras el inicio de la 
crisis, los mercados de deuda europeos se desacoplaron y los países denominados 
GIIPS (Grecia, Italia, Irlanda y Portugal) tuvieron una correlación negativa con el 
índice de la UEM, mostrando una menor dependencia en las colas. Como resultado, 
el riesgo sistémico cambió drásticamente y el valor de la CoVaR aumentó. 
Contrariamente, para los países que no fueron afectados por la crisis el co-
movimiento no cambió sustancialmente, a pesar de que el riesgo sistémico aumentó. 
Además, también se constata que el riesgo sistémico de la deuda griega sobre otros 
mercados europeos fue bajo y estable antes de la llegada de crisis, mientras que a 
partir del inicio de la crisis el riesgo sistémico de la deuda griega aumentó 
principalmente para los países en situación crisis, con un efecto particularmente 
negativo en el mercado portugués, y no tuvo efectos sistémicos sobre los países que 
no fueron afectado da la crisis debido al desacoplamiento entre el mercado de la 
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deuda griega y los mercados de deuda de los países que no fueron afectados por la 
crisis. 
3. Nuestra evidencia indica que existen diferencias sustanciales en el impacto 
sistémico de la deuda soberana sobre el sistema financiero en los períodos antes y 
después del inicio de la crisis. En el período previo al estallido de la crisis, deuda 
soberana tiene un efecto sistémico positivo al generar reducciones del VaR en el 
sistema financiero, excepto para el caso de Portugal. Este impacto puede ser 
explicado en términos del efecto diversificación de la deuda soberana en la cartera de 
los bancos, incluso con la deuda soberana griega. Sin embargo, en el período 
posterior al inicio de la crisis se constata que la deuda soberana doméstica tiene un 
impacto sistémico negativo en los sistemas financieros nacionales, con reducciones 
impotantes en el valor del CoVaR. Esta evidencia es común para todos los países de 
la periferia de la zona Euro; mientras que para los países no periféricos la deuda 
soberana siguió desempeñando un papel de diversificación, tenniendo un impacto 
positivo en el CoVaR. Este efecto positivo puede ser explicado con el hecho de que el 
impacto negativo de la crisis de la deuda soberana no se transmitió completamente a 
los países de la zona no periférica. En cuanto al impacto sistémico de la deuda 
soberana griega en los sistemas financieros de los otros países, se muestra que todos 
los sistemas financieros europeos podrían verse afectados, pero en diferentes grados. 
Así, para los países no perféricos, después del inicio de la crisis de la deuda, la deuda 
soberana griega siguió desempeñando un efecto de diversificación, aunque este efecto 
fue menos intenso, con la excepción de Bélgica y Holandalos Países Bajos donde se 
observa un incremente del efectos sistémico de la deuda soberana griega sobre el 
sistema financiero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
